November 19, 2013
State of Arizona, Respondent,
Julian Adrian Wyatt, Petitioner.
Not For Publication See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20063253 The Honorable Howard Hantman, Judge
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By Jacob R. Lines, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for Respondent
Julian Wyatt, Buckeye In Propria Persona
Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kelly and Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
¶1 Petitioner Julian Wyatt seeks review of the trial court's order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. "We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). Wyatt has not sustained his burden of establishing such abuse here.
¶2 After a jury trial, Wyatt was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release for twenty-five years. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Wyatt, No. 2 CA-CR 2008-0274 (memorandum decision filed July 28, 2009). We also denied relief on Wyatt's petitions for review from the trial court's dismissal of his first two post-conviction proceedings. State v. Wyatt, No. 2 CA-CR 2011-0288-PR (memorandum decision filed Feb. 8, 2012); State v. Wyatt, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0302-PR (memorandum decision filed Nov. 15, 2012).
¶3 Wyatt filed his third petition for post-conviction relief in April 2012, relying on the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Missouri v. Frye, U.S, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012) and Lafler v. Cooper, U.S., 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012), and claiming he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to plea bargaining. The trial court summarily denied relief, concluding Wyatt's claims were precluded.
¶4 On review, Wyatt again contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining process and asserts his claims are exempt from preclusion because they are based on a significant change in the law. Wyatt is correct that, in Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court acknowledged a defendant has a right to effective representation by counsel during plea negotiations. See Lafler, U.S. at, 132 S.Ct. at 1384; Frye, U.S. at, 132 S.Ct. at 1407-08. But it has long been the law in Arizona that a defendant is entitled to effective representation in the plea context. See State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, ¶¶ 9, 14, 10 P.3d 1193, 1198, 1200 (App. 2000). Thus, as the trial court correctly concluded, any such claim could have been raised in a previous collateral proceeding and is now precluded. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g), 32.2(a); see also State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, ¶ 8, 260 P.3d 1102, 1105 (App. 2011) (significant change in law "'requires some transformative event, a clear break from the past'"), quoting State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, ¶ 15, 203 P.3d 1175, 1178 (2009).
¶5 Therefore, although we grant the petition for review, relief is denied.