United States District Court, D. Arizona
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United States of America, Plaintiff: Edward G Caspar,
Jennifer Larissa Mondino, Jonathan M Smith, Puneet Cheema,
LEAD ATTORNEYS, U.S. Dept of Justice - Civil Rights
(Pennsylvania Ave.), Washington, DC USA; Brian Buehler,
Cynthia Coe, U.S. Dept of Justice - Civil Rights Division,
Washington, DC USA; Paul Killebrew, U.S. Dept of Justice -
Civil Rights, Washington, DC USA; Thomas Jackson Morse, Jr,
U.S. Dept of Justice, Washington, DC USA.
County of Maricopa, Arizona, Defendant: Charles W Jirauch,
Richard K Walker, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Walker & Peskind PLLC,
Scottsdale, AZ USA; Dan K Webb, Joel E Connolly, LEAD
ATTORNEYS, Winston & Strawn LLP - Chicago, IL, Chicago, IL
Joseph M Arpaio, in his official capacity as Sheriff of
Maricopa County, Arizona, Defendant: John T Masterson, Joseph
John Popolizio, Lori Lea Voepel, William R Jones, Jr., LEAD
ATTORNEYS, Justin Michael Ackerman, Jones Skelton & Hochuli
PLC, Phoenix, AZ USA.
Roslyn O. Silver, Senior United States District Judge.
the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment (Doc. 332, 334, 345).
the United States brought the present action alleging a
pattern or practice of discrimination against Latinos in
Maricopa County, Arizona by Defendants Joseph M. Arpaio
(" Arpaio" ) and Maricopa County in violation of
the Constitution and federal statutes. Defendant Arpaio is
the Sheriff of Maricopa County and heads the Maricopa County
Sheriff's Office (" MCSO" ). As MCSO's
chief officer, Arpaio directs law enforcement throughout
Maricopa County. He is responsible for MCSO's
policies and operations, which include all facets of policing
and prison administration. MCSO is a subdivision of Maricopa
County. Maricopa County's primary governing body is the
Board of Supervisors (the " Board" ). The Board
consists of five Supervisors, each of whom is elected from
one of Maricopa County's five districts. Maricopa County
determines the budgets and provides the funding for its
subdivisions, including municipal courts, public schools, and
law enforcement (i.e. MCSO). Maricopa County receives federal
financial assistance from the United States, which it
distributes to various county subdivisions, including MCSO.
The Prior Litigation: Melendres v. Arpaio
2007, private individual plaintiffs initiated a class action
lawsuit against Arpaio, MCSO, and Maricopa County, alleging
MCSO officers engaged in racial discrimination against
Latinos " under the guise of enforcing immigration
law." Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F.Supp.2d
959, 969 (D. Ariz. 2011), aff'd sub nom.
Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012)
(hereinafter " Melendres " ). The case
focused on " saturation patrols," which were
described as " crime suppression sweeps" in which
officers saturate a given area and target persons who
appeared to be Latino for investigation of their immigration
status. (2:07-CV-02513-GMS, Doc. 26 at 10). Jose de Jesus
Ortega-Melendres, the named plaintiff, was stopped in his
vehicle by members of the MCSO's Human Smuggling Unit and
detained without probable cause while officers investigated
his immigration status, along with those of his passengers.
Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F.Supp.2d 822, 880 (D.
Ariz. 2013); (2:07-CV-02513-GMS, Doc. 26 at 17). The
certified class of plaintiffs encompassed " [a]ll Latino
persons who, since January 2007,
have been or will be in the future stopped, detained,
questioned or searched by [the defendants'] agents while
driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or
parking area in Maricopa County, Arizona." Melendres
v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2012). See
also Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F.Supp.2d
959, 994 (D. Ariz. 2011).
2009, Maricopa County requested a stay pending the outcome of
the United States' investigation of Arpaio's
practices, which had begun one month earlier. The United
States opposed the motion, as did Arpaio, and the court
denied the stay due to the timing and uncertainty regarding
the outcome of the United States' investigation.
Melendres v. Maricopa Cnty., No. 07-cv-02513, 2009
WL 2515618, at *4 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2009). Over the course
of the Melendres litigation, the United States
requested deposition transcripts and filed motions for
protective orders regarding discovery. It also sought to
transfer a 2010 Title VI enforcement action to the
October 2009, the Melendres court granted a joint
motion and stipulation to dismiss Maricopa County without
prejudice. (2:07-CV-02513-GMS, Doc. 194). The stipulation
stated, " Defendant Maricopa County is not a necessary
party at this juncture for obtaining the complete relief
sought." (2:07-CV-02513-GMS, Doc. 178).
