from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20161809001 The
Honorable Richard D. Nichols, Judge
Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By Jacob R. Lines,
Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for Appellee
Kimminau Law Firm, PC, Tucson By Chris J. Kimminau Counsel
Espinosa authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Kelly  concurred.
Bo Johnson was convicted in Green Valley Justice Court of
threatening or intimidating in violation of A.R.S. §
13-1202(A)(1) and misconduct involving weapons in violation
of A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(12). Johnson appealed his
convictions to the Pima County Superior Court, which affirmed
them, and he now appeals to this court, challenging the
validity of the weapons misconduct statute, and asking us to
take jurisdiction to reverse his threatening or intimidating
conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm his weapons
misconduct conviction and dismiss the appeal of his
threatening or intimidating conviction.
and Procedural Background
In September 2014, Johnson and D.M. became involved in a
verbal conflict while on the road in separate cars. The
following day, the two encountered one another in a school
parking lot. D.M. walked over to Johnson's truck and
Johnson, who was handling a gun, said words to the effect of
"driving like that will get you shot." D.M.
reported both the gun and the statement to a police officer
assigned to the school. The officer then spoke with Johnson
and examined the gun, which had bullets in its magazine
although none in its firing chamber.
Johnson was charged with two counts of threatening or
intimidating and one count of misconduct involving weapons.
One of the threatening or intimidating counts was
subsequently dismissed, and Johnson was convicted of the two
remaining charges, placed on probation, and ordered to
complete four sessions of anger management and pay a fine.
The Pima County Superior Court affirmed his convictions in
Johnson filed a motion for rehearing on his weapons
misconduct conviction, arguing that § 13-3102, which
contains an exception for an unloaded firearm, is
unconstitutionally vague because it lacks a definition of
"loaded, " which could be construed as limited to a
gun having a bullet in its firing chamber. The superior court
denied the motion and again affirmed Johnson's
convictions, noting that the common understanding of
"loaded" is "containing ammunition."
Johnson appealed to this court, arguing the superior court
erred in affirming both convictions and in particular that
13-3102(A)(12) and 13-3102(I)(1) are unconstitutionally
Our jurisdiction over appeals from a justice court ruling
already appealed to superior court is limited to actions
involving the relevant statute's "validity."
A.R.S. § 22-375(A). Accordingly, we have appellate
jurisdiction to hear Johnson's challenge to the
constitutional validity of § 13-3102 but not his
argument that the superior court erred in affirming his
threatening or intimidating conviction.
on School Property
As noted above, we consider only Johnson's argument that
13-3102(A)(12) and 13-3102(I)(1) are unconstitutionally vague
when read together. Section 13-3102(A)(12) provides that
misconduct involving weapons occurs when a person knowingly
"[p]ossess[es] a deadly weapon on school grounds."
Section 13-3102(I)(1), however, provides an exception to
(A)(12) when the weapon is a "[f]irearm that is not
loaded and that is carried within a means of transportation
under the control of an adult." Johnson essentially
argues that the Arizona statute is unconstitutionally vague
because some other states have defined "loaded"
more narrowly than simply "containing ammunition."
In support, Johnson cites Utah's definition of
"loaded" as "when there is an unexpended
cartridge, shell, or projectile in the firing position"
or "when an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile
is in a position whereby the manual operation of any
mechanism once would cause [it] to be fired." Utah Code
§ 76-10-502(1)-(2). In contrast, however, California has
defined "loaded" in one context as "whenever
both the firearm and the unexpended ammunition capable of
being discharged from the firearm are in the immediate
possession of the same person" and otherwise as
"when there is an unexpended cartridge or shell . . .
in, or ...