United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Randall T. Arnett's
Application for Disability Insurance Benefits by the Social
Security Administration (“SSA”) under the Social
Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a
Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review of
that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's
Opening Brief (Doc. 16, “Pl.'s Br.”),
Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner's
Opposition (Doc. 20, “Def.'s Br.”), and
Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 24, “Reply”). The
Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc.
12, R.) and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge's
decision (R. at 14-29) as upheld by the Appeals Council (R.
at 1-3).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed his Application on March 4, 2013, for a period of
disability beginning September 30, 2011 (R. at
163-64)-apparently later revised to November 1, 2010 (R. at
14, 64)-through his date last insured of September 30, 2014
(R. at 17). Plaintiff's claim was denied initially on
July 15, 2013 (R. at 62-77), and on reconsideration on
December 5, 2013 (R. at 78-102). Plaintiff then testified at
a hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) on December 22, 2014. (R. at 35-61.) On
February 25, 2015, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's
Applications. (R. at 14-29.) On July 30, 2016, the Appeals
Council upheld the ALJ's decision. (R. at 1-3.) The
present appeal followed.
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety, and
the pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in
addressing the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon
considering the medical records and opinions, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff has severe impairments of obesity, lumbar
degenerative disc disease status post-surgery, fibromyalgia,
and atrial fibrillation (R. at 18), but that Plaintiff has
the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform unskilled or semi-skilled light work with some
limitations, such that Plaintiff is not disabled under the
Act (R. at 28-29).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where he determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises two arguments for the Court's consideration: (1)
the ALJ erred in weighing a treating physician's opinion;
and (2) the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff's testimony
less than fully credible. (Pl.'s Br. at 10-25.)
A.
The ALJ Provided Sufficient Reasons to Give Little Weight to
the Assessment of Plaintiff's Treating Physician and
Properly Considered the Record as a Whole
Plaintiff
first argues the ALJ committed reversible error by assigning
inadequate weight to the assessment of Plaintiff's
primary care physician, Dr. Scherer. (Pl.'s Br. at
13-20.) An ALJ “may only reject a treating or examining
physician's uncontradicted medical opinion based on
‘clear and convincing reasons.'”
Carmickle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155,
1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lester v. Chater, 81
F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996)). “Where such an
opinion is contradicted, however, it may be rejected for
specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by
substantial evidence in the record.” Id.
In this
instance, the ALJ found that Dr. Scherer's assessment of
Plaintiff's functional capacity was based on
Plaintiff's subjective complaints of musculoskeletal
impairments but is inconsistent with the treatment records.
(R. at 24-25.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that Dr. Scherer
is not a specialist trained to treat Plaintiff's physical
conditions, including degenerative disc disease and
fibromyalgia, and the record contains no reliable treatment
notes by a specialist during the relevant time period. (R. at
25.) For example, with regard to Plaintiff's reports of
fibromyalgia symptoms, the ALJ noted that the objective
medical record does not contain support for those reports; to
the extent a rheumatologist noted fibromyalgia symptoms, the
examination conducted did not meet the American College of
Rheumatology test requirements. (R. at 22-23.) The ALJ also
noted Dr. Scherer did not document any clinical findings
based on objective testing and that he freely refilled
Plaintiff's pain medication prescription without a
further plan of care. (R. at 25.) Moreover, the ALJ observed
that Plaintiff was not compliant with treatment
recommendations, including exercise and losing weight. (R. at
24.) On the whole, the ALJ found the limitations identified
in Dr. Scherer's opinions diverge “extremely”
from the objective medical evidence of Plaintiff's
physical conditions. (R. at 25.) The ALJ gave clear and
convincing reasons to assign little weight to Dr.
Scherer's assessments of Plaintiff, and the Court finds
the reasons are supported by the record as a whole. See,
e.g., Kibble v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin.,
584 Fed.Appx. 717, 719 (9th Cir. 2014); Tommasetti v.
Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008).
The ALJ
also gave little weight to Dr. Scherer's assessment of
Plaintiff's mental limitations, for similar reasons. (R.
at 25.) Again, the ALJ noted that Dr. Scherer is not a
specialist trained to treat psychological impairment, and he
also noted that Dr. Scherer's treatment notes rarely
mentioned any symptoms of psychological impairments-and never
at a marked level. (R. at 25.) Furthermore, Dr. Scherer's
assessment was contradicted by that of an examining
psychologist, Dr. Peetoom-a specialist-who opined that
Plaintiff had no significant issues with understanding,
memory, sustained concentration, persistence, social
interaction, or adapting to change. (R. at 25.) The Court
finds the ALJ gave specific, legitimate reasons to discount
Dr. Scherer's opinions of Plaintiff's mental
impairment, and the ALJ's decision to assign little
weight to Dr. Scherer's assessment and, as applicable,
great weight to Dr. Peetoom's assessment is supported by
the medical record as a whole. See Smolen v. Chater,
80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting “the
opinions of a specialist about medical issues related to his
or her area of specialization are given more weight than the
opinions of a nonspecialist”). As a result, the Court
finds no error on the part of the ALJ in her assessment of
the medical record.
B.
The ALJ Properly Weighed ...