United States District Court, D. Arizona
Honorable Cindy K. Jorgenson United States District Judge
before the Court is Timothy Paul Olmos' Motion to
Intervene in the instant case. (Doc. 126.) Also before the
Court is Olmos' Motion for Sanctions Against Defense
Counsel Paul Carter. (Doc. 131.) The Court has reviewed
Olmos' motions, as well as Defendants' Response to
Motion to Intervene (Doc. 126), Plaintiff Rudisill's
Opposition to Motion to Intervene by Timothy Paul Olmos (Doc.
128), and Defendant's Motion to Strike Non-Party
Olmos's Ex Parte Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 132). The
Court will deny Olmos' Motion to Intervene as untimely.
Further, Olmos has no standing to request sanctions.
September 13, 2013, Stephen Rudisill filed a pro se
civil rights complaint against Defendants Charles Ryan,
Robert Patton, Therese Schroeder, and Danial
Lundberg. (Doc. 1). The complaint alleged Defendants
violated Rudisill's Fourteenth Amendment rights by
segregating inmates based on race. (Doc. 1 at 10.) After
substituting counsel (Doc. 14), Rudisill filed a First
Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint on February 4, 2014.
(Doc. 19.) The parties participated in multiple settlement
conferences in front of the Honorable Charles R. Pyle on
January 30, April 6, June 30, and August 24, 2015. (Doc. 85,
90, 94, 99.) The parties finally advised the Court they
reached a settlement in the action on December 22, 2015.
(Doc. 113 at 2.)
February 5, 2016, the parties entered into an Amended
Stipulation for Order (“Stipulation”). (Doc.
119.) The Stipulation denied any allegations made in the
complaint, and formulated an intricate program that would
“apply to the 10 [Arizona Department of Corrections
(“ADC”)] complexes: Douglas, Eyman, Florence,
Lewis, Perryville, Phoenix, Safford, Tucson, Winslow, and
Yuma.” (Id. 119 at 2.) It also outlined
policies and procedures necessary to implement an
“Integrated Housing Program” (“IHP”).
“The purpose of the IHP is to foster racial equality
among inmates by assigning inmates to integrated housing
placements, with the intention that doing so will enhance
rehabilitation and security interests.” (Id.
at 119.) The Stipulation also agreed to develop and implement
a “Nondiscriminatory Employment Program”
(“NEP”), again to foster racial equality among
inmates by employing them regardless of race, with limited
exceptions when racial discrimination is narrowly-tailored to
serve a compelling state interest and when race is only one
factor in employment selection. (Id. at 8-9.) The
parties developed a schedule showing estimated dates for the
ADC to incorporate the procedures throughout its facilities.
(Id. at 9.) The IHP and the NEP were to be
implemented in all dormitory sex offender units between
January 1, 2017 and March 1, 2018. (Id.)
Court terminated this case on February 8, 2016. (Doc. 120.)
on December 12, 2016, Timothy Paul Olmos filed the pending
Motion to Intervene. (Doc. 126.) In it, Olmos states he is
housed in the Huachuca Unit of the ADC, in medium-custody
housing for sex offenders. (Id. at 2.) He argues
that sex offenders incarcerated at ADC facilities cannot work
in “premium jobs” in which other
similarly-situated inmates may be employed. Olmos claims he
has a right to intervene in the instant case because he has
an important property interest--his work--that has been
violated, and the Court's failure to grant intervention
would impair his ability to protect that interest because the
existing parties do not adequately represent it.
(Id. at 1, 3.)
believes his interest in this case stems from the fact that
he and other sex offenders are subject to the terms of the
IHP and NEP. (Id.at 3.) He claims that since the IHP
applies to all inmates, he should be afforded the equal right
to work in the “premium jobs”, just like other
non-sex offender inmates, but because sex offenders are not
able to be in lower than medium custody,  he is prevented
from ever obtaining these higher level jobs. Olmos concludes
that this prohibition eliminates incentives to participate in
the IHP or NEP, and because there is no incentive, the IHP
and NEP cannot “accomplish its goal of total inmate
compliance with the IHP.” (Id. at 3.)
point in either his Motion or Reply does Olmos claim that he
was discriminated against because of race; merely that his
classification based on sex offender status confines him to
medium custody, which in turn limits his ability to obtain
higher-level employment within the ADC.