24, 2013, the Melendres court issued Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Melendres v. Arpaio,
989 F.Supp.2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013) (" Melendres
Order" ). The court held MCSO's " saturation
patrols all involved using traffic stops as a pretext to
detect those occupants of automobiles who may be in this
country without authorization," id. at 826, and
" MCSO's use of Hispanic ancestry or race as a
factor in forming reasonable suspicion that persons have
violated state laws relating to immigration status violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 899. The court also found
MCSO conducted discriminatory traffic stops outside of
saturation patrols. Id. at 844-845, 889-890. The
Melendres Order enjoined MCSO from " using
Hispanic ancestry or race as [a] factor in making law
enforcement decisions pertaining to whether a person is
authorized to be in the country, and  unconstitutionally
lengthening [vehicle] stops." Id. at 827.
the ruling, the United States filed a statement of interest
concerning potential forms of relief. On October 2, 2013,
the court issued its Supplemental Permanent
Injunction/Judgment Order. Melendres v. Arpaio, No.
CV-07-02513-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 5498218, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2,
2013) (" Supplemental Order" ). The order
permanently enjoined Defendants from: 1) " [d]etaining,
holding or arresting Latino occupants of vehicles in Maricopa
County based on a reasonable belief, without more, that such
persons are in the country without authorization" ; 2)
" [u]sing race or Latino ancestry as a factor in
deciding whether to stop any vehicle" or in deciding
whether a vehicle occupant was in the United States without
authorization; (3) " [d]etaining Latino occupants of
vehicles stopped for traffic violations for a period longer
than reasonably necessary to resolve the traffic violation in
the absence of reasonable suspicion that any of the
vehicle's occupants have committed or are committing a
violation of federal or state criminal law" ; (4) "
[d]etaining, holding or arresting Latino occupants of a
vehicle . . . for violations of the Arizona Human Smuggling
Act without a reasonable basis for believing the necessary
elements of the crime are present" ; and (5) "
[d]etaining, arresting or holding persons based on a
reasonable suspicion that they are conspiring with their
employer to violate the Arizona Employer Sanctions Act."
Id. The Supplemental Order also contained numerous
provisions regarding the implementation of bias-free
policing, including standards for bias-free detention and
arrest policies and training, as well as detailed policies
and procedures for ensuring and reviewing MCSO's
compliance with the Melendres Order. The procedures
included the appointment of an independent monitor to report
on Arpaio and MCSO's compliance and collection of traffic
stop data. Id.
and MCSO appealed the Melendres Order and the
Supplemental Order (collectively, the "
Melendres injunction" ), challenging provisions
which addressed non-saturation patrol activities and arguing
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the district
court's conclusion that Arpaio and MCSO's
unconstitutional policies extended beyond the context of
saturation patrols. Melendres v. Apraio, No.
13-16285, Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellant Arpaio, Doc.
32-1, at 2, 13-15, 17-18 (March 17, 2014). MCSO also argued
it was not a proper party in the case. Id.
April 15, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion holding
MCSO was not a proper party because it is a non-jural entity
lacking separate legal status from Maricopa County.
Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015).
The Ninth Circuit ordered Maricopa County substituted as a
party in lieu of MCSO. Id. at 1260. But the court
also stated, " [o]n remand, the district court may
consider dismissal of Sheriff Arpaio in his official capacity
because 'an official-capacity suit is, in all respects
other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity.'" Id.  In addition, the court
held the Melendres injunction was not overbroad
because it applied to activities beyond saturation patrols:
" Although the evidence largely addressed [the] use of
race during saturation patrols, the district court did not
clearly err in finding [Arpaio's] policy applied
across-the-board to all law enforcement decisions--not just
those made during saturation patrols."  Id.
However, the court found the requirements for the independent
monitor " to consider the 'disciplinary outcomes for
any violations of departmental policy' and to
assess whether Deputies are subject to 'civil suits or
criminal charges . . . for off-duty conduct" were not
narrowly tailored and ordered the district court " to
tailor [these provisions] to address only the constitutional
violations at issue." Id. at 1267.
The Litigation Before This Court: U.S. v.
March 10, 2009, the United States Department of Justice
(" DOJ" ) sent Arpaio a letter notifying him it was
commencing an investigation of his office. (Doc. 333-3 at 6).
