United States District Court, D. Arizona
A. Teilborg Senior United States District Judge.
before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal (Doc.
199), Plaintiff's Motion for Miscellaneous Relief under
Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule
60”) (Doc. 180), and several additional motions and
miscellaneous filings by Plaintiff asking the Court to take
“Judicial Notice” of purportedly
“new” information or otherwise reconsider past
holdings. (Doc. 176, 177, 183, 186, 188, 189, 192, 193, 195,
203, 204, 205, 209, 210, 211, 213, 217, 219, 220, 221). Also
pending before the Court is the Pinal County
Defendants' Motion to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious
Litigant (Doc. 197), which the State Defendants subsequently
joined (Doc. 198). The Court now rules on the motions.
motions relate to a §1983 claim Cristobal Hernandez, Jr.
(“Plaintiff”) brought against Defendants in
October 2011. (Doc. 1). On July 9, 2012, this Court dismissed
all of Plaintiff's claims except one, which was a Fourth
Amendment claim against Defendant Parry, a Pinal County
deputy who conducted a traffic stop of Plaintiff. (Doc. 42).
Subsequently, on September 10, 2013, this Court granted
summary judgment to Defendant Parry and issued a final
judgment for Defendants. (Doc. 167).
then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On
August 26, 2016, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court's
ruling and ultimately denied Plaintiff's many motions and
requests, including a request for reconsideration, a panel
rehearing, and a rehearing en banc. Hernandez v.
Brewer, 658 Fed.Appx. 837, 839 (9th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied sub nom. Hernandez v. Ducey, 137 S.Ct.
1333 (2017), reh'g denied, 137 S.Ct. 2151
(2017). Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, which was
denied on March 30, 2017. Id. Plaintiff's
subsequent petition for rehearing was also denied.
this Court entered a judgment in Plaintiff's case, which
was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and refused to be reheard
by the Supreme Court, Plaintiff reverted to filing motions
and requests in this Court. Plaintiff submitted numerous
motions calling the Court's attention to
“new” evidence or case law (Doc. 176, 177, 183,
186, 188, 189, 192, 193, 195, 203, 204, 205, 209, 210, 211,
213, 217, 219, 220, 221), in addition to a more formal
request for relief under Rule 60 (Doc. 180) and a Motion for
Recusal (Doc. 199). Defendants filed timely responses to each
of Plaintiff's motions calling for action. (Doc. 184,
187, 190, 194, 200, 206, 214, 218). Additionally, Defendants
asked the Court to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigant and
enter a pre-filing order against him. (Doc. 197, 198). The
Court will first analyze Plaintiff's pending Motion for
Recusal (Doc. 199).
MOTION FOR RECUSAL
moves for the undersigned judge's recusal “for not
follow[ing] binding case law.” (Doc. 199).
statutes govern whether a federal judge must recuse in a
particular case. The first, 28 U.S.C. § 144, provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes
and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge
before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse
party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but
another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. The
affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the
belief that bias or prejudice exists, . . . A party may file
only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied
by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made
in good faith.
28 U.S.C. § 144 (2006).
second statute, 28 U.S.C. §455, further provides in
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
substantive standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144
and 28 U.S.C. § 455 is “whether a reasonable
person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” United States v. Bigley,
CV-14-00729-PHX-HRH, 2017 WL 3432370, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug.
10, 2017) (citations omitted). In interpreting these
statutes, the United States Supreme Court determined that
“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid
basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 541 (1994). This is because
a judge's opinions formed “on the basis of facts
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
proceedings, or of prior proceedings do not constitute a
basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. “A
judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administration-even
a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at
courtroom administration-remain ...