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Zounds Hearing Franchising LLC v. Bower

United States District Court, D. Arizona

September 19, 2017

Zounds Hearing Franchising, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company; and Zounds Hearing Inc., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiffs,
Edward T. Bower and Barbara Bower, husband and wife; and Lend Me Your Ears, Inc., an Ohio corporation; Defendants. Zounds Hearing Franchising, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company; and Zounds Hearing Inc., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiffs,
Frank R. Graziano and Mary E. Graziano, husband and wife; and FNM Enterprises, Inc., an Ohio corporation, Defendants. Zounds Hearing Franchising, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company; and Zounds Hearing Inc., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiffs,
Glenn Harbold, an individual; and Perfect Clarity LLC, an Ohio limited liability company, Defendants. Zounds Hearing Franchising, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company; and Zounds Hearing Inc., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiffs,
Lawrence R. Woerner and Nancy Woerner, husband and wife; Susan Steigerwald and David Steigerwald, husband and wife; Lawrence W. Woerner and Rosemarie Woerner, husband and wife; and WOCO Franchise LLC, an Ohio limited liability company, Defendants. Edward T. Bower; Lend Me Your Ears, Inc.; Frank Graziano; FNM Enterprises, Inc.; Glenn Harbold; Perfect Clarity, LLC; Lawrence Woerner; WOCO Franchise, LLC, Plaintiffs,
Zounds Hearing Franchising, LLC; Zounds Hearing, Inc.; Frannet, LLC; Jose Torres, dba Frannet of South Florida; Todd Pfister; FranChoice, Inc.; Chris L. Cynkar Defendants.

          ORDER [RE: ALL CASES]

          Neil V. Wake Senior United States District Judge.

         Statutes in most states protect investors in franchises by, among other things, requiring certain disclosures, prohibiting certain contract terms in franchise agreements, requiring others, and giving certain rights whether or not stated in the franchise agreements. See Mitchell J. Kassoff, Complex of Federal and State Laws Regulates Franchise Operations as Their Popularity Grows, 73 N.Y. St. B. J. 48 n.5 (Feb. 2001) (listing 33 states). If an in-state franchisor selling an in-state franchise to an in-state franchisee tried to escape those obligations by writing in his franchise agreement that the franchisee agrees he does not have to comply with those laws, he would be laughed out of court. That is because the very nature of such statutes is to impose obligations on people that override what they might otherwise agree to among themselves. Such statutes say what you cannot agree to.

         Indeed, it is in the nature of investor protection statutes generally that they override the “freedom of contract” of investors to waive their statutory rights in advance. That is the whole point of such statutes. For example, sellers of securities cannot excuse themselves from state securities laws by saying in their offering that the buyer agrees the state's securities laws do not apply to the seller-or that the laws of some more lenient state will apply instead of the laws of the state of the offering.

         A few states like Arizona have no special protections for investors in franchises. In Arizona any contract term and anything short of fraud will go. It is now common for franchisors in laissez faire states like Arizona to try to immunize themselves from the investor protection laws of the states in which they do business by saying it is so in their contracts. They include in the franchise agreement a provision choosing the law of a state other than the state where the franchise operates, a state with lesser or no franchisee protections.

         The question posed in this case is whether such a contract term is valid, whether an out-of-state franchisor can avoid local investor protection statutes by getting the investor to agree that local law does not apply and the law of some other state applies instead. The cases are surprisingly diverse on this question. The diversity-and the error of some of the cases-arises from courts' attempts to apply the highly abstract methodology of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 and 188 (1971).

         The answer is clearly no. Under choice-of-law principles, parties cannot circumvent by contract the investor protections a state provides to all within its boundaries, especially for its own residents. The state of the franchise situs is the state whose laws would apply in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties-i.e., the state with the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 187(2)(b), 188 (1971). Under the better analysis, that is so even if the franchisee being protected is a resident of a different state. But in this case the franchisees are residents of the state of the situs of the franchise, and the state that has the strongest interest in protecting its own residents. The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws does not present a bright line rule, but the Comments do present an analysis with a clear result. Cases that miss that result are to be forgiven but not followed.

         This is an easy case. It is triply easy. First, the franchise and the franchisees are both located in Ohio. In those circumstances, a foreign-domiciled franchisor may not “contract” out of the Ohio protections any more than an Ohio-domiciled franchisor could. There is no scenario in which another state would have a materially greater interest in having its less protective franchise laws applied than the more protective laws of the state in which the franchisee resides and the franchise operates. Without that materially greater interest in another state, it is beyond the power of the parties to contract for application of the other state's law.

         Second, even if the franchisee were out-of-state, the state of location of the franchise would still have a materially greater interest in having its protective franchise laws applied than the state of the franchisor with less protective laws.

         Third, if there were any doubt that the investor protection franchise laws override parties' ability to contract out of them, and thus are fundamental state policy, the Ohio statute says it a second time: that the franchisee protection laws are fundamental policy of Ohio out of which the parties cannot contract. It is not necessary for a state to say twice that its law controls whether or not the parties agree. But Ohio did say it twice.

         Investor protection franchise laws reflect a fundamental policy of a state as to what contract terms are permitted and legal for investments and businesses in the state. Franchisors may not exempt themselves from such laws merely by entering into the forbidden contract terms and adding that the law of some other state will substitute. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 cmt. g (“[A] fundamental policy may be embodied in a statute which makes one or more kinds of contracts illegal or which is designed to protect a person against the oppressive use of superior bargaining power.”)