Court must permit anyone to intervene who claims an interest
relating to the . . . transaction that is the subject of the
action, and whose interests would be impeded by the
disposition of the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). But,
“[i]t is well settled in this circuit that motions to
intervene for substantive reasons-to revisit original
settlements-must be timely.” County of Orange v.
Air California, 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94
L.Ed.2d 791 (1987); Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods,
572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
837, 99 S.Ct. 123, 58 L.Ed.2d 134 (1978). The question of
timeliness is at the sound discretion of the trial court.
Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v.
New York, 413 U.S. 345, 356, 93 S.Ct. 2591, 37 L.Ed.2d
648 (1973); United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370
F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). “When adjudging the
timeliness of substantive motions to intervene, this circuit
looks at: 1) the stage of the proceeding at which an
applicant seeks to intervene; 2) the prejudice to other
parties; and 3) the reason for and length of the
delay.” Air California, 799 F.2d at 537;
Alaniz, 572 F.2d 657 at 659. “[P]arties who
delay in attempting to intervene, and who end up doing so
only after the original parties have reached an acceptable
settlement, should not be able, without good reason, to
intervene when their intervention may well cause substantial
prejudice to the original parties.” Empire Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. Janet Greeson's A Place For
Us, Inc., 62 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1995).
attempts to intervene almost a year after the parties entered
into the Stipulation. Motions to intervene may be found
untimely in complicated litigation where the motion was not
filed until after settlement. See e.g., Air
California, 799 F.2d at 538 (intervenor untimely when
motion was filed after proposed settlement was reached by
parties after five years of negotiations); Alaniz,
572 F.2d 657 at 659 (motion to intervene filed approximately
two weeks after consent decree approved deemed was untimely);
Tesseyman v. Fisher, 231 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1955)
(intervenor's motion was untimely where litigation
extended over a year and motion was not filed until after
trial). This case took approximately three years to litigate.
The parties engaged in four separate settlement conferences
and the complex terms of the agreement necessitated revision
before the Stipulated Order was finalized (Doc. 114 and Doc.
119). Renegotiation of this agreement would result in
prejudice because a modification of the Stipulation would
unravel the original settlement. See e.g., Empire,
62 F.3d at 1220. The purpose of the agreement was to protect
inmates from racial discrimination, not classifications based
on sex offenses. Further, the classifications Olmos'
objects to are not part of the Stipulated Order, rather they
are designations included in the ADC's Inmate
Classification Order 801. Allowing Olmos' intervention
would force the parties to negotiate policies never presented
for litigation. In addition, the IHP and NEP programs are
already being implemented, and intervention would postpone or
eliminate future progress under the Stipulation. Defendants
would also suffer prejudice by incurring costs were they
required to revamp their housing and employment procedures to
accommodate Olmos' sex offender demands.
Olmos asserts he was unable to file his motion before because
he did not have knowledge that the litigation affected him
until the IHP and NEP programs were implemented in the sex
offender units. (Doc. 130 at 5.) Olmos' intervention
needed to occur when he knew “or ha[d] reason to know
that his interests might be adversely affected by the outcome
of litigation.” United States v. Alisal Water
Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). Although Olmos
brought the pending Motion soon after speculating his
interest in his job may be affected by the Stipulation, in
fact, the Stipulation had no effect on his employment
situation. Olmos' ability to achieve a lower custodial
classification and a higher level of employment is not
affected by implementation of the policies determined in
settlement. Absent the Stipulation, Arizona Department of
Corrections Department Order 801 would still classify him as
a medium custody inmate. In addition, Olmos has not asserted
any racial discrimination under the IHP or NEP; he was not
prevented from obtaining “premium” employment
through any racial classification, only his sex offender
status. Therefore, Olmos' asserted interests in his sex
offender custody status and employment are not impeded by the
disposition of this matter, and despite the purported
timeliness of his Motion, he is not entitled to an
intervention of right.
Court finds Olmos' Motion is untimely; it was filed long
after the conclusion of the action, the parties would suffer
prejudice upon Olmos' intervention, and Olmos has shown