and Submitted July 8, 2016 Portland, Oregon
Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals Agency No. A088-994-318
David Shamloo (argued), N. David Shamloo, Esq., Portland,
Oregon, for Petitioner.
L. Watson (argued), Trial Attorney; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr.,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Civil Division, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
Hutchins and James Feroli, Immigrant & Refugee Appellate
Center, Alexandria, Virginia, for Amici Curiae Thomas
Hutchins, James Feroli, and Immigrant & Refugee Appellate
Before: Harry Pregerson, Carlos T. Bea, and John B. Owens,
panel granted Agustin Ortega-Lopez's petition for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals' published
precedential decision, Matter of Ortega-Lopez, 26 I.
& N. Dec. 99 (BIA 2013), which held that his conviction
for sponsoring or exhibiting an animal in an animal fighting
venture under 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) is a categorical
crime involving moral turpitude.
panel found that the IJ and BIA did not discuss how the
statute of conviction, cockfighting, involves an action that
affects a protected class of victim. The panel cited the
finding in Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2010), that "non-fraudulent crimes of moral
turpitude almost always involve an intent to harm someone,
the actual infliction of harm upon someone, or an action that
affects a protected class of victim." The panel wrote
that although this court's case law does not explicitly
require the BIA to apply the language in Nunez, it
thought a remand to consider the language was appropriate
because the crime at issue involving harm to chickens is
outside the normal realm of CIMTs.
fully in the majority opinion, Judge Bea wrote separately to
emphasize the unsuitability of the Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), framework to determine
whether a particular crime is one involving moral turpitude.
Ortega-Lopez, a Mexican citizen, contends that his
misdemeanor conviction for participating in cockfighting in
violation of the Unlawful Animal Venture Prohibition, 7
U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1), does not qualify as a categorical
crime involving moral turpitude ("CIMT"). The
Immigration Judge ("IJ") and Board of Immigration
Appeals ("BIA") concluded that it did. We grant ...