Original proceeding in Mandamus. Alternative writ made peremptory.
Mr. H. S. McCluskey and Mr. Fred O. Wilson, for Plaintiff.
Mr. Joe Conway, Attorney General, and Mr. Earl Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, for Defendant.
Mr. Geo. T. Wilson and Messrs. Minne & Sorenson, Amici Curiae.
[60 Ariz. 466] McALISTER, C.J.
The Sixteenth Legislature on March 6, 1943, enacted chapter 26, known as the "Arizona Occupational Disease Disability Law," and placed upon the plaintiff the duty of putting it into effect and enforcing it. In doing this the commission rented and received a typewriter from Walsh Bros., of Phoenix, Arizona, for an agreed consideration of $4 per month beginning May 3, 1943. In order to pay the rental therefor, plaintiff filed with defendant for audit and payment, on May 19, 1943, the original claim of Walsh Bros., duly verified and approved by it against the appropriation of $7,500, made to the Industrial Commission in section 62 of chapter 26, and on the 8th day of June, 1943, the auditor, acting upon the theory that all uncertain claims should be first passed upon by the court, rejected it upon the ground that the effective date of the act was uncertain and for the further reason that the attorney general advised that some provisions of the act may be in conflict with the Constitution. Section 64 Makes the effective date Jyly 1, 1943, and the act itself carries the emergency clause and was passed and signed by the governor on March 6, 1943. On June 9, 1943, this court, upon petition of the Industrial Commission, issued an alternative writ of mandamus commanding the auditor to draw her warrant in payment of the claim, or to show cause why she had not done so.
In reply to the writ the defendant takes the position that section 8, article 18, of the Constitution of the state does not authorize the enactment of the "Arizona Occupational Disease Disability Law" because it directs the legislature to enact a Workmen's Compensation Law by which compensation shall be paid to any workman, or his dependents, if injury or death, "from any accident arising out of, and in the course of," such employment is caused by the risk or danger of such employment; whereas section 3, of chapter [60 Ariz. 467] 26, contemplates that compensation will be paid on account of industrial diseases "arising out of or in the course of" his employment, these expressions being dissimilar in meaning. Section 13, of the act imposes liability upon the employer for payment of compensation to an employee only for an occupational disease "arising out of his employment" and section 35 reads:
"Sec. 35. Occupational Diseases -- Proximate Causation. The occupational diseases hereinafter defined shall be deemed to arise out of the employment, only if there is a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease, and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, and which can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause, and which does not fome from a hazard to which workmen would have been equally exposed outside of the employment. The disease must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. The disease need not have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a natural consequence."
In the light of this section, it is obvious that chapter 26 was not designed to compensate for diseases which arise as the result of an accident, but in order to be compensable the disease "must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a natural consequence." A constitutional provision "directing the Legislature to enact particular legislation necessarily carries with it no authority to enact something not included therein." Home Accident Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 34 Ariz. 201, 269 P. 501, 503. The plaintiff does not claim, however, [60 Ariz. 468] that section 8, article 18, of the Constitution, authorizes the passage of the Arizona Occupational Disease Disability Law, but merely that it does not prohibit the enactment of it by the legislature in the exercise of its police power. So it is conceded that the legislature could not look to section 8, article 18, for authority to enact the occupational disease law.
The defendant contends further that the Arizona Occupational Disease Disability
Law, as enacted, abrogates the right of action for, and limits the amount of, damages for injuries, in contravention of section 31, article 2, and section 6, article 18, of the state Constitution. These provisions read as follows:
Section 31, Article 2: "No law shall be enacted in this state limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death ...