United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
A. Teilfefirg Senior United States District Judge
before the Court is Pure Wafer, Inc.'s (“Pure
Wafer's”) Motion for Judgment on Remand
(“Motion”). (Doc. 135). The City of Prescott (the
“City”) and the City's individual
administrators in their official capacities filed a Response
to Pure Wafer's Motion. (Doc. 139). Pure Wafer has filed
a Reply, (Doc. 141), and the City has filed an Objection to
Pure Wafer's Reply, (Doc. 145). The Court now rules on
Pure Wafer's Motion.
Court previously detailed the factual and procedural
background in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Permanent Injunction (“Findings and
Conclusions”). (See Doc. 87 at 1-13). After a
bench trial, the Court found that the City violated the
Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution when it declared
that its sewage treatment plant would no longer accept
effluent discharged by Pure Wafer. (See Id. at 13-
29). Because the Court found in favor of Pure Wafer on its
Contract Clause claims, it did not reach the merits of Pure
Wafer's alternative claims for breach of contract and the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing resulting
from the parties' obligations under a Development
Agreement. (Id. at 29). The Court also granted Pure
Wafer's request for a permanent injunction, enjoining the
City from enforcing various provisions of the City's
Ordinance No. 4856-1313 (the “Ordinance”) against
Pure Wafer. (See Id. at 29-32). The Court finally
entered a final judgment in Pure Wafer's favor.
(“Judgment, ” Doc. 88).
City appealed the Findings and Conclusions as well as the
Judgment. (Doc. 95). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (the
“Ninth Circuit”) affirmed-in-part and
reversed-in-part and remanded for further proceedings.
Pure Wafer Inc. v. City of Prescott, 845 F.3d 943,
959 (9th Cir. 2017). In particular, the Ninth Circuit held:
[W]hile the City prevails on its appeal of the Contract
Clause issue, judgment for Pure Wafer can be sustained on the
alternative ground that the City has breached its contract
with Pure Wafer. We leave it for the district court on remand
to decide the appropriate remedy.
Id. at 958. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the
Court's judgment on the City's counterclaim.
Id. at 958 n.14.
reviewing the parties' Joint Status Report on Remand, the
Court continued to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Pure Wafer's breach of contract claims and deemed Pure
Wafer's complaint amended to conform to the evidence
presented at trial. (Doc. 134 at 1-2). The Court also ordered
supplemental briefing on the appropriate remedy in light of
the Ninth Circuit's opinion. (Id.).
plaintiff must satisfy the following four-factor test before
a court may grant permanent injunctive relief: (1) the
plaintiff must suffer irreparable injury; (2) legal remedies,
such as money damages, are inadequate; (3) an equitable
remedy is warranted in light of the balance of hardships
between the parties; and (4) a permanent injunction would not
disserve the public interest. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson
Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156-57 (2010) (citing eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
“[T]he decision whether to grant or deny injunctive
relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district
courts, and . . . such discretion must be exercised
consistent with traditional principles of equity.”
eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
Wafer argues that the Court should grant its request for a
permanent injunction that (1) enjoins the City from enforcing
portions of the Ordinance against Pure Wafer; and (2) orders
the City to comply with specific portions of the Development
Agreement. (See Doc. 135-1 at 28-29). The City
argues that Pure Wafer's request is duplicative, and the
Court should only order it to comply with specific portions
of the Development Agreement. (See Doc. 139-1 at
2-3). Because the basis justifying Pure Wafer's remedy is
different from the basis the Court relied upon in its
Findings and Conclusions, the Court will re-analyze the four
factors necessary to issue a permanent injunction consistent
with the Ninth Circuit's mandate.
Specific Performance or a Permanent Injunction
threshold matter, the parties disagree whether the Court
should order specific performance and/or grant Pure
Wafer's request for a permanent injunction. In
particular, Pure Wafer argues that both remedies are
appropriate, (Docs. 135 at 5-10; 141 at 2-3), while the City
argues that only specific performance is an ...