United States District Court, D. Arizona
James A. Teilbrorg Senior United States District Judge.
Pending before the Court is “Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of Court’s June 29, 2015 Order” (Doc. 116). The Court now rules on the motion.
For brevity, the Court will not recite the facts of this case but refers to its prior Order, in which the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and incorporates the terms defined in that order (such as “FMLA” and “MAM”). (Doc. 114). In that Order, the Court ruled that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII sex discrimination claim, FMLA retaliation claim, Title VII retaliation claim, and federal and state equal pay claims. (Id. at 22-23) The Court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed on Plaintiff’s claim for FMLA interference. (Id.) Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of this Order. (Doc. 116).
II. Legal Standard
The Court will grant a motion for reconsideration if one of the following four elements is satisfied:
(1) There are material differences in fact or law from that presented to the Court and, at the time of the Court's decision, the party moving for reconsideration could not have known of the factual or legal differences through reasonable diligence;
(2) There are new material facts that happened after the Court's decision;
(3) There has been a change in the law that was decided or enacted after the Court's decision; or
(4) The movant makes a convincing showing that the Court failed to consider material facts that were presented to the Court before the Court's decision.
Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003). Additionally, “[n]o motion for reconsideration shall repeat in any manner any oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to the original motion.” Id.
Plaintiff makes two arguments in her motion for reconsideration. First, Plaintiff suggests the Court was unclear in articulating its analysis of the FMLA interference claim. (Doc. 116 at 2). Second, Plaintiff argues that she presented sufficient evidence of pretext to survive ...