from the Superior Court in Pima County No. C20173374 The
Honorable Geoffrey L. Ferlan, Judge Pro Tempore
Abril, Vail In Propria Persona
Judge Eckerstrom authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.
ECKERSTROM, CHIEF JUDGE.
Jill Abril appeals from the trial court's grant of an
injunction against harassment in favor of Nydia Wood and her
three minor children. For the following reasons, we vacate
In July 2017, Wood sought an injunction against her
ex-husband's girlfriend, Abril. The trial court granted
the injunction and, after holding a hearing requested by
Abril, the court affirmed the injunction. This appeal
Although neither party has raised the issue, this court has
an independent duty to examine its own jurisdiction. See
In re Marriage of Johnson and Gravino, 231 Ariz. 228,
¶ 5 (App. 2012). The trial court's order refusing to
dissolve the injunction after a hearing did not contain
language pursuant to Rule 54(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P., that no
further matters remained pending and that the judgment was
Injunctions against harassment are governed by the Arizona
Rules of Protective Order Procedure. See A.R.S.
§ 12-1809; Ariz. R. Protective Order P. 1. When an
injunction against harassment is not sought in conjunction
with a pending family law case, the Arizona Rules of Civil
Procedure apply to the extent they are not inconsistent with
the Rules of Protective Order Procedure. Ariz. R. Protective
Order P. 2. This case is not associated with any pending
family law matter, and Rule 54(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P., does not
conflict with the Rules of Protective Order Procedure.
However, in Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C.,
this court concluded that "neither Rule 54(b) nor Rule
54(c) apply to rulings that are not 'final judgments'
but are independently appealable by statute." 240 Ariz.
420, ¶ 11 (App. 2016). We further noted that an order
granting, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve an injunction
pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b) was not a final
judgment. Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 28. And, an order
refusing to dissolve an injunction against harassment is
expressly appealable under § 12-2101(A)(5)(b). Rule
54(c) therefore does not apply. See LaFaro v.
Cahill, 203 Ariz. 482, ¶ 8 (App. 2002) (applying
previous version of statute). Accordingly, the order in this
case is appealable notwithstanding the lack of Rule 54(c)
language, and we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(5)(b).
Abril claims the court's finding of harassment was not
supported by sufficient evidence, specifically claiming the
evidence showed, at most, one incident that could constitute
harassment. We review a trial court's grant of an
injunction against harassment for an abuse of discretion.
LaFaro, 203 Ariz. 482, ¶ 10. "If there is
substantial evidence to support the issuance of an
injunction, we will not substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court." Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Pochiro, 153 Ariz. 368, 370 (App. 1987).
¶7 "[H]arassment" is defined
in our statute in relevant part as "a series of acts
over any period of time." A.R.S. § 12-1809(S).
"At a minimum, the 'series of acts' condition
requires two incidents." LaFaro, 203 Ariz. 482,
¶ 14. Here, Wood's petition alleged two incidents: a
"verbal altercation" between herself and Abril in
March 2017 and a "physical fight" at Abril's
home in April 2017. She also alleged that, in July 2017,
Wood's ex-husband told her that Abril was a heavy drinker
and that Abril had called her and sent her text messages to
At the evidentiary hearing, Wood, testifying about the March
incident, stated, "[Abril] didn't say anything. It
was just a verbal fight between me and [Wood's
ex-husband]." When the trial court asked if it was
correct that she had only argued with her ex-husband in
March, and not with Abril, she said that it was. This
incident therefore could not support a finding that Abril
harassed Wood on that occasion. See id. ¶ 13.
Likewise, Wood's ex-husband telling her that Abril was a