Not for Publication – Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2011-158912-001 The Honorable Edward W. Bassett, Judge
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Michael T. O'Toole Counsel for Appellee.
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Thomas K. Baird Counsel for Appellant.
Chief Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.
DIANE M. JOHNSEN CHIEF JUDGE
¶1 Eddie Dupree Taylor was convicted of five counts of aggravated assault, each a Class 2 dangerous felony; one count of unlawful discharge of a firearm, a Class 6 dangerous felony; one count of misconduct involving weapons, a Class 4 felony; and disorderly conduct, a Class 6 dangerous felony. The superior court sentenced Taylor to various concurrent and/or consecutive terms of incarceration for his several convictions. It granted him 517 days of presentence incarceration and ordered him to "submit to DNA testing for law enforcement identification purposes and pay the applicable fee for the cost of that testing in accordance with [Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.")] § 13-610."
¶2 On appeal, Taylor does not dispute his convictions nor the terms of incarceration the superior court imposed. He argues only that the court should have allowed him one additional day of presentence incarceration credit and erred by ordering him to pay for DNA testing pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-610 (2013). The State confesses error. It agrees that Taylor was incarcerated for 518 days before he was sentenced, and acknowledges that in State v. Reyes, 232 Ariz. 468, 472, ¶ 14, 307 P.3d 35, 39 (App. 2013), this court held that A.R.S. § 13-610 does not authorize the superior court to impose a DNA collection fee on a convicted defendant.
¶3e agree with the parties that Taylor is entitled to an additional day of presentence incarceration credit. We also agree that, pursuant to Reyes, which was issued after Taylor was sentenced, the court erred by imposing the collection fee. We therefore modify the judgment of conviction to increase the presentence incarceration credit to ...