United States District Court, D. Arizona
Allen C. Taylor and Lynell M. Taylor, Plaintiffs,
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley Capital 1 Inc. Trust 2006-NC2 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-NC2, Defendant.
DOUGLAS L. RAYES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10, 2016, Plaintiffs Allen and Lynell Taylor filed suit
against Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company in
Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 1-1.) Defendant removed
the case to this Court one month later. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs
thereafter filed a first amended complaint alleging three
claims arising out of a residential mortgage and foreclosure
process: quiet title, false recordings perpetuated on
rescinded loan, and violation of the Truth in Lending Act.
October 20, 2016, the Court granted Defendant's motion to
dismiss because Plaintiffs' rescission theory failed and
their claims otherwise were barred by the statute of
limitations and a loan modification agreement. (Doc. 20.)
Plaintiffs have filed motions for leave to amend and to
vacate the dismissal order. (Docs. 21, 22.) The motions are
fully briefed, and no party requested oral argument. For
reasons stated below, the motions are denied.
Motion for Leave to Amend
seek leave to amend the first amended complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Rule 15(a)(2) requires the
Court to “freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Plaintiffs correctly note that this
directive should be applied liberally in favor of amendments.
(Doc. 21 at 2-3.) This Circuit has made clear, however, that
“leave need not be granted where the amendment of the
complaint would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is
sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or
creates undue delay.” Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil
Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
carefully reviewed the proposed second amended complaint,
(Doc. 21-1), and the record as a whole, the Court finds that
granting leave to amend would be futile and cause undue delay
and not all amendments are sought in good faith. The motion
for leave to amend therefore is denied.
The Proposed Pleading Violates Rule 8
Court notes at the outset that the second amended complaint
fails to comply with the pleading requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 8 requires a “short and
plain statement” of the claim showing an entitlement to
relief. Fed. R. Civ. 8(a)(2). The rule further provides that
each allegation must be “simple, concise, and
direct.” Fed. R. Civ. 8(d)(1).
second amended complaint falls far short of these pleading
requirements. The complaint is a lengthy narrative of events
that spans nearly 40 pages and includes more than 200 verbose
paragraphs and over 100 pages in exhibits. (Doc. 21-1, 10-1.)
The complaint impermissibly contains legal arguments and
related citations to various legal authorities. The document
reads more like a Rule 56 summary judgment motion and
statement of facts than a simple and concise Rule 8 pleading.
the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level, see Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), it is
unnecessary and in violation of Rule 8 for Plaintiffs
“to provide a lengthy narrative setting forth every
detail regardless of how trivial or irrelevant.”
Peyton v. Vasquez, No. 1:06-cv-01758-OWW-GSA, 2008
WL 4168837, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008). Stated
differently, a heightened pleading standard is no
“invitation to disregard's Rule 8's requirement
of simplicity, directness, and clarity.” McHenry v.
Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996). This
requirement “applies to good claims as well as bad, and
is a basis for dismissal independent of Rule 12(b)(6).”
Id. at 1179. The Court finds that the proposed
second amended complaint is so far removed from a simple,
direct, and clear pleading that it would be subject to
dismissal under Rule 8. See Id. (affirming dismissal
of complaint that engaged in “storytelling” and
contained “narrative rumblings”); Hatch v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985) (no
abuse of discretion in dismissing complaint pursuant to Rule
8 where the complaint and exhibits exceeded 70 pages in
length and were confusing and conclusory).
Granting Leave to Amend Would Be Futile
the second amended complaint satisfied Rule 8's pleading
requirements, allowing the proffered amendments “would
be nothing more than an exercise in futility.”
Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).
The proposed complaint asserts five claims: quiet title,
false recordings perpetuated on rescinded loan, breach of
contract, unconscionability, and a second breach of contract
claim. (Doc. 21-1, ¶¶ 110-208.) None of the claims,
as amended, states a plausible claim for relief.
Counts One and Two: Quiet Title and False Recording
have added Wells Fargo and Michael Bosco, the loan servicer
and trustee respectively, as defendants to the quiet title
and false recording claims, but these claims are nearly the
same as previously pled and continue to rely on the failed
rescission theory. (Doc. 21-1, ¶¶ 110-76.)
Plaintiffs re-allege that they rescinded the note and deed of
trust in September 2008 and the rescission automatically
voided the documents. (Id., ¶¶ 113, 132,
146.) In the dismissal order, however, the Court squarely
rejected the rescission theory given that Plaintiffs
admittedly signed the notice of right to cancel in November
2005 and the notice conspicuously disclosed the applicable
three-day rescission period. (Doc. 20 at 4-5.) The Court also
found the quiet title and false recording claims to be barred
by the statute of limitations and satisfied by the loan