United States District Court, D. Arizona
Brian O. Claros-Bey, Petitioner,
J.T. Shartle, Warden, Respondent.
Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald United States Magistrate Judge
pending before the Court is Petitioner Brian Claros-Bey's
pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody
(“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondent has filed his
Return and Answer (“Answer”) (Doc. 10).
Petitioner did not file a Reply, but rather filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16). Respondent filed a Response
to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
is an inmate currently incarcerated at the United States
Penitentiary (“USP”) in Tucson, Arizona, serving
a 500 month sentence. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) Inmate Locater,
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited
September 16, 2016); Answer (Doc. 10), Huband Decl. (Exh.
“1”), Superior Ct. of the Distr. of Columbia,
Judgment in a Criminal Case (Attach. “2”) at 1.
At sentencing, the Superior Court for the District of
Columbia ordered Petitioner to pay $500 pursuant to the
Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act of 1996.
Id. The Judgment indicates that these costs
“ha[d] not been paid” at the time of sentencing.
October 19, 2015, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this
Court. Petition (Doc. 1). Petitioner contends that
“[b]y being subjected to the lowest score on
‘Responsibility' on the Custody Classification Form
(BP-338) in accordance with the United States Bureau of
Prisons' (‘BOP') Security Designation and
Custody Classification Manuel [sic] Program Statement, and
receiving poor ‘program reviews' for not
participating in the BOP's Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program (‘IFRP') violates [sic] the
treaty and/or contract that the District of Columbia has with
the BOP (D.C. Code 24-101).” Petition (Doc. 1) at 4.
Petitioner further asserts that Section 24-101(b), of the
District of Columbia code, gives “BOP authority to
subject District of Columbia prisoners . . . ‘to any
law or regulation applicable to persons committed for
violations of laws of the United States CONSISTENT with the
sentenced [sic] imposed.'” Petition (Doc. 1) at 4.
Petitioner asserts that because BOP Program Statement Number
P5380.08 regarding the Inmate Financial Responsibility
Program “does not include the Victims of Violent Crime
Compensation Act of 1996 (“VVCCA”) . . .
[a]ssessments under the VVCCA is [sic] not an applicable IFRP
courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to
examine their own jurisdiction, ' . . . and a federal
court may not entertain an action over which it has no
jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d
861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). “Generally,
motions to contest the legality of a sentence must be filed
under § 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions
that challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a
sentence's execution must be brought pursuant to §
2241 in the custodial court.” Id. at 864.
Therefore, before proceeding to any other issue a court must
establish whether a habeas petition is filed pursuant to
§ 2241 or § 2255 to determine whether jurisdiction
is proper. Id. at 865.
Petitioner does not claim that the sentencing court imposed
an illegal sentence; rather, he seeks relief with respect as
to how the ordered criminal monetary penalties are being
collected while he is incarcerated at a federal facility.
Thus, Petitioner is challenging the manner, location, or
condition of the execution of his sentence. When a petitioner
challenges the “manner in which his sentence was
executed, ” the action is “maintainable only in a
petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241.” Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 331
(9th Cir. 1991); see also Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d
1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (considering whether the district court
impermissibly delegated its authority to BOP under the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”) under
§ 2241); United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d
1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering validity of IFRP requiring
restitution payments at a greater rate than specified by the
sentencing court under § 2241). Challenges brought
pursuant to § 2241 must be brought in the custodial
court. At the time of filing the Petition, Petitioner was
incarcerated at USP- Tucson in Arizona. Accordingly, this
Court has jurisdiction over this matter. See Francis v.
Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990).
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
[28 U.S.C. § 2241] does not specifically require
petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before filing petitions
for habeas corpus. [Footnote omitted.] However, we require,
as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust
available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking
relief under § 2241.
Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir.
2001), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v.
Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323
(2006). “The requirement that federal prisoners exhaust
administrative remedies before filing a habeas corpus
petition was judicially created; it is not a statutory
requirement.” Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533,
535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno
v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 2023-24,
132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995). “Nevertheless,
‘[p]rudential limits like jurisdictional limits and
limits on venue, are ordinarily not optional.'”
Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)
(alterations in original) (quoting Castro-Cortez v.
INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated
on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548
U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323 (2006)).
may require prudential exhaustion if ‘(1) agency
expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a
proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of
the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is
likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to
preclude the need for judicial review.'”
Id. (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335
F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). “When a petitioner does
not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court
ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without
prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has
exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.”
Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d ...