United States District Court, D. Arizona
Curtis Lee Block brought this pro se civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Phoenix Police Department
Officers Adam Applegate, James Ray, and Seth Jahnke. (Doc.
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, which Plaintiff opposes. (Docs. 34, 57.)
Court will grant the Motion and terminate the action.
First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on June 21,
2014, Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when
they entered the curtilage of his residence to arrest him
without a warrant. (Doc. 7.)
move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) they did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because Plaintiff had
numerous misdemeanor warrants for his arrest and (2)
Plaintiff's claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). (Doc. 34.)
Court issued an Order with the Notice required under Rand
v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 1998), which
informed Plaintiff of the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 37.) After some procedural delays,
the Motion for Summary Judgment is fully briefed and ready
for ruling. (Docs. 57, 63.)
Summary Judgment Standard
must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears
the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its
motion and identifying those portions of the record, together
with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the
nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099,
1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial
responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the
fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and
that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D.
Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant
need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in
its favor, First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288- 89 (1968); however, it must
“come forward with specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ.
summary judgment, the judge's function is not to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court does not make
credibility determinations; it must believe the
nonmovant's evidence and draw all inferences in the
nonmovant's favor. Id. at 255; Soremekun v.
Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir.
2007). The court need consider only the cited materials, but
it may consider any other materials in the record.
14, 2014, Sergeant Jahnke met with members of his squad and
informed them that there was probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff on an attempted robbery charge stemming from a 2012
incident. (Doc. 35, Defs.' Statement of Facts ¶ 1.)
Applegate conducted a records check of Plaintiff and found
that he had numerous misdemeanor warrants for his arrest,
primarily for failure to appear, and Applegate shared this
information with Jahnke and Ray. (Id. ¶ 2.)
Defendants decided to conduct a knock-and-talk at
Plaintiff's last known address; however, they were
advised Plaintiff had not been at that residence recently.
(Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) Defendants attempted to
locate Plaintiff at possible job sites and another
residential address, to no avail. (Id. ¶¶
at the last residential address directed Defendants to a
house on the corner of 10th Avenue and Buckeye, where
Defendants observed a bicycle that matched the description of
the bicycle Plaintiff was known to ride. (Id.
¶¶ 13, 16.) This house had a chain link fence
surrounding the front yard and a gate. (Id. ¶
17.) Applegate approached the gate and could see someone
seated inside a porch enclosure; Applegate called out
Plaintiff's name, and Plaintiff came to the gate.
(Id. ¶¶ 18-19; Doc. 58 at 2.) Upon
request, Plaintiff handed his Arizona driver's license to
Applegate, which confirmed Plaintiff's identity. (Doc. 35
¶ 20; Doc. 58 at 2.) Applegate asked Plaintiff to come
out of the yard to discuss a case with him, but Plaintiff
refused and advised Applegate to get a warrant. (Doc. 35
¶ 22; Doc. 58 at 2.) According to Plaintiff, he and
Applegate had a discussion about the officers' need for a
warrant to enter the premises absent any exigent
circumstances. (Doc. 7 at 3.) Plaintiff also told Applegate
that he was aware there was a misdemeanor warrant for his
arrest; however, Applegate told Plaintiff the officers were
not there on the misdemeanor warrant. (Doc. 58 at 2.)
then went into a huddle, and Applegate explained the
situation to Jahnke; they agreed that Applegate would attempt
to detain Plaintiff the next time he made contact. (Doc. 58
at 2; Doc. 35 ¶ 23.) Applegate returned to the front
gate and handed Plaintiff his driver's license back; when
Plaintiff reached for his license, Applegate grabbed his