Court of Appeals of Arizona, First Division, Department D
Not for Publication – Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County Cause No. CV2008-000526 The Honorable John C. Rea, Judge
Gregory Best Phoenix In Propria Persona
Goldman & Zwillinger PLLC Tempe By: Scott H. Zwillinger Attorneys for Appellees
ANDREW W. GOULD, Presiding Judge
¶1 Plaintiff Gregory Best appeals from the order granting Magdaleno and Barbara Cortez (collectively "Cortez") summary judgment on Best's breach of contract claim. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶2 The following material facts are undisputed. Cortez owns a home in South Phoenix ("Property") . On March 20, 2004, Best and Cortez signed an option agreement granting Best the exclusive right until March 23, 2009 to purchase their Property for $75, 000.00 ("Option Contract"). Best paid Cortez $50.00 as "Earnest Money." On April 7, 2004, Cortez sent Best a "Cancellation of Exclusive Purchase Option Contract" by certified mail, stating Cortez "terminate[d]" the Option Contract on March 31 ("Cancellation Letter"). Best refused to accept the Cancellation Letter, and Cortez recorded it with the Maricopa County Recorder's Office.
¶3 On March 26, 2006, Best informed Cortez by letter that he was exercising his right under the Option Contract to purchase the Property, stating: "Let this also serve as a Notice of my intent to purchase, as of this date. Take your earnest money to the title company of your choice. Provide them with a copy of our contract and my mailing address, so I can successfully exercise my right to purchase, immediately." Cortez did not comply with Best's demands.
¶4 On January 7, 2008, Best filed a complaint alleging he had "exercised the [O]ption[, ]" and Cortez breached the Option Contract by "refus[ing] to cooperate within [sic] Plaintiff to complete the terms of the Option Contract despite written demand that they do so." For relief, Best sought damages and specific performance.
¶5 Cortez moved for summary judgment, arguing Best provided no evidence that he was ready, willing and able to pay Cortez $75, 000.00, and the trial court should therefore dismiss the complaint based on Best's inability to perform under the Option Contract. The trial court denied Cortez's motion,  and Best thereafter unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment. The trial court subsequently reconsidered its decision and granted Cortez summary judgment after Cortez presented it with three recent memorandum decisions ("Memo Decisions") from this court. Based on the Memo Decisions, the trial court concluded that Best, under similar option agreements with other homeowners, had failed to provide evidence that he could perform under the applicable agreements; as a result, the trial court determined that Cortez was also entitled to summary judgment on Best's breach of contract claims. Best timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (West 2013) and -2101(A) (West 2013).
¶6 Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Brookover v. Roberts Enters., Inc., 215 Ariz. 52, 55, ¶ 8, 156 P.3d 1157, 1160 (App. 2007) . "We will affirm the superior court if its ruling was 'correct for any reason, even if that reason was not considered' by the court." Parkinson v. Guadalupe Pub. Safety Ret. Local Bd., 214 Ariz. 274, 277, ¶ 12, 151 P.3d 557, 560 (App. 2007) (quoting Glaze v. Marcus, 151 Ariz. 538, 540, 729 P.2d 342, 344 (App. 1986)).
¶7 Best argues the court erred as a matter of law in granting Cortez summary judgment. He contends that because Cortez repudiated the Option Contract, he was excused as a matter of law from having to actually tender the $75, 000.00 payment to Cortez. Best further argues that Cortez' alleged repudiation also excused him from having to prove he was ready, willing and able to tender the $75, 000.00 payment. As a result, Best asserts he is entitled to "specific performance." ¶8 "[A]n option agreement must be strictly construed, in that it must be exercised in exact accord with its terms and conditions. . . . If an option expresses a manner in which payment is to be made, the optionee must ...