Over a year later, on August 3, 2010, DOJ issued a "
Notice of noncompliance with the obligation to cooperate with
the Department of Justice investigation
pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
(Doc. 333-3 at 9) (" Notice Letter" ). Although the
Notice Letter appears to have been mailed only to counsel for
MCSO, counsel for Maricopa County responded to it. (Doc.
333-3 at 9). On August 12, 2010, Maricopa County's
private counsel wrote to the United States to express
Maricopa County's " desire to cooperate in any way
possible with the [United States'] investigation
referenced in the Notice Letter," emphasizing, "
[a]s a recipient of Title VI funds, Maricopa County believes
it has an obligation to cooperate." Id.
Maricopa County offered to use its subpoena power to procure
documents in aid of DOJ's investigation. Id. at
10. The letter also stated Maricopa County would "
[notify] MCSO that it [could] not expend any public funds,
including on outside counsel, to resist any DOJ Title VI
inquiry," and that " Maricopa County [would] not
pay those bills as resisting a Title VI inquiry is outside
the scope of the employment of any elected or appointed
December 15, 2011, DOJ sent Maricopa County Attorney Bill
Montgomery (" Montgomery" ) a 22-page letter
notifying him of the investigation into MCSO and announcing
" the findings of the Civil Rights Division's
investigation into civil rights violations by the
[MCSO]." (Doc. 333-2 at 2) (" Findings Letter"
). The Findings Letter did not reference Maricopa County,
specifically. Montgomery immediately responded that DOJ had
" noticed the wrong party." (Doc. 333-3 at 12). On
January 17, 2012, DOJ responded it would continue to include
Maricopa County in all correspondence because its "
investigation potentially affect[ed] Maricopa County as the
conduit of federal financial assistance to MCSO." (Doc.
333-3 at 14).
9, 2012, DOJ advised Maricopa County:
[I]n accordance with the notice requirements set forth in
DOJ's Title VI regulations, 28 C.F.R. §
42.108(d)(3), it is the intention of the Department of
Justice to file a civil action against Maricopa County, the
Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, and Sheriff Joseph M.
Arpaio in order to remedy the serious Constitutional and
federal law violations, including noncompliance with Title
VI, as noted in our December 15, 201 Findings Letter.
(Doc. 333-3 at 25). The following day, the United States
filed a complaint in this Court, outlining six claims for
relief against Arpaio, MCSO, and Maricopa County:
(1) Intentional discrimination on the basis of race, color
or national origin in violation of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §
14141 (" Section 14141" ) and the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(2) Unreasonable searches, arrests and detentions lacking
probable cause or reasonable suspicion in violation of
Section 14141 and the Fourth Amendment.
(3) Disparate impact and intentional discrimination on the
basis of race, color or national origin in violation of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
§ 2000d-2000d-7 (" Title VI" ).
(4) Disparate impact and intentional discrimination against
limited English proficient (" LEP" ) Latino
prisoners in violation of Title VI.
(5) Disparate impact and intentional discrimination in
violation of Defendants' contractual assurances under
(6) Retaliation against Defendants' critics in
violation of Section 14141 and the First Amendment.
MCSO, and Maricopa County moved to dismiss. On December 12,
the Court denied Maricopa County's motion and granted
Arpaio and MCSO's motion in part. (Doc. 56). MCSO was
dismissed from the case based on the Arizona Court of Appeals
decision, Braillard v. Maricopa County, which held
MCSO is a non-jural entity, lacking the capacity to sue and
be sued. 224 Ariz. 481, 487, 232 P.3d 1263 (Ct.App. 2010).
remaining parties proceeded with discovery. The United States
and Arpaio now each move for partial summary judgment. (Doc.
332, 345). Maricopa County moves for summary judgment on all
claims. (Doc. 334).
Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate when the moving
party demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is material when,
under governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome
of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986);
United States v. Kapp, 564 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir.
2009). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248.
seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material
fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can
satisfy this burden in two ways: either (1) by presenting
evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case; or (2) by demonstrating the nonmoving party
failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case on which the nonmoving party bears the
burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. "
Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not
preclude a grant of summary judgment." T.W. Elec.
Serv., Inc. v. P. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d
626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
the moving party establishes the absence of genuine disputes
of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
set forth facts showing a genuine dispute remains.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. The nonmoving party cannot
oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by "
rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The
party opposing summary judgment must also establish the
admissibility of the evidence on which it relies. Orr v.
Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir.
