United States District Court, D. Arizona
G. Campbell United States District Judge
John Priestley, Jr., apparently as a beneficiary of the John
Priestley, Sr. Trust, filed his complaint in this case on
November 28, 2016. Doc. 1. On January 30, 2017, the Court
screened Plaintiff's complaint, entered an order
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim, and
granted Plaintiff until February 24, 2017 to file an amended
complaint. Doc. 12. The Court dismissed the amended complaint
for failure to state a claim, failure to follow Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and failure to follow this
Court's order of January 30, 2017. Id. Plaintiff
was afforded one final opportunity to file an amended
complaint in compliance of Rule 8 and this Court's orders
(Docs. 12, 19). On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed his second
amended complaint. Doc. 22. The Court has reviewed
Plaintiff's second amended complaint, and will dismiss it
without further leave to amend.
proceedings, a district court “shall dismiss the case
at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . .
. fails to state a claim on which relief can be
granted[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of
§ 1915 concerns prisoner litigation, § 1915(e)
applies to all IFP proceedings. Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1126 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). “Section
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) . . . allows a district court to dismiss
sua sponte . . . a complaint that fails to state a
claim[.]” Id. at 1130. “It is also clear
that section 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district
court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to
state a claim.” Id. at 1127. A district court
dismissing a case under this section “should grant
leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was
made, unless it determines that the pleading could not
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”
Id. at 1127-29 (citations omitted).
Second Amended Complaint.
the original and first amended complaints, Plaintiff's
claims continue to focus on two houses in Buckeye, Arizona.
Unlike the first two complaints, however, Plaintiff's
second amended complaint names only two Defendants: Rick Dane
Moore, Esq., and Patrick Priestly, successor trustee of the
John J. Priestly Trust. See Doc. 22. The second
amended complaint alleges a number of wrongs committed by
other parties, including allegations that a judge
“acting under color of law” violated
Plaintiff's civil rights. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff
requests that the Court “allow hearing by telephone to
review alleged racketeering acts; compare I.R.S. records
available . . . [and] Appoint a Certified Fraud Analyst at
Defendant's expense upon preliminary finding of
fraud.” Id. at 19-20. Plaintiff also demands
that the Court “abrogate the anti injunction act or
follow 13-2314.04 B to prevent and restrain further abuse of
Judicial power. . . . order replacement of the entire stock
portfolio to be replaced . . . . [order Defendants to] cease
and desist cutting trees/replace $20, 000[, ]” and
grant other forms of relief that are not clear.
alleges few new facts in his second amended complaint.
See Doc. 22. Most are incomplete and fail to either
identify the actor or provide needed context. Furthermore,
the complaint frequently fails to connect Plaintiff's
alleged facts to his claims. The amended complaint fails to
state the basis for this Court's jurisdiction, the legal
nature of Plaintiff's claim, or the actions of Defendants
that give rise to liability.
provides that a complaint should contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “Each
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1). A complaint that fails to comply with
these requirements may be dismissed. See McHenry v.
Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1996).
fails to allege specific facts showing how each Defendant
violated the particular right at issue in a given count.
Plaintiff scatters facts throughout the complaint and
includes allegations that seem irrelevant.
does not name an immune party as a Defendant to the action,
but the second amended complaint does allege claims against a
judge. See Doc. 22 at 5-6. Specifically, Plaintiff
states that “[t]he Plaintiff claims this Judge whose
duty is to protect civil rights is acting under color of law.
. .The actions of these Defendants in concert with a Judge
acting under color of law violating due process entitles
Plaintiff to vindication from this conviction and relief from
any sentence, penalty or sanction imposed.”
Id. Plaintiff appears to allege that an Oklahoma
judge conspired with opposing parties to rule against
Plaintiff. The Court need not sift through more because the
judge in question is entitled to judicial immunity for
decision made in the adjudication of cases. Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (“When applied to
the paradigmatic judicial acts involved in resolving disputes
between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court,
the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity has not been
particularly controversial.”) Because the violation
Plaintiff alleges against the judge stems from a decision
made from the bench, Plaintiff's claim may not stand.
Federal Law Claims.
alleges that Defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
§ 1985, § 1986, § 1988, “the Fifth,
Sixth Amendments, and Fourteenth Amendments, Freedom of
speech and Freedom of Association and Equal protection, and