United States District Court, D. Arizona
Gonzalo Estrada and Aurelia Martinez, on behalf of themselves and all individuals similarly situated,  Plaintiffs,
Bashas' Incorporated, Defendant.
ROBERT C. BROOMFIELD, District Judge.
Currently pending before the court is a motion for reconsideration by defendant Bashas' Incorporated (Doc. 309). Bashas' is seeking to have this court reconsider its order in Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360 (D.Ariz. 2013), granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification with respect to their pay claim. For the reasons set forth herein, the court denies defendant Bashas' motion.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3), this court certified a class, defining it as follows:
All Hispanic workers currently and formerly employed by defendant Bashas' Inc. in an hourly position at any Food [C]ity retail store since April 4, 1998, who have been subject to the challenged pay policies and practices.
Id. at 403. Assuming familiarity with the detailed analysis in Parra, and the protracted history of the issue of class certification in this case, the court will proceed directly to an analysis of Bashas' motion to reconsider.
I. Standard of Review
Initially, Bashas' did not indicate the basis for its reconsideration motion. Nonetheless, it was clear to the plaintiffs, as it is to the court, that 7.2(g)(1) is the basis for this motion. Bashas' acknowledges as much in its reply, contending that reconsideration is "warranted" because the "plain requirements of LR Civ. 7.2(g)" are met in this case. Reply (Doc. 314) at 1:25-26.
As pertinent here, in accordance with LR Civ. 7.2(g)(1), "[t]he Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration... absent a showing of manifest error[.]" LR Civ. 7.2(g)(1). The term "manifest error" is "an error that is plain and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law or the credible evidence in the record." Black's Law Dictionary 622 (9th ed. 2009) ("Black's"). Rule 7.2(g)(1) also requires, inter alia, that motions thereunder "point out with specificity the matters that the movant believes were overlooked or misapprehended by the Court[.]" LR Civ. 7.2(g)(1). Additionally, Rule 7.2(g)(1) prohibits "repeat[ing] any oral or written argument made by the movant in... opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order." Id . Lastly, Rule 7.2(g)(1) grants courts the discretion to deny a motion for reconsideration for failure to comply therewith.
In addition to complying with LR Civ. 7.2(g)(1), a party moving for reconsideration must take into account the narrow scope of such a motion. "[D]issatisfaction or disagreement is not a proper basis for reconsideration[.]" Ellsworth v. Prison Health Services Inc., 2013 WL 1149937, at *2 (D.Ariz. March 20, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Dennis v. Ayers, 2008 WL 1989304, at *1 (N.D.Cal. May 6, 2008) (Petitioner's disagreement "with the Court's prior resolution of the claim... is, of course, [an] insufficient [basis] for... grant[ing] a motion for reconsideration.") Likewise, a motion for reconsideration may not be used to "ask this court to rethink what [it]... already thought through, rightly or wrongly." Morgal v. Maricopa County Bd. of Sup'rs, 2012 WL 2368478, at *1 (D.Ariz. June 21, 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Reconsideration motions "are not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their original briefs." Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors , 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D.Ariz. 2003) (citing Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc. , 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988)). Thus, as is evident, "[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored and should be granted only in rare circumstances.'" Ellsworth, 2013 WL 1149937, at *1 (quoting Morgal, 2012 WL 2368478, at *1 (other quotation marks and citation omitted). It is against this legal backdrop that the court will consider Bashas' reconsideration motion.
Bashas' diffuse approach makes it difficult to ascertain the precise grounds which it claims warrant reconsideration. What is readily ascertainable though is that Bashas' has not met the demanding standards necessary to warrant granting the extraordinary remedy of reconsideration. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.1995) (The ...