2002) (a court deciding summary judgment motion " can
only consider admissible evidence" ); see also
Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Services, Inc., 854 F.2d
1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988) (" It is well settled that
only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." );
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, 2010 Advisory Committee Notes (" The
burden is on the proponent to show that the material is
admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form
that is anticipated." ).
ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view
every inference drawn from the underlying facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 601, 106
S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court does not make
credibility determinations with respect to evidence offered.
See T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630-631 (citing
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587). Summary judgment is
not appropriate " where contradictory inferences may
reasonably be drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts."
Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622
F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 1980).
Justiciability of Claims Against Arpaio
argues the United States' claims involving discriminatory
traffic stops in Counts One, Two, Three, and Five are
moot. He argues the Melendres
injunction eliminated all threat of immediate and future
discriminatory traffic stops, as well as the ability of this
Court to provide redress for those claims. The United
States argues its traffic stop claims are not moot for four
reasons: (1) the Melendres injunction does not reach
all of the conduct challenged in the present suit because it
is necessarily tied to and based upon the immigration-related
operations at issue in Melendres ; (2) the federal
government has unique interests which warrant providing it
with its own enforcement mechanism for the types of reforms
and controls in the Melendres injunction; (3) Arpaio
appealed the scope of the Melendres injunction; and
(4) the Melendres injunction is years away from full
doctrine prevents courts from ruling " when the issues
presented are no longer live and therefor the parties lack a
cognizable interest for which the courts can grant a
remedy." Alaska Ctr. For Env't v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1999). " The
party asserting mootness bears the burden of establishing
that there is no effective relief that the court can
provide." Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d
455, 461 (9th Cir. 2006). And " [t]hat burden is
'heavy'; a case is not moot where any
effective relief may be granted." Id. "
Partial relief in another proceeding cannot moot an action
that legitimately seeks additional relief."
Flagstaff Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Sullivan, 962 F.2d 879,
885 (9th Cir. 1992).
general principle, " the government is not bound by
when the government's action seeks to enforce a federal
statute that implicates both public and private
interests." California v. IntelliGender, LLC,
771 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). See also Hathorn v.
Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 268 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 72
L.Ed.2d 824 (1982); City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U.S. 358, 373 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 45
L.Ed.2d 245 (1975). For example, in E.E.O.C. v. Goodyear
Aerospace Corp., the Ninth Circuit held the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (" EEOC" )
" interests in determining the legality of specific
conduct and in deterring future violations are distinct from
the employee's interest in a personal remedy." 813
F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1987). For that reason, the Court
held the EEOC's enforcement action was not mooted by a
private plaintiff's lawsuit and settlement based on the
same facts. Id. at 1543 (" [The private
plaintiff's] settlement does not moot the EEOC's
right of action seeking injunctive relief to protect
employees as a class and to deter the employer from
Goodyear Aerospace Corp. involved a previous suit by
an individual private plaintiff. But the court's analysis
relied in part on Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons,
where the prior suit was a private class action. 805 F.2d 682
(7th Cir. 1986). In Fitzsimmons, the Seventh Circuit
held the Secretary of Labor was not barred by res judicata
from bringing an ERISA enforcement action based on the same
facts as a previously settled class action in which the
Secretary had intervened. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d at
699. The decision was based in part on the history and
structure of ERISA. The court noted ERISA arose out of
concern over the " increasingly interstate" "
operational scope and economic impact" of employee
benefit plans and the direct effect such plans had on the
" well-being and security of millions of employees and
their dependents." Id. at 689 (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)). Employee benefit plans were also thought to
" substantially affect the revenues of the United
States" and therefore to be " affected with a
national public interest." Id. The statute
provided the Secretary of Labor the right to intervene in any
action brought by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.
defendants in Fitzsimmons argued the right to
intervene in private lawsuits created privity between the
Secretary of Labor and the private plaintiffs so as to bar
the Secretary from bringing a separate enforcement action. In
determining no privity existed between the government and the
private class of plaintiffs, the court articulated compelling
and unique government interests, which justified the
Secretary's separate, second lawsuit:
[I]t is clear that the Secretary does have a unique,
distinct, and separate public interest, duty and
responsibility in bringing this ERISA action to enforce the
trustees' fiduciary obligations and duties, to ensure
public confidence in the private pension system that provides
billions of dollars of capital for investments affecting
federal tax revenues and interstate commerce, and most
importantly, to protect the income of the retired workers and
beneficiaries. Further, the Secretary of Labor has a separate
interest when he intervenes so as to prevent the
establishment of harmful legal precedent as well as to ensure
uniformity in the enforcement and application of ERISA laws.