         The cases on validity of franchise choice-of-law clauses call for more extended review, with harmonization where possible and rejection where necessary.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Before the Court is the Zounds Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint or, Alternatively, to Stay Proceedings and Compel Mediation. (Doc. 43.) Zounds Hearing Franchising, LLC, is an Arizona limited liability company that franchises third parties to operate hearing aid centers under the Zounds trade name. Its parent company, Zounds Hearing, Inc., is a Delaware corporation that sells Zounds approved products. Both companies have their principal place of business in Arizona. They will be referred to as “Zounds.” In 2013, Zounds entered into franchise agreements with four Ohio companies and their owners (“the Franchisees”) to operate hearing aid centers in Ohio.

         As is common among state franchise laws, the Ohio franchise statutes protect buyers of franchises and other business opportunity plans by limitations and prohibitions on the kinds of terms that may be included in franchise agreements. They commonly track or exceed the disclosures and protections afforded under Federal Trade Commission Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 436, which are enforceable only by the FTC and not by private right of action. See 1 W. Michael Garner, Franchise and Distribution Law and Practice 6.3-6.4 (2016) (summarizing state laws). The state franchise disclosure statutes are enforceable by the wronged franchisees themselves.

         The franchises fared poorly and two are already out of business. On May 11, 2016, the Franchisees filed an action in Ohio state court alleging Zounds violated the Ohio Business Opportunity Purchasers Protection Act. They allege specifically that Zounds' franchise agreements failed to give a five-day cancellation right as required by Ohio Rev. Code § 1334.06, and that Zounds made false, misleading, and/or inconsistent representations in connection with the sale of the franchises in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 1334.03. They assert that during a pre-signing “discovery day” agents of Zounds made statements regarding the revenue the Franchisees might expect to receive and showed them purported monthly financial results of an affiliated Zounds franchise on a whiteboard, which were not in the mandatory disclosure documents and could not be substantiated. At oral argument counsel acknowledged that the Franchisees will prevail under Ohio law and will fail under Arizona law. Zounds responded the next day by filing four separate declaratory judgment actions in this Court in Arizona.

         The franchise agreements include identical provisions regarding choice of Arizona law, exclusive Arizona venue, and mandatory pre-suit mediation in Arizona at the sole option of Zounds. Section 22(A) provides, “This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Arizona, without reference to Arizona's conflict of law principles.” Section 22(E) provides that “any actions arising out of or related to this Agreement must be initiated and litigated in the state court of general jurisdiction closest to Phoenix, Arizona or, if appropriate, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.” Section 22(C) provides that, at Zounds' election, Franchisees must mediate their disputes in Arizona before filing suit. But the section is more than a mediation clause; it precludes the Franchisees from ending mediation and suing until either Zounds or the Mediator consents. Zounds is free to terminate whenever it wants.

         Zounds' four actions in this Court seek declarations that the term for pre-suit mediation in Arizona “is valid and enforceable and that mediation must occur in Phoenix, Arizona, as a condition precedent to the suit Defendants filed in Ohio.” Zounds burdened the Franchisees with four lawsuits in this distant forum to have this Court instruct the Ohio court how to rule on a defense in the Ohio lawsuit. This Court consolidated those four actions on June 30, 2016, under Rule 42, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Local Rule LRCiv 42.1, notwithstanding the franchise agreements' attempt to disable this Court from using those rules in the administration of its cases.

         Zounds removed the Ohio action to federal court and then moved to dismiss or transfer to Arizona, thus presenting for decision in the Ohio court the very issue on which it had sued the Franchisees four times in this Court-whether the Ohio franchise statutes trump the franchise agreements' Arizona choice of law and venue provisions or vice versa. The Ohio Federal court expressly did not decide that question but instead transferred the Ohio case to this Court solely in its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for the convenience of parties and witnesses. All further motions were expressly left to this Court to decide. By agreement of the parties, the transferred case was consolidated here with the four Arizona cases.

         In light of the transferor court's limited ruling, Zounds filed this Renewed Motion, which poses the question the Ohio court did not decide, whether the franchise agreements successfully exempt Zounds from Ohio's franchise disclosure laws, including the prohibition of out-of-Ohio venue terms, or the Ohio laws govern and invalidate the Arizona venue and choice of law clauses. (Doc. 43.) The Ohio statutes govern and the contrary terms in the franchise agreements are invalid. The Motion will be denied, and the case originally filed in Ohio will be transferred to the Northern District of Ohio under the mandatory venue term of the Ohio statutes.


         “A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the forum state's choice of law rules.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). Arizona and Ohio both follow the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) (“Restatement”) when deciding whether a contractual choice of law is valid and enforceable. Swanson v. Image Bank, Inc., 206 Ariz. 264, 266, 77 P.3d 439, 441 (2003); Schulke Radio Prods., Ltd. v. Midwestern Broad. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 436, 439, 453 N.E.2d 683, 686 (1983).

         Under the Restatement as pared down for this case, there are three steps: (1) as a starting point, the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties governs and (2) if the parties chose the law of another state, the law of the chosen state will govern (3) unless it would be contrary to fundamental policy of the state with the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties and that state has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue.

         A. Ohio Is the State with the Most Significant Relationship to the Transaction and the Parties

         The rules for finding which state's laws would apply in the first place are found in the Restatement § 188 and § 6. Section 6 states a non-exclusive list of factors relevant to choice of the applicable rule of law:

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

         Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § (6).

         With respect to an issue in contract, the Restatement § 188 states additional focused rules and contacts to be considered in determining the law applicable to an issue:

(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine ...

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