United States District Court, D. Arizona
Safegate Airport Systems, Inc., a Minnesota corporation; and Safegate International AB, a corporation of Sweden, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
RLG Docking Systems, Inc., an Arizona corporation; and Robert L. Gaugenmaier, individually, Defendants/Counterclaimants.
G. MURRAY SNOW, District Judge.
Pending before the Court are RLG Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment for Invalidity (Doc. 89) and Safegate's Motion to Strike RLG's Motion (Doc. 94). For the following reasons, Safegate's Motion to Strike and RLG's Motion for Summary Judgment are denied.
The facts in this case have been laid out in this Court's previous orders, which are incorporated here by reference. In addition to the previously discussed background facts in this case, RLG submitted a Separate Statement of Facts (Doc. 90) and a Declaration by its attorney (Doc. 91), which included copies of the patents, prosecution history, and expert reports from both parties (Docs. 91-1 to 91-5). Safegate submitted a Controverting Statement of Facts. (Doc 99.) RLG now moves for summary judgment on Claim 14 of U.S. Patent 6, 023, 665 (665) and Claims 1 and 11 of U.S. Patent 6, 324, 489 (489).
I. Motion to Strike
LRCiv 7.2(m)(1) provides that "a motion to strike may be filed if it seeks to strike any part of a filing or submission on the ground that it is prohibited (or not authorized) by a... court order." Safegate asks that RLG's Motion to Dismiss be stricken because it raises issues outside of the timeline established by this Court's Case Management Order as amended. However, although the deadlines for discovery related to invalidity have passed, this Court's previous order on this issue provides that "Defendant RLG's invalidity motion, if filed, is limited to the grounds that came up after December 16, 2013, the Prior Art Statement date." (Doc. 83.) Therefore, the Court will not strike the Motion for Summary Judgment entirely, but the Court will disregard any arguments based on grounds that existed as of December 16, 2013.
II. Motion for Summary Judgment
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Substantive law determines which facts are material, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "A fact issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Thus, the nonmoving party must show that the genuine factual issues "can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.'" Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). Because "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, ... [t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor" at the summary judgment stage. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). Furthermore, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).
RLG makes two related arguments about the invalidity of Claim 14 of '665 Patent and Claims 1 and 11 of '489 Patent as interpreted by this Court's previous order. (Doc. 85.) Those arguments are that neither the requirement to claim what the inventor "regards as the invention" under 35 U.S.C. §112(b) nor the enabling requirement of §112(a) ...