Id. at 696. See also Herman v. S.
Carolina Nat. Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1424 (11th Cir. 1998)
(same) (citing Beck v. Levering, 947 F.2d 639, 642
(2d Cir. 1991)); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d
1455, 1462-63 (5th Cir. 1983)).
Supreme Court has addressed the situation where the
government seeks injunctive relief which is potentially
duplicative of relief already afforded to a private party. In
United States v. Borden Co., the Supreme Court held
a private plaintiff's injunctive relief did not bar the
federal government from bringing suit for injunctive relief
under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25. 347 U.S. 514,
520, 74 S.Ct. 703, 98 L.Ed. 903 (1954). The district court
had held the violations described in the government's
complaint and shown at the trial were, " for the most
part, old violations . . . [and] the [private injunction]
assure[d], as completely as any decree can assure, that there
will be no new violations." Id. at 517-518
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the district court's
reasoning ignored " the prime object of civil decrees
secured by the Government--the continuing protection of the
public, by means of contempt proceedings, against a
recurrence of  violations." Id. at 519. The
Should a private decree be violated, the Government would
have no right to bring contempt proceedings to enforce
compliance; it might succeed in intervening in the private
action but only at the court's discretion. The private
plaintiff might find it to his advantage to refrain from
seeking enforcement of a violated decree; for example, where
the defendant's violation operated primarily against
plaintiff's competitors. Or. the plaintiff might agree to
modification of the decree, again looking only to his own
interest. In any of these events it is likely that the public
interest would not be adequately protected by the mere
existence of the private decree. It is also clear that
Congress did not intend that the efforts of a private
litigant should supersede the duties of the Department of
Justice in policing an industry. Yet the effect of the
decision below is to place on a private litigant the burden
of policing a major part of the milk industry in Chicago, a
task beyond its ability, even assuming it to be consistently
so inclined." Id. at 519.
the Supreme Court recognized the government's interest in
enforcing the provisions of a privately-held injunction, as
well as its duty to enforce its laws may justify a second
injunction. The private decree was to be considered in
determining whether the government could show a likelihood of
recurring illegal activity, but it was not dispositive of
that question. Id. at 520.
Supreme Court also determined that, in stating the United
States district attorneys and the Attorney General had a duty
to institute equity proceedings to enforce antitrust laws
while also allowing private plaintiffs to obtain injunctive
relief, the Clayton Act created a scheme in which "
private and public actions were designed to be cumulative,
not mutually exclusive." Id. at 518.
similar conclusion applies to Title VI, one of the statutes
under which the United States' brings its claims. Title
VI is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a sweeping piece
of legislation which
banned racial discrimination in voting, schools, workplaces,
and public accommodations and created mechanisms through
which the federal government could enforce each provision.
The Act was passed in the context of widespread conflict and
unrest regarding racial desegregation, including resistance
to desegregation by state and local governments and private
individuals. Its purpose was to harness the power of the
federal government to eradicate racial discrimination
throughout the United States, regardless of local bias. The
Supreme Court has held private plaintiffs may bring suit
under Title VI for violations caused by intentional
discrimination but not disparate impact discrimination.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511,
149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). The federal government, by contrast,
may sue for either intentional or disparate impact
discrimination. See infra, Part III(A). And federal
agencies which extend federal financial assistance are both
" authorized and directed to effectuate [its]
provisions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (emphasis added).
Just as in Borden Co., the statutory scheme of Title
VI and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 lends itself to and is
enhanced by viewing private enforcement action as
supplemental and cumulative to government enforcement action.
other statute under which the United States brings these
claims, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, may be best known for its crime prevention measures,
including a federal ban on assault weapons and increased
federal funding of local law enforcement. See Rachel
A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of
Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 870, 883 n. 35-36 (2015). But
the Act also contains provisions directed at reforming law
enforcement. For instance, under § 14141, the relevant
section here, the Attorney General has discretion to bring
civil actions to obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory
relief to eliminate the pattern or practice of law
enforcement that violates constitutional rights and
of the United States' claims of discriminatory policing
involve conduct addressed in Melendres
--discriminatory vehicle stops related to immigration
enforcement. But the United States' claims also include
allegations regarding discriminatory home raids, worksite
raids, and non-motor vehicle related arrests and detentions,
which are different in important respects from those
presented in Melendres. For one, the United
States' claims are not confined to immigration
enforcement, but extend to discrimination in general law
this overlap, the United States possesses a unique interest,
which supports the finding of a live controversy as to
allegations regarding discriminatory traffic stops.
