Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Barnes v. Raytheon Technical Services Company, LLC

United States District Court, Ninth Circuit

May 28, 2013

Terrence Barnes, Plaintiff,
v.
Raytheon Technical Services Company, LLC, an Arizona Corporation, Defendant.

ORDER

CINDY K. JORGENSON, District Judge.

Pending before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted and Failure to Join a Party Under Rule 19. (Doc. 10). The Court finds these matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f).

I. Background

Defendant Raytheon Technical Services Company ("Raytheon") is a technology company that specializes in defense, homeland security, and aerospace matters. Raytheon contracts with the United States Army's ("Army") Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instruction, known as the Warfighter Field Operations Customer Support Program. (Doc. 10-1). Through this Army program, Raytheon trains Army personnel in the use of unmanned aircraft systems. Id. Raytheon has a subcontract with General Dynamics Information Technology ("GDIT"). Id. GDIT provides the Army with training personnel. Id.

Plaintiff Terrence Barnes, is a disabled former employee with GDIT. (Doc. 1). Initially Plaintiff was hired as a flight instructor. Id. As a flight instructor he was required to pass a FAA flight physical. Id. In 2008, Plaintiff was promoted to Site Lead, which included administrative, logistical, and instructional oversight for flight operations. Id. A year later in 2009, Plaintiff was promoted to a higher instructional position and remained as the Site Lead. Id. During this time, Plaintiff maintained his FAA flight physical because he continued to have instructional duties. Id. In May 2011, Plaintiff was promoted to General Manager II, which was a full-time management position.[1] Id. Plaintiff ceased all instructional duties. Id. On July 26, 2012, GDIT terminated Plaintiff's employment because he was unable to pass the FAA flight physical. Id.

On November 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Raytheon discriminated against Plaintiff in violation Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that on June 26, 2012, Raytheon directed GDIT to order Plaintiff to pass a FAA flight physical within thirty days. After Plaintiff was unable to pass the FAA flight physical within the thirty day limit, Raytheon directed GDIT to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff alleges that Raytheon was aware that Plaintiff was disabled and held a managerial position, which did not require his ability to pass the FAA flight physical. Plaintiff further alleges that Raytheon only required Plaintiff to pass the FAA flight physical, which it knew he could not pass, with the intention of terminating his employment.

On February 14, 2013, Raytheon filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted and Failure to Joint a Party Under Rule 19. (Doc. 10). Plaintiff filed his opposition on March 8, 2013. (Doc. 14). Raytheon filed a Reply on March 22, 2013. (Doc. 17).

II. Private Right of Action

Raytheon argues that Plaintiff's cause of action pursuant to Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act must be dismissed because section 503 does not permit a private right of action. In response, Plaintiff argues that since he is seeking relief against Raytheon under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, he may allege Raytheon's violations of sections 503 and 504. Plaintiff does not cite any authority to support his position.

Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act contains an express enforcement scheme. Accordingly, violations of section 503 are handled by the Department of Labor. See 29 U.S.C. §793. "Section 503 does not expressly provide that its provisions may be enforced through a private right of action." Fisher v. City of Tucson, 663 F.2d 861, 862 (9th Cir. 1981). Additionally, there is no implied private right of action under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 867. Further, Plaintiff may not circumvent the prohibition of a private right of action under section 503 by asserting his section 503 claim via section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Meyerson, v State of Ariz., 709 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983) vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1095 (1984). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief pursuant to section 503.

III. Failure to Join a Party

Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure "19 governs compulsory party joinder in federal district courts." E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 400 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2005). Rule 19 "provides a three-step process for determining whether the court should dismiss an action for failure to join a purportedly indispensable party." U.S. v. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 688 (9th Cir. 1999). The first step is to determine if the absent party is necessary. Id. Pursuant to Rule 19,

[a] person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of subject matter ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.