United States District Court, D. Arizona
HONORABLE JAMES A. SOTO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration, (Doc. 93). Based on the following reasoning,
Plaintiff's motion, (Doc. 93), will be
motions for reconsideration are denied absent “a
showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal
authority that could not have been brought to [the
Court's] attention earlier with reasonable
diligence.” LRCiv. 7.2 (g)(1).
A motion to reconsider must provide a valid ground for
reconsideration by showing two things. First, it must
demonstrate some valid reason why the Court should reconsider
its prior decision. Second, it must set forth facts or law of
a strongly convincing nature to induce the Court to reverse
its prior decision.
Courts have advanced three major grounds justifying
reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in the controlling
law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need
to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
Bahrs v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 795 F.Supp. 965, 967
(D. Ariz. 1992); see also Defenders of Wildlife v.
Browner, 909 F.Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995) (a
motion for reconsideration should not be used to ask a court
to “rethink what the court had already thought
through-rightly or wrongly.”); Refrigeration Sales
Co. v. Mitchell-Jackson, Inc., 605 F.Supp. 6, 7
(N.D.Ill. 1983) (arguments that a court was in error on the
issues it considered should be directed to the court of
January 3, 2013, Defendant Christian Burton struck pedestrian
Defendant Richard Paul Venable. (PSOF, at ¶¶ 7-8.)
Previously, Plaintiff Safeco Insurance Company of America
(“Safeco”) issued insurance to Defendant Tucker
C. Geer and his then spouse for their vehicles. (Id.
at ¶ 1.) Mr. Geer was listed as the sole “Named
Insured.” (See id. at ¶ 17.) Ms. Geer
added her son,  Defendant Burton's vehicle to the
policy. (DSOF, at ¶3.)
January 5, 2018, the Court granted, in part, and denied, in
part, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied
Defendant Venable's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Doc. 92.) On January 18, 2018, Plaintiff filed a timely
motion for reconsideration, arguing that Ms. Geer's
expectation should not be considered by the Court because she
was not the “Named Insured.” (Doc. 93, at
2:11-17.) Further Plaintiff argues that Ms. Geer was not the
contracting insured because she was not a “Named
Insured.” (Id. at 3:5-6.)
is well established that a contracting party's reasonable
expectations may affect the enforceability of non-negotiated
terms in a standardized agreement.” Averett v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 869 P.2d 505, 506 (Ariz.
1994) (analyzing the reasonable expectation of the named
insured). Plaintiff cites cases in which Arizona courts
disregarded any reasonable expectation that hopeful insureds
may assert. (Doc. 93, at 2:21-26.) These cases differ greatly
from the present fact pattern.
Plaintiff cites to Cullen v. Koty-Leavitt Ins.
Agency, 168 P.3d 917 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2007), vacated on
other grounds, 189 P.3d 344 (Ariz. 2008). (Doc. 93, at
2:21-26.) Cullen was injured in a vehicle owned by a third
party. Cullen, 168 P.3d at 920. He filed a claim
with Auto Owners, which covered a different vehicle and
listed Sierrita Mining and Ranch Company, who provided the
insured vehicle to Cullen's family, as the named insured.
Id. Cullen is described as “a stranger to the
insurance contract.” Id. at 925. Therefore,
the decisive factor was if Sierrita Mining and Ranch Company
had a reasonable expectation that Cullen would be covered.
Id. at 925-26.
Plaintiff cites to Ogden v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co., 933 P.2d 1200 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1996). (Doc. 93, at
2:25-26.) Ogden was in a car accident with a vehicle driven
by Lichman, an employee of J.M. Steel Erecting, Inc.
Ogden, 933 P.2d at 1202. Lichman purchased the
vehicle form J.M., but never transferred the title.
Id. J.M. continued to provide insurance for the
vehicle. Id. The court stated that
“Lichman's expectations have little effect upon the