G. MURRAY SNOW, District Judge.
Pending before the Court are Motions to Dismiss from the following Defendants: Thomas E. McCauley, Jr., and the State Bar of Arizona (Doc. 13), the State of Arizona (Doc. 16), David Cavazos and the City of Phoenix (Doc. 25), Maricopa County (Doc. 29), and the Federal Defendants (Doc. 56). Also pending are Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant Maricopa County's Motion to Dismiss and Warn Regarding Sanctions (Doc. 31), Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the City of Chandler's Answer to the Complaint and Defendants McCauley and the State Bar of Arizona's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32), Plaintiff's Motion to Hold an Authentication Hearing and Request for Production from Defendant Maricopa County (Doc. 60), Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Judge's Order (Doc. 71), and Plaintiff's Motion for a Default Judgment against Defendant Marc Adair (Doc. 88). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants' Motions and dismiss Plaintiff's Motions.
This case arises from an alleged conspiracy between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of State, the United States Armed Forces Reserve Officers' Training Corp (ROTC), the State of Arizona, the cities of Chandler and Phoenix, Arizona, the State Bar of Arizona, Maricopa County, employees of those entities, and other individuals. Plaintiff alleges that the FBI declared him to be a terrorist suspect because of his religious beliefs and his past meetings with an alleged terrorist organization. Plaintiff asserts that he spoke with FBI agents and that the agents decided that they did not want him to continue to work as an airline pilot. (Doc. 1 ¶ 111.) To achieve this end, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to have him arrested for stalking a teenager, herself working as part of the conspiracy, and to deny him process throughout his criminal case. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 156-57.) He asserts that the FBI eventually determined that he was not a terrorist, but remained committed to preventing him from working as an airline pilot because of his religious beliefs. (Doc. 1 ¶ 154.) During the course of his criminal case, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to warrantless arrests (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 133, 139), warrantless searches of his home ( Id. ), and other violations. Plaintiff states that all criminal charges against him were eventually dismissed, except for charges related to his failure to provide law enforcement with his name. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 142-43.) As a result of this conspiracy and the ensuing criminal prosecution, Plaintiff alleges that he eventually lost his job as an airline pilot. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 156, 158-59.)
Plaintiff has filed multiple federal lawsuits related to these claims. In April 2012, Plaintiff filed a federal suit against the FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and other federal defendants alleging the conspiracy described above. First Amended Complaint, Jamali v. FBI, et. al., No. 12-CV-752-SRB (D. Ariz. April 24, 2012), Doc. 8. In his first action, Plaintiff brought a variety of constitutional claims under Section 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and assorted state law claims. ( Id. ) On November 7, 2012, Judge Bolton granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to establish personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Order, Jamali v. FBI, et. al., No. 12-CV-752-SRB (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2012), Doc. 37.
A month later, in December 2012, Plaintiff filed another federal suit, arising out of the same alleged conspiracy, against a variety of state, county, and municipal defendants. Complaint, Jamali v. Hyatt, et. al., No. 12-CV-2702-FJM (D. Ariz. Dec. 12, 2012), Doc. 1. Plaintiff alleged ninety-five causes of action that included claims under state statutes, the Arizona Constitution, federal statutes, and the federal constitution. ( Id. ) On January 9, 2013, Judge Martone denied Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the action as frivolous. Order, Jamali v. Hyatt, et. al., No. 12-CV-2702-FJM (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2013), Doc. 8.
Two months later, in March 2013, Plaintiff filed yet another federal suit apparently arising from the same alleged conspiracy, this time brought against Maricopa County and a number of defendants who Plaintiff alleged improperly published Plaintiff's name and image on the internet following his allegedly unlawful arrest. Complaint, Jamali v. Maricopa County, et. al., 13-CV-613-DGC (D. Ariz. March 26, 2013), Doc. 1. Judge Campbell dismissed Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on October 21, 2013. Order, Jamali v. Maricopa County, et. al., 13-CV-613-DGC (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2013), Doc. 130.
Plaintiff filed the instant federal suit on May 23, 2013, against federal, state, county, municipal, and individual defendants. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff seeks relief under a variety of legal theories, including constitutional, state law and federal law claims. These claims include: (1) civil conspiracy; (2) an alleged Ninth Amendment right to privacy and the freedom from intrusion; (3) forgery; (4) procedural due process, including kidnapping, false imprisonment, a variety of fraud claims, unlawful arrest, and unlawful warrant; (5) substantive due process, including claims arising from Plaintiff's alleged placement in solitary confinement, a psychiatric ward, and his denial of hygiene while in custody; (6) the First Amendment right to free speech; (7) false swearing; (8) abuse of process; (9) deceit or fraud by means of factual misrepresentation; (10) an alleged violation of the Sixth Amendment arising from the appointment of an attorney in Plaintiff's criminal case; (11) the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial; (12) the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; (13) battery; (14) municipal liability; (15) false imprisonment; (16) malicious prosecution; (17) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (18) supervisory liability; (19) influencing jurors and bribery; (20) defamation; (21) trespassing; (22) false pretenses; (23) unlawful use of a social security number under public servant statutes; (24) negligent hiring, supervision or retention; (25) malfeasance; (26) negligence; (27) willful misconduct; (28) judicial misconduct; (29) failure to intervene; (30) breach of duty; and (31) an alleged Ninth Amendment right to work. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Defendants Thomas E. McCauley, Jr., the State Bar of Arizona, the State of Arizona, David Cavazos, the City of Phoenix, Maricopa County, and the Federal Defendants move to dismiss the suit.
I. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) is designed to "test the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action"; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While "a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations... it must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, a plaintiff must do more than employ "labels, " "conclusions, " or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), "[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
II. Federal Claims
A. Thomas E. McCauley, Jr., and the State ...