Court of Appeals of Arizona, First Division, Department C
Not for Publication -103(G) Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.; Rule 28 ARCAP
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. JV555602 The Honorable Bradley H. Astrowsky, Judge
William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney Phoenix. By Joneice S. Burnett, Deputy County Attorney Attorneys for Appellee.
Christina Phillis, Maricopa County Public Advocate Mesa By Arthur K. Merchant, Deputy Public Advocate Attorneys for Appellant.
JON W. THOMPSON, Judge
¶1 Anthony B. (Juvenile) appeals from the juvenile court's order requiring him to register as a sex offender. Juvenile argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to order him to register, and that the order was an abuse of the juvenile court's discretion. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In February 2010, Juvenile's three-year-old cousin, K.B., reported that Juvenile had, among other things of a sexual nature, "touched his private to her private." Juvenile was fourteen years old at the time. Juvenile subsequently entered a plea agreement in March 2011, pleading delinquent to solicitation to commit molestation of a child, a class 4 felony. At the disposition on June 21, the juvenile court placed Juvenile on probation and ordered him to adhere to both the conditions of standard probation and sex offender addendum terms 1-7 and 9-19. Juvenile was also ordered to participate in, cooperate with, and complete all sex offender treatments, including placement at a treatment facility. A decision regarding whether Juvenile needed to register as a sex offender pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 13-3821(D) (2010) was deferred by the juvenile court.
¶3 Juvenile was first placed at A New Leaf treatment facility and, upon successful discharge from A New Leaf, was placed in the U-Turn Foundation treatment facility (U-Turn). Shortly before his discharge from U-Turn, however, it was discovered that Juvenile was in possession of a number of pornographic images, thereby violating sex offender addendum term 10. Juvenile was unsuccessfully discharged from U-Turn, and his probation officer filed a petition alleging two counts of probation violation: Count One, Juvenile failed to participate in, cooperate with, and successfully complete all sex offender treatments by being unsuccessfully discharged from his placement; Count Two, Juvenile possessed sexually oriented material as deemed inappropriate by the treatment facility's staff.
¶4 Pursuant to a plea agreement, the juvenile court adjudicated Juvenile as being in violation of probation on Count Two and dismissed Count One with prejudice. The juvenile court then ordered Juvenile committed to the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections and that he register as a sex offender. Juvenile timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) (2007), 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), and 12-2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2012).
¶5 Juvenile argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to order sex offender registration because the judge signed the June 21, 2011 minute entry, adopting its one-year deferment, leaving the juvenile court without jurisdiction to order sex offender registration since the year had passed. Whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to order sex offender registration is subject to de novo review. David S. v. Audilio S., 201 Ariz. 134, 136, ¶ 4, 32 P.3d 417, 419 (App. 2001).
¶6 When a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of a sentence and its minute entry can be resolved by examining the record, the "[o]ral pronouncement in open court controls over the minute entry." State v. Ovante, 231 Ariz. 180, ¶ 38, 291 P.3d 974, 982 (2013) (citation omitted) (oral pronouncement stating two sentences would run consecutively controlled over minute entry stating they would run concurrently). It is possible for a minute entry to be affirmed over an oral pronouncement, but that occurs when the record demonstrates the oral pronouncement to be in error. See State v. Bowles, 173 Ariz. 214, 216, 841 P.2d 209, 211 (App. 1992) (trial court made oral statements on two previous occasions clearly supporting minute entry over oral pronouncement).
¶7 Here, the one-year deferment is only mentioned in the June 11 minute entry, with no support anywhere else in the record. Consequently, the oral pronouncement controls, which stated only that ...