Furthermore, the purposes of Title VI and § 14141 would
be served by permitting the United States to bring its own
enforcement actions, regardless of previous action taken by
private plaintiffs. The United States' interest in this
case is distinct from those of private plaintiffs' in
Melendres. As with the Secretary of Labor in
Fitzsimmons, the federal government has an interest
in the uniform and robust enforcement of federal civil rights
legislation nationwide. Its interest in preventing the type
of discrimination charged in this case extends beyond the
well-being of a defined class of plaintiffs to the safety,
security, and just and harmonious coexistence of all
citizens. The United States likewise has an interest in
ensuring confidence in law enforcement activities which
utilize federal funding and may affect interstate commerce.
In addition, the findings in Part III(A), infra,
show congressional intent to permit the federal government to
bring an enforcement action.
To paraphrase Fitzsimmons, to hold mootness doctrine
bars the Attorney General from independently pursuing
enforcement of Title VI would effectively limit the authority
of the Attorney General under the statute--something a court
will not do in the absence of an explicit legislative
directive. See Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d at
addition, the Melendres injunction does not moot the
portions of the United States' claims which overlap with
Melendres because continued violations by Arpaio and
MCSO following the issuance of the injunction demonstrate a
real and immediate threat of future harm, as well as the
importance of granting the United States authority to enforce
injunctive relief addressing MCSO's discriminatory
traffic stops. See Borden Co., 347 U.S. at
519; (2:07-CV-2513-GMS, Doc. 948) (Arpaio's stipulation
to violations of the Melendres injunction by Arpaio
and MCSO); (2:07-CV-2513-GMS, Doc. 0127 at 118-125). In
addition, in the context of the United States' broader
claims, its claims regarding traffic stops may lead to
different injunctive measures than those put forth in
Melendres, where the allegations of discriminatory
traffic stops were brought in isolation. In other words, the
Melendres injunction may afford some, but only
partial relief for the United States' claims.
See Flagstaff Med. Ctr., Inc., 962 F.2d at
it is premature for the Court to conclude the United
States' allegations would lead to a replica of the
Melendres injunction. And, even if portions of the
order were replicated, the United States' unique interest
in enforcing those provisions and the continuing threat of
future harm it faces render the claims justiciable.
Justiciability of Claims Against Maricopa County
County argues the United States does not have standing
because it has failed to show " the harms it alleges are
'likely to be redressed' by a judgment against the
County." (Doc. 334 at 8). The United States contends it
has shown a likelihood of redress and that the " law of
the case" precludes the County's argument. (Doc. 348
Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) it
has suffered " injury in fact--an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is . . . concrete and
particularized" ; (2) " a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of" ; and (3) the
likelihood " the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
previous order, the Court held, " Under Arizona law, the
Sheriff has final policymaking authority with respect to
County law enforcement and jails, and the County can be held
responsible for constitutional violations resulting from
these policies," (Doc. 56 at 13), and denied Maricopa
County's motion to dismiss, including the allegation of
lack of standing.
Law of the case" doctrine " preclude[s a court]
from reexamining an issue previously decided by the same
court, or a higher court, in the same case." United
States v. Jingles, 702 F.3d 494, 499 (9th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). The doctrine applies where an issue was
" decided explicitly or by necessary implication in
previous disposition." Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
finding Maricopa County could be held responsible for
Arpaio's constitutional violations, the Court ruled, by
necessary implication, the County was capable of redressing
those violations. Nonetheless, Maricopa County now claims the
Court's previous analysis was flawed because it relied on
precedents from § 1983 cases involving claims for
monetary, rather than injunctive relief. Maricopa County
acknowledges A.R.S. § 11-201 gives it the power to
determine MCSO's budget, but maintains that authority is
insufficient to influence or control how MCSO is run.
Maricopa County also claims: 1) the County cannot " cure
the alleged violations here" (Doc. 356 at 10); 2) the
United States has failed to show Arpaio and MCSO engage in
" assessing, collecting, safekeeping, managing or
disbursing the public revenues" such that they would
fall under Maricopa County's supervisory authority
pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-251(1); and 3) A.R.S. §
11-444 severely limits its authority to withhold funding.
the cases on which the Court's previous order relied
involved claims under § 1983, which allows for monetary
as well as injunctive relief, the reasoning applied to find
Maricopa County potentially liable for MCSO's
constitutional violations was not premised on the form of
relief sought, but rather on the bases for "