United States District Court, D. Arizona
A. TEILBORG SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is Plaintiff Shaine Carl Cagle’s
(“Plaintiff”) motion to transfer the present case
to Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan in Parsons v.
Ryan, CV-12-00601-DKD. (Doc. 92). Defendants have
responded, (Doc. 98), and Plaintiff has elected not to reply.
present case, Plaintiff filed a complaint against a prison
director and prison supervisors, workers, and medical
providers alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). (Doc.
21). In Parsons, the plaintiffs filed a class action
suit against prison and health directors alleging Eighth
Amendment violations. Complaint, Parsons v. Ryan,
No. CV-12-00601-DKD (D. Ariz. Oct. 9, 2014)
(“Complaint”). Plaintiff requests to consolidate
his case with Parsons.
Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) allows a court to consolidate
cases “[i]f the actions before the court involve a
common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
District courts, however, “enjoy substantial discretion
in deciding whether and to what extent to consolidate
cases.” Hall v. Hall, 138 S.Ct. 1118, 1131
(2018). A court “must balance the interest of judicial
convenience against the potential for delay, confusion and
prejudice that may result from such consolidation.”
Sapiro v. Sunstone Hotel Inv'rs, L.L.C., No.
CV-03-1555-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 898155, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 4,
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Local Rule”) 42.1(a)
allows consolidation if the cases:
(1) arise from substantially the same transaction or event;
(2) involve substantially the same parties or property; (3)
involve the same patent, trademark, or copyright; (4) call
for determination of substantially the same questions of law;
or (5) . . . [remaining unconsolidated] would entail
substantial duplication of labor if heard by different
LRCiv 42.1(a). The Court considers these factors, but
“has broad discretion in deciding a motion to transfer
under Local Rule 42.1(a).” Addington v. US Airline
Pilots Ass’n, No. CV-08-01633-PHX-NVW, 2010 WL
4117216, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 2010). When considering a
motion under Local Rule 42.1(a), “[a] principal factor
is whether party economy or judicial economy is substantially
served by transfer to another judge.” City of
Phoenix v. First State Ins. Co., No.
CV-15-00511-PHX-NVW, 2016 WL 4591906, at *20 (D. Ariz. Sept.
2, 2016), aff’d, No. 16-16767, 2018 WL 1616011
(9th Cir. Apr. 4, 2018).
Application of Local Rule 42.1(a) to Present Motion
appears to argue that consolidation with Parsons is
proper under Local Rule 42.1(a). (Doc. 92).
Arising From Substantially the Same Transaction or
cases do not arise from substantially the same transaction or
event. While the plaintiffs in both cases allege prison
mismanagement, the cases stem from entirely different facts
and events. Compare (Doc. 21 at 7–55),
with Complaint at 1–3, 15–56. The
plaintiffs in Parsons allege systemic failures in
the prison healthcare system, Complaint at 1–3,
15–56, while Plaintiff in the present case alleges
mismanagement by specific prison officials and medical
providers stemming from specific acts and incidents relating
to Plaintiff’s unique medical situation, (Doc. 21 at