United States District Court, District of Arizona
ORDER AND OPINION [RE: MOTION AT DOCKET 12]
JOHN W.SEDWICK, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I. MOTION PRESENTED
At docket 12 plaintiff Karyl Krug (“Krug”) proceeding in propria persona filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 7.2(g). In substance, Krug’s motion requests reconsideration or relief from the judgment entered against her at docket 9. If a motion for reconsideration is filed within 10 days of entry of judgment, as Krug’s motion was, it is treated as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Defendants Maricopa County Superior Court, et al. (collectively, “defendants”) filed an opposition at docket 27. Oral argument was not requested but would not assist the court.
The background giving rise to this lawsuit is set out in detail in the court’s earlier order at docket 7 and need not be repeated here. In that order the court g ranted defendants’ motion to dismiss Krug’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Thereafter, judgment was entered that Krug take nothing.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[R]econsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” District courts enjoy considerable discretion in granting or denying a motion to reconsider. “In general, there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) if such motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if such motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an intervening change in controlling law.” A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.
Krug argues that reconsideration of the judgment is necessary to correct the following five manifest errors of fact or law upon which the judgment rests: (1) the court misapplied Rule 12(b)(6); (2) the court made an inappropriate credibility determination based on a deceptive exhibit; (3) the court violated Rule 12(d) by not giving the parties sufficient notice that it would review evidence outside the pleadings; (4) the court erred in ruling that the complaint does not address an obvious alternative explanation for Krug’s termination; and (5) the court erred in ruling that it would be futile to allow Krug to amend her complaint to name Maricopa County as a defendant.
A. The Court Properly Applied Rule 12(b)(6)
Krug argues that the court misapplied Rule 12(b)(6) by not construing the complaint in the light most favorable to Krug and by inappropriately relying on Ashcroft v. Iqbal. These arguments lack merit.
With regard to Krug’s first argument, the only matter that Krug challenges with specificity is the court’s conclusion that the only factual support in her complaint for her claim that she was fired in retaliation for protected speech is the timing of her termination. Krug argues that this conclusion is “insupportable” because of “the copious factual recitations set out in” her complaint. Because Krug’s motion does not cite a single one of these factual recitations, and because her retaliatory termination claims are supported by legal conclusions, not facts, Krug’s argument fails.
With regard to Krug’s second argument, Krug argues that Iqbal’s “‘plausibility’ analysis” does not apply because the defendants in this case are not “geographically remote.” Krug cites no authority to support her argument that if there is no “geographic remoteness of the parties” a complaint need not allege plausible claims. This argument lacks merit.
B. The Court Did Not Make a Credibility Determination Based on Exhibit 1, and Exhibit 1 Is ...