United States District Court, D. Arizona
Anthony L. Rodrigues, Plaintiff,
Charles L. Ryan, et al., Defendants.
G. Campbell United States District Judge.
Anthony L. Rodrigues, who is currently confined in the Red
Rock Correctional Center in Eloy, Arizona, brought this civil
rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants
Rider, Diaz, and Ryan now move for summary judgment. (Doc.
166.) The Court issued a notice, as required under Rand
v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc), informing Plaintiff of his right to respond and
the requirements for doing so (Doc. 169), and Plaintiff filed
a response (Doc. 192). The Court will grant the motion for
action arises from alleged constitutional and Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) violations that arose while Plaintiff
was incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison (ASP)-Kingman.
(Doc. 15.) In his two-count second amended complaint,
Plaintiff names as Defendants Charles L. Ryan, Director of
the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC); R. Scott
Marquardt, President and CEO of Management Training
Corporation (MTC); Tara R. Diaz, ADC Contract Beds Bureau
Director; and Pamela Rider, Warden at ASP-Kingman's
Hualapai Unit. (Id. at 2.) On screening pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that
Plaintiff stated Eighth Amendment and ADA claims in count two
and directed Defendants to answer these claims. (Doc. 16.)
The Court dismissed count one and the remaining claims in
count two. Id. The Court subsequently dismissed
Defendant Marquardt and Plaintiff's ADA claims in count
two. (Doc. 104.) The remaining claims in this action are
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims in count two against
Defendants Rider, Diaz, and Ryan (hereinafter
remaining claims are based on the following allegations.
Plaintiff has a documented cardiac condition for which he is
receiving treatment. On November 26, 2013, Plaintiff was
sanctioned for two unexcused absences from a life skills
class. As a result, Plaintiff lost his preferred housing and
was reassigned to a two-man bunk located in the rear of the
dorm, where inmates smoked despite ADC policies prohibiting
indoor smoking. After his housing reassignment, Plaintiff was
hospitalized at least twice due to the effects of second-hand
smoke. Plaintiff requested from at least January 2, 2014 to
be reassigned to a new bunk away from the smoking, but he was
not moved until June 2014. Defendants were aware of the
environmental conditions that were causing Plaintiff serious
harm, but they denied his grievances without proper
investigation or consideration of his claims. (Doc. 15.)
must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears
the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its
motion and identifying those portions of the record, together
with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the
nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co.,
Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if
the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden
shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a
factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material
(a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law) and that the dispute is genuine (the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmovant). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton
Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th
Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue
of fact conclusively in its favor, First Nat'l Bank
of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89
(1968), but it must “come forward with specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, ”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation
omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth, but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
The court must believe the nonmovant's evidence and draw
all inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Id. at
255. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it
may consider any other materials in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P.
state an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim,
plaintiffs must meet a two-part test. “First, the
alleged constitutional deprivation must be, objectively,
sufficiently serious” such that the
“official's act or omission must result in the
denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). Second, the prison
official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of
mind, ” that is, he must act with “deliberate
indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). Deliberate indifference is a
higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due care
for the prisoner's safety. Id. at 835. In
defining “deliberate indifference” in this
context, the Supreme Court has imposed a subjective test:
“the official must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added).
relevant times in this action, Plaintiff was an inmate at
ASP-Kingman. (Doc. 15 at 1.) Plaintiff was sanctioned in
November 2013 for two unexcused absences in a life skills
class, and he lost his “phase III” privileges,
including preferred housing. (Id. ¶ 4.) As a
result, Plaintiff was moved from ...