United States District Court, D. Arizona
Kenneth W. Reed, Plaintiff,
Karen Barcklay, et al., Defendants.
JAMES A. TEILBORG, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Injunction Claim, (Doc. 346); Defendant's Motion to Supplement Defendant's Statement of Facts in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Injunctive Claim, (Doc. 359); and Plaintiff's Motion to Preclude/Strike Declaration of Dr. Arnold; Alternatively for Leave to Depose Dr. Arnold and Provide a Rebuttal Expert, (Doc. 354).
The Court will grant the Motion for Summary Judgment and deny without prejudice Defendant's Motion to Supplement and Plaintiff's Motion to Preclude.
Plaintiff Reed, an Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADC") inmate, claims that Defendant Barcklay, a doctor at the Arizona State Prison Complex ("ASPC")-Yuma, was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment because Defendant refused to prescribe Cafergot to treat Plaintiff's migraine headaches. (Doc. 22 at 12-14). Defendant began working for the ADC in 2001. (Doc. 347 at 1). On July 1, 2012, when Arizona privatized the medical care of its inmates, Defendant became an employee of Wexford Health Sources, the contracted medical care provider for the ADC. ( Id. ) On March 3, 2013, Defendant began working for Corizon when it replaced Wexford Health Sources as the contracted medical care provider for the ADC. ( Id. at 2).
Plaintiff was committed to ADC custody in 1994. (Doc. 345 at 1-2). He was first prescribed Cafergot along with Excedrin for his migraine headaches in 2008. (Doc. 22 at 4). In October 2009, Plaintiff was transferred to ASPC-Yuma. ( Id. at 1-2). After Plaintiff's transfer to ASPC-Yuma, he began seeing Defendant for his migraine headaches and hypertension. (Doc. 167 at 2; Doc. 275 at 2-4). Defendant refilled Plaintiff's Cafergot and Excedrin prescriptions in December 2009 and wrote a prescription for a six-month supply of both medications in January 2010. (Doc. 167 at 2; Doc. 275 at 2-4). But, in July 2010, Defendant refused to renew Plaintiff's Cafergot prescription. (Doc. 346 at 3). Instead, Defendant only renewed the Excedrin prescription. ( Id. ) Plaintiff claims that the combination of Cafergot and Excedrin effectively treated his migraine headaches, but Excedrin alone has not been effective. (Doc. 275, Ex. 1, Reed Aff. ¶ 25). On August 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed a formal inmate grievance regarding Defendant's failure to prescribe Cafergot. (Doc. 22 at 5; Doc. 275, Attach. D1). Plaintiff appealed the response to his formal grievance on October 5, 2010 and his appeal was denied on December 14, 2010. (Doc. 22 at 6; Doc. 275 Attach. D2).
On May 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint in state court against Defendant seeking injunctive relief. (Doc. 1). Defendant removed the case to this Court on July 6, 2011, and Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 3, 2011. (Doc. 1; Doc. 22). On April 4, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred from ASPC-Yuma to ASPC-Tucson. (Doc. 339 at 2). Defendant has not treated Plaintiff since Plaintiff was transferred to ASPC-Tucson. Plaintiff has not been able to obtain a Cafergot prescription since he was transferred to ASPC-Tucson. (Doc. 347 ¶¶ 17-19).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is moot because Plaintiff is no longer an inmate at ASPC-Yuma and, therefore, she no longer has any control over Plaintiff's medical treatment. (Doc. 346 at 6-9). Plaintiff asserts that his claim is not moot for two reasons. First, Plaintiff contends that the ADC only transferred him to ASPC-Tucson to moot his claim against Defendant. (Doc. 355 at 3). Second, Plaintiff argues that his claim is not moot because there is a reasonable expectation that he will be transferred back to ASPC-Yuma. ( Id. at 4).
II. STATEMENT OF LAW
Under Article III of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of a federal court depends on the existence of a "case or controversy"; without a case or controversy a claim is moot. Pub. Util. Comm'n of State of Cal. v. FERC, 100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim is considered moot if it is no longer a present and live controversy or if no effective relief can be granted. Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1996). When a question before the court has been mooted by changes in circumstances after the complaint is filed, there is no justiciable controversy. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Questions of mootness regarding injunctions are viewed "in light of the present circumstances." Mitchell, 75 F.3d at 528.
Generally, an inmate's transfer from one prison to another while his claims are pending will moot his claims for injunctive relief that relate to the first prison. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03, 95 (1975); Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991). However, if there is a reasonable expectation that the inmate will be transferred back to the prison where the alleged injury occurred, then the transfer does not moot the inmate's claim. Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013); Johnson, 948 F.2d at 519. A claim that the inmate might be transferred back to the prison where the injury occurred, without evidence to support such a transfer, is too speculative to overcome mootness. Dilley, 64 F.3d at 1369.
A. Motive for Transfer
Plaintiff asserts that his transfer from ASPC-Yuma to ASPC-Tucson, was "an obvious attempt to moot the injunctive portion of Plaintiff's action." (Doc. 355 at 3). Specifically, Plaintiff notes that his security status did not change and he did not have any altercations with staff members at ASPC-Yuma. ( Id. ) Accordingly, Plaintiff concludes that the only logical reason for his transfer to ASPC-Tucson was to moot his claim for injunctive relief. ( Id. at 3-4). ...