GRAHAM COUNTY, ARIZONA, by and Through Its Board of Supervisors, VIRGIL McEUEN, J. W. GREENHALGH and VICTOR CHRISTENSEN, Petitioner,
SHELDON G. DOWELL, J. W. ANGLE, JOHN M. SCOTT, E. C. SEALE and R. G. LANGMADE, as Members of the Arizona State Highway Commission of the State of Arizona, Respondents
Original proceeding in Mandamus. Alternative writ quashed.
Mr. Chas. Rogers, Mr. Jesse A. Udall and Mr. Benjamin Blake, for Petitioner.
Mr. Joe Conway, Attorney General, and Mr. A. R. Lynch, his Assistant, for Respondents.
[50 Ariz. 222] LOCKWOOD, J.
Graham County, hereinafter called petitioner, acting by and through its board of supervisors, filed in this court an original petition for a writ of mandamus against the members of the Arizona State Highway Commission, hereinafter called respondents, directing them to supervise and maintain a certain highway in Graham County.
Petitioner bases its claim on chapter 26 of the act of the 13th Legislature of Arizona, which reads as follows:
"An Act Relating to highways, and directing the state highway commission to designate as a state route the Pima-Hot Springs-Fort Thomas and Pima Bryce-Safford road.
"Be it Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona:
"Section 1. Designation of highway. The Arizona highway commission is authorized and directed to designate as a state route, include in the state highway system, and assume supervision and maintenance of that certain highway in Graham County beginning at the northern boundary of the city of Pima and running in a northerly direction to and crossing the Gila river at Bryce, one fork thereof thence running in a southeasterly direction to the Gila river crossing and connecting with highway 70 at the city of Safford, the other fork running from Bryce in a northwesterly and westerly direction to the towns of Eden and Indian Hot Springs and crossing the river and connecting with highway 70 at Fort Thomas."
[50 Ariz. 223] It alleges that, after said bill became a law, the highway commission did designate the highway set forth in chapter 26, supra, as a state route, and adopted a budget which included $8,270 for the maintenance thereof, but that it then immediately adopted another resolution suspending the maintenance until it was determined whether chapter 26, supra, was constitutional. It is alleged that such chapter imposed a mandatory ministerial duty upon the respondents, and that they should be compelled by this court to fulfill that duty.
The alternative writ was issued in due course, and respondents in their return thereto demurred, moved to quash the writ, and answered, and the case was submitted to the court upon the petition, the return and the briefs accompanying the same.
There are a number of interesting questions of procedure raised by the pleadings, not the least important of which is whether or not Graham County is entitled to maintain an action of this kind. We think, however, that the case can and should be determined on the issue of whether or not chapter 26, supra, is a valid exercise of legislative power. Section 19, ...