Court of Appeals of Arizona, Second Division, Department B
Not for Publication Rule 28, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PIMA COUNTY Cause Nos. C20121596 and C20121558 Honorable Jan E. Kearney, Judge Honorable Ted B. Borek, Judge.
Glenn Lockerby Tucson In Propria Persona.
Michael G. Rankin, Tucson City Attorney By Michael W.L. McCrory Tucson Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
PETER J. ECKERSTROM, Judge.
¶1 In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff/appellant Glenn Lockerby challenges trial court rulings that disposed of two actions he had brought against defendants/appellees City of Tucson and its employees (collectively "the city"). We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 Before commencing the present actions, Lockerby was involved in a dispute with the City of Tucson concerning two alleged land use code violations. The enforcement action ultimately terminated in his favor after Lockerby appealed to the superior court. He then initiated two civil actions against the city.
¶3 In an amended pro se complaint filed in C20121596, Lockerby alleged the city had committed various torts against him during "a 27-year pattern of harassment" that had deprived him of his constitutional rights as well as the "quiet enjoyment of his properties." The city filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, for dismissal. After a hearing on the motion, Judge Kearney found the complaint to be "of the 'kitchen sink' variety, " meaning it was "difficult to ascertain with any certainty just what legal claims are intended." She consequently dismissed the complaint on the ground that it did not comply with Rule 8(a), Ariz. R. Civ. P., by stating clear and concise legal claims.
¶4 Alternatively, Judge Kearney determined that all but one of Lockerby's claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitation. The remaining claim—one for malicious prosecution based on a citation issued for motor homes that had been kept on Lockerby's property—concerned the earlier city court judgment that had been appealed to the superior court. Judge Kearney determined that the enforcement action had been supported by probable cause; hence, the elements of the malicious prosecution claim could not be met as a matter of law. Accordingly, because the complaint's deficiencies could not be cured by further pleading, she dismissed the amended complaint without allowing additional amendments.
¶5 In the other cause of action, C20121558, Lockerby filed an amended complaint alleging claims of trover, conversion, and conspiracy, and seeking damages resulting from the city's prior enforcement action. Specifically, he sought to recover damages for the loss of his jungle gym and motor home. Judge Borek granted the city's motion for judgment on the pleadings. He determined that conspiracy is not a cognizable tort and that Lockerby's trover and conversion claims similarly were not cognizable because he did not allege that the city had exercised control over his property.
¶6 Although Judge Kearney's signed order did not expressly dismiss Lockerby's complaint with prejudice, the order nonetheless was an involuntary dismissal that operated as an adjudication on the merits. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 41(b). We therefore have jurisdiction over Lockerby's appeal from this order pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) or (3). Compare Thiele v. City of Phoenix, 232 Ariz. 40, ¶¶ 8-9, 301 P.3d 206, 208 (App. 2013) (dismissal with prejudice appealable as final judgment), with Tripati v. Tucker, 222 Ariz. 372, ¶ 2, 214 P.3d 1013, 1014 (App. 2009) (dismissal with prejudice appealable under former A.R.S. § 12-2101(D), now subsection (A)(3), as order determining action and preventing final judgment); see also Flynn v. Johnson, 3 Ariz.App. 369, 373, 414 P.2d 757, 761 (App. 1966) (noting dismissal order may be appealed if trial court expressly denies leave to ...