United States District Court, D. Arizona
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
HONORABLE JACQUELINE M. RATEAU UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
March 19, 2018, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss
Indictment for Violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers
(Doc. 95). The Government filed a Response on March 26, 2018
(Doc. 96) and the Defendant filed a Reply on April 4, 2018
(Doc. 97). The Motion was heard by Magistrate Judge Rateau on
April 19, 2018. Having considered the matter, the Magistrate
Judge recommends that Defendant's Motion be DENIED.
January 27, 2016, while the Defendant was serving a state
prison sentence in Nevada, the Pima County Attorney's
Office filed a detainer with the Nevada Department of
Corrections pursuant the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
(IAD), 18 U.S.C. App. II, § 1, et seq. The Defendant was
under indictment on three felony cases in Arizona. On March
8, 2016, Nevada acknowledged receipt of the detainer and
provided information to Pima County about the Defendant's
location and inmate status. On April 14, 2016, the
administrative details of the transfer were complete and Pima
County sent a letter to Nevada accepting temporary custody of
the Defendant under the IAD.
on March 2, 2016, the Defendant, along with his co-defendant
and wife, Jane Sheafe, were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury
and charged with Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud, Bank Fraud,
and Aggravated Identity Theft. (Doc 3). On April 7, the
Government filed an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Prosequendum (Writ) with this Court. (Doc 21). The Writ was
granted on April 11, 2016, and on April 15, 2016, the U.S.
Marshals Service took custody of the Defendant and
transported him to Federal Court where he had an initial
appearance on April 26, 2016.
was originally scheduled for June 21, 2016. It is now
scheduled for June 5, 2018. Defendant agreed to all but three
of the continuances.
is a compact entered into by 48 States (Louisiana and
Mississippi are the exceptions), the federal government, and
the District of Columbia to establish procedures for
resolution of one jurisdiction's outstanding charges
against a prisoner or inmate who is in the custody of another
jurisdiction. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111
(2000). The purpose of the IAD is to minimize the adverse
impact of a foreign prosecution on the rehabilitative
programs of the confining jurisdiction. United States v.
Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 1992).
inmate is transferred from a jurisdiction where he is serving
a sentence (“the sending state”) to a
jurisdiction where an indictment is pending (“the
receiving state”), the IAD imposes time limits within
which the receiving state must bring the prisoner to trial.
The time limits differ depending on whether it is the inmate
or the receiving state that requested the transfer. If the
inmate requested the transfer, the receiving state must try
him within 180 days of his arrival. 18 U.S.C. app. II, §
2, art. III(a). If the receiving state requested the
transfer, it must try the inmate within 120 days of his
arrival. 18 U.S.C. app. II, § 2, art. IV(c).
timeline is not absolute and a court, upon good cause
showing, may grant any necessary or reasonable continuances.
18 U.S.C. App. II, § 2, article IV(c). This
‘“necessary or reasonable continuance'
provision is, by clear implication, the sole means by which
the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits
over the defendant's objection.” Hill, 528
U.S. at 116. The IAD does not define “good
cause.” Brown v. Wolff, 706 F.2d 902, 906 (9th
Cir. 1983). Nor do the various legislative histories of the
original drafting of the IAD by the Joint Committee on
contends that his indictment must be dismissed because he has
not been tried within 120 days of the federal government
taking custody of him. The Government argues that the IAD
does not even apply to Defendant's case because it
secured Defendant's transfer by means of a Writ rather
than a federal detainer. Defendant counters that interpreting
the provisions of the IAD in this manner, creates a loophole
that permits the Government to avoid the IAD's strict
Supreme Court addressed this exact issue in United States
v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978). While warning that the
government should not circumvent the IAD by means of a writ,
the Court nonetheless ruled that a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum, like the one filed in this case, is
not a detainer within the meaning of the IAD.
Mauro, 436 U.S. at 349. Defendant is not entitled to
relief on this ground because he was transferred from Nevada
to federal custody in Arizona pursuant to a writ not a
federal detainer. See also United States v. Moore,
822 F.2d 35, 37 (8th Cir.1987) (The IAD is inapplicable when
the government secures the presence of a state prisoner by
means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum without
filing a detainer.); Baxter v. United States, 966
F.2d 387 (8th Cir.1992) (same).
assuming the IAD applies to this case, the Government argues
it has not violated the IAD's stringent 120-day time
limit because the trial continuances were based on
“good cause” which made it ...