Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County No. P1300CR20020252 The Honorable Tina R. Ainley, Judge
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Eric Knobloch Counsel for Appellee
C. Kenneth Ray, II, PC, Prescott By C. Kenneth Ray, II Counsel for Appellant
Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.
¶1 John Alden Turner appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing a statute that allows the court to extend probation when a defendant has failed to pay restitution does not allow the court to extend conditions of probation unrelated to restitution. Because Turner misconstrues the statute and because he had proper notice of the extension, we affirm the revocation.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Turner pled guilty to attempted fraudulent schemes and artifices, a Class 3 felony. The superior court suspended his sentence and placed him on supervised probation for five years. Before Turner's probation expired, his probation officer filed a petition to extend probation, alleging Turner had failed to pay $65, 988 in restitution. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-902(C) (2016), the court found Turner still owed restitution and extended his probation for five years. Two years later, Turner's probation officer filed a petition to revoke probation, alleging Turner had failed to comply with probation conditions unrelated to restitution. After Turner admitted one of the violations, the court continued him on supervised probation for 54 months.
¶3 About six months later, Turner's probation officer filed another petition to revoke, alleging Turner had violated several conditions of probation, including his restitution obligation. Following a hearing, the court found the State had failed to prove Turner had violated the restitution-related condition, but had proven other violations. The court then revoked Turner's probation and sentenced him to two years in prison.
¶4 Turner timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) (2016), 13-4031 (2016) and -4033 (2016).
A. Section 13-902(C).
¶5 Turner argues that when the court exercises its power to extend probation under A.R.S. § 13-902(C), it may extend only the condition requiring payment of restitution, not the other conditions of probation. He argues that, having extended his probation under § 13-902(C), the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke his probation for a violation of a condition unrelated to restitution.
¶6 As Turner contends, once probation has expired, the court lacks jurisdiction to revoke probation. State v. Chacon, 221 Ariz. 523, 526, ¶ 6 (App. 2009). A question about subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Id. at 525-26, ¶ 5. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Barnett, 209 Ariz. 352, 354, ¶ 7 (App. 2004). "The primary principle of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to legislative intent." Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284 (1991). We first look to the language of the statute to determine the legislature's intent. United Dairymen of Ariz. v. Rawlings, 217 Ariz. 592, 596, ¶ 12 (App. 2008). "If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must give it effect without resorting to any rules of statutory construction." State v. Johnson, 171 Ariz. 39, 41 (App. 1992); see also Janson ex rel. Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 (1991) ("[T]he best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning is its language and, when the language is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute's construction."). ...