United States District Court, D. Arizona
G. Campbell United States District Judge
Plaintiff Sarah Nathreen Nakanwagi filed a complaint against
Defendant Central Arizona Shelter Services, Inc.
(“CASS”) seeking various forms of relief for an
alleged violation of her state, federal, and international
rights. Doc. 1. Defendant has filed a motion for summary
judgment. Doc. 17. In response, Plaintiff has filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Doc. 25. Neither party has
requested oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court will grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
seeking summary judgment “bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the
record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is
appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). Summary judgment is also appropriate against a party
who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed
evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
alleges that she was physically attacked by three CASS
security guards while waiting to use the bathroom at a
shelter. She alleges physical and emotional
injuries, and seeks a broad range of relief.
Federal Law Claims.
brings federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 3617, and 28 U.S.C. §
Sections 1981, 1982, 1988.
1981 guarantees “[a]ll persons . . . the same right . .
. to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens.” CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553
U.S. 442, 458 (2008). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts
indicating that Defendant's conduct or the conduct of the
security guards interfered with her ability to make or
enforce a contract. As a result, the Court will grant summary
judgment as to Plaintiff's § 1981 claims.
1982 provides for the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages for individuals who suffer intentional discrimination
in employment. Plaintiff does not allege that she was
employed by Defendant or was discriminated against as an
employee. Thus, the Court will grant summary judgment as to
Plaintiff's § 1982 claims.
1988 does not provide a cause of action, but allows for an
award of attorneys' fees and expert fees.
1983 is a vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal
constitutional and statutory challenges to actions by state
and local officials.” Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d
1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege two distinct elements: (1) the violation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, (2) by a person acting under the color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Dismissal of
a § 1983 claim “is ...