[89 Ariz. 308] M. V. Gibbons, St. Johns, Kerr, Conn & Davis, Oklahoma City, Okla., and Gust, Rosenfeld, Divelbess & Robinette, Phoenix, for appellant.
Earl Platt, St. Johns, for appellee.
[89 Ariz. 309] STRUCKMEYER, Chief Justice.
This is an action by W. J. McCray, hereinafter referred to as appellee, against the
Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., Apache Oil and Helium Corporation and another. From a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee and an order declaring a lien, Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc. brings this appeal.
On July 9, 1955 appellee and the Apache Oil and Helium Corporation entered into an oral contract whereby appellee was to furnish a well drilling rig, fully manned for the purpose of drilling a well or wells at locations to be chosen by the Apache Oil and Helium Corporation. Appellee moved his rig to a location chosen and operated it until March 31, 1956, at which time the Apache Oil and Helium Corporation requested the rig to be shut down. It was further requested that the rig be not moved from the location and that it 'stand-by', available for further service. Appellee kept his rig at the well location until September 8, 1956 at which time Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc. acquired an interest in the property.
On September 9, 1956 appellee commenced drilling operations at the same location under a contract with appellant. Thereafter on December 4, 1956 appellee filed a claim for lien against the land upon which the well was located and subsequently brought this action alleging that both the Apache Oil and Helium Corporation and appellant, Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc. claimed some interest in the well property. Appellee asserted a balance due from the Apache Oil and Helium Corporation of $3,311.09 for work done prior to April 1, 1956 and further claimed an amount in the sum of $5,500 for stand-by time between April 1, 1956 and September 8, 1956. Judgment was entered in favor of appellee on both items and a lien was declared for the amount of $8,811.09.
Appellee here claims certain procedural irregularities in an effort to defeat the appeal. First, that under Rule 75(a) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.., an appellant must in the designation of contents of record on appeal designate a transcript of the record or it may not be considered on appeal. Appellant's designation does not include a specific reference to the transcript. It does provide:
'Notice Is Hereby Given, That Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., one of the Defendants hereinabove named and Appellant herein, deems the entire record in this matter, as necessary to present the questions involved on appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, as follows:'
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(Here follows an itemization of the papers desired. The transcript of testimony was not specified.)
[89 Ariz. 310] Appellant argues that the requirements of Rule 75(a) were actually, if not technically, met and that no one was misled by its designation. The relevant portion of Rule 75(a) is:
'* * * Every document and other object filed in an action shall constitute a part of the record thereof. Within ten days after an appeal to the supreme court is perfected, the appellant shall serve upon the appellee and file with the superior court a designation of the portions of the record, proceedings, and evidence to be contained in the record on appeal * * *.'
We observe that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from which our rules were derived, governing the preparation of the record on appeal should be liberally construed to promote justice and relieve against undue hardship. Hall v. Gordon, 74 App.D.C. 24,119 F.2d 463. The very purpose of the rules is to obviate delays and to administer speedy justice. Pinkerton v. Pritchard,71 Ariz. 117, 223 P.2d 933, and they should be construed in a reasonable manner to effectuate this ...