United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Douglas L. Rayes United States District Judge.
In this
civil rights action, Plaintiff Kessele Livingston alleges
that Defendants, who are Arizona Child Protective Services
(CPS) caseworkers, violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983 by infringing upon his substantive due process rights
and discriminating against him because of his race. (Doc.
21.) Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's third
amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). (Doc. 26.) For reasons stated below, the motion is
granted in part.[1]
BACKGROUND[2]
Plaintiff,
a Liberian national, came to the United States in 2007 as an
eleven-year- old refugee fleeing civil war. (Doc. 21
¶¶ 6-8.) He was born May 5, 1996, but upon
admission to the United States his aunt incorrectly recorded
his birth date as January 2, 1994. (¶¶ 9-11.) As a
result, the resident card issued by the United States listed
Plaintiff's birth date as January 1, 1994 and he
thereafter was deemed two years older than his actual
age.[3]
(¶ 36.)
CPS
obtained custody of Plaintiff in 2011, and in December of
that year Plaintiff informed his caseworkers, Defendants
Rebecca Ohton, Teresa Patterson, and Lauri Esslinger
(“2012 caseworkers”), that he was two years
younger than his recorded age. (¶¶ 36, 53.)
Plaintiff's GED instructor and a psychiatrist also noted
a discrepancy between Plaintiff's recorded age and how he
appeared and behaved. (¶¶ 30, 37.) Nevertheless,
Plaintiff was “aged out” of CPS more than two
years early, had to leave his group home, and was denied
restorative services. (¶¶ 39-40, 49.)
Though
he was a juvenile, Plaintiff later was convicted of an adult
criminal offense based on the erroneously recorded birth
date, which compromised his immigration status. (¶¶
69, 71-72.) Plaintiff was placed into removal proceedings and
detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at its
facility in Florence, Arizona. (¶ 74.) While in ICE
custody, a forensic dental analysis confirmed that Plaintiff
was a minor. (¶ 76.) Plaintiff's federal records
were then corrected to reflect a May 5, 1996 birth date.
(¶ 77.)
Plaintiff
was released from ICE custody and returned to CPS care.
(¶ 84.) There, his new caseworkers-Defendants Robin
Ance, Brenda Lemley-Spence, Maria Villagrana, Anrise Reeves,
and Lisa Lucchesi (“2013 caseworkers”)-told him
that he need not comply with his probation requirements.
(¶ 89.) No attempt was made to correct Plaintiff's
criminal record or contact his probation office, and he was
subsequently arrested and imprisoned twice for violating his
probation. (¶¶ 86, 95, 97.)
Plaintiff's
criminal charges eventually were set aside and he was deemed
lawfully present in the country. (¶¶ 103-104.)
After Plaintiff turned eighteen, he brought this action
against his 2012 and 2013 caseworkers, who now move to
dismiss.
LEGAL
STANDARD
A
successful Rule 12(b)(6) motion must show that the complaint
lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege facts
sufficient to support such a theory. See Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.
1988). A complaint that sets forth a cognizable legal theory
will survive a motion to dismiss only where it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although the
court must take “the well-pled factual allegations in
the complaint as true, [it is] ‘not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.'” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff
alleges that his 2012 and 2013 caseworkers violated his
substantive due process rights and discriminated against him
because of his race by failing to confirm his age and correct
the error despite being aware of the problem and its
potentially serious ramifications. Defendants argue that the
complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to
state plausible claims to relief under 42 U.S.C. §§
1983 and 1981. Defendants further argue that, even if
Plaintiff has adequately alleged civil rights violations,
they are entitled to qualified immunity. As explained more
fully below, the Court disagrees in part and concludes that
Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim under § 1983
against the 2012 caseworkers. The Court agrees with
Defendants, however, that Plaintiff has not stated a
plausible claim under § 1983 against the 2013
caseworkers, nor a plausible claim under § 1981 against
any Defendant.
I.
Section 1983
To
sustain an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of
a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.
Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants, acting at all relevant times under
color of state law, deprived him of his substantive due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in three ways:
(1) the 2012 caseworkers failed to provide him with
age-appropriate care, (2) all Defendants failed to correct
his age on official records, and (3) the 2013 caseworkers
told ...