G. MURRAY SNOW, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendant City of Phoenix's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 10.) For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
This case arises out of a supervisor's instructions concerning and objection to sexually offensive materials in the workplace and his employer's response to that objection. Plaintiff Frank Cheatham has been employed with Defendant City of Phoenix's (the "City") Fire Department (the "Fire Department") as a Firefighter since 1979. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 7.) Cheatham was promoted through the ranks to the Deputy Chief Shift Commander of the South Shift Command. ( Id. ¶ 9.)
In November 2009, Cheatham observed sexually suggestive drawings depicting male genitalia openly displayed in Fire Station 1. ( Id. ¶ 11-12.) The Fire Department had a policy prohibiting such materials in the workplace. ( Id. ¶ 13.) Cheatham admonished the Station supervisors that such drawings were inappropriate and would not be tolerated in the future. ( Id. ¶ 15.) After Cheatham's admonishments, the supervising Battalion Chief asked Cheatham to refrain from taking his meals at the Station. ( Id. ¶ 16.)
Soon after Cheatham's complaint, he observed a t-shirt with another drawing of male genitalia displayed at the Fire Department's gym. ( Id. ¶ 18.) Cheatham also received in the interoffice mail two small pieces of pasta resembling male and female genitalia; written on the female genitalia was Cheatham's first name. ( Id. ¶ 19-20.)
In February 2010, Cheatham began hearing rumors that he would be removed from his position at the Fire Department. ( Id. ¶ 21.) Then, in March 2010, Cheatham was informed by his supervisors that he had been removed from his position and transferred to the Safety Division. ( Id. ¶ 22.) Cheatham's job responsibilities in the Division are less significant than those he had as Deputy Chief Shift Commander. ( Id. ¶ 27.) As Commander, Cheatham had three full-time staff members, supervised four battalion chiefs, and indirectly supervised approximately 440 firefighters. ( Id. ¶ 25.) In the Safety Division, his job duties are undefined and do not involve supervision of firefighters, personnel management, or direct reports. ( Id. ¶ 23-24.) He also has less favorable working hours than before. ( Id. ¶ 26.)
The constructive demotion and sexual harassment of Cheatham was in retaliation to his complaints of sexually offensive materials at the Fire Department. ( Id. ¶ 29.) Even after Cheatham's repeated complaints to authorities at the City, the City did not properly investigate the complaints, halt the harassment, or remediate the retaliation. ( Id. ¶ 31.) The harassment and retaliation had a negative impact on Cheatham's psychological well-being along with his employment and continues to do so. ( Id. ¶ 33.)
Cheatham filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination against the City on June 1, 2010. ( Id. ¶ 34.) Cheatham received a Right to Sue Letter on January 10, 2013, ( id. ¶ 36.), and filed this action against the City on March 29.
In his Complaint, Cheatham alleges retaliation and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. ( Id. ¶¶ 1, 29.) He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k). ( Id. ¶ 36.) The City now moves to dismiss the Complaint. (Doc. 10.) In his Response to the City's Motion, Cheatham abandons his prayer for punitive damages and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Doc. 13 at 10.)
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) is designed to "test the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action"; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While "a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations... it must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, a plaintiff must do more than employ "labels, " "conclusions, " or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id.
When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), "[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted ...