Submitted July 9, 2018 [*] San Francisco, California
Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals Agency No. A096-025-359
Alexandra Monaco, The Monaco Law Group Ltd., Las Vegas,
Nevada, for Petitioner.
Allison Frayer, Trial Attorney; Melissa Neiman-Keltin, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.; for Respondent.
Before: Susan P. Graber and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit
Judges, and Ivan L.R. Lemelle, [**] District Judge.
panel denied a petition for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals' denial of Martinez-de Ryan's
application for cancellation of removal on the ground that
she was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
panel rejected the government's contention that the
void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply at all to any
grounds of inadmissibility, such as crimes involving
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (rejecting
a void-for-vagueness challenge to the phrase "crime of
moral turpitude") and Tseung Chu v. Cornell,
247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957) (following Jordan), the
panel held that the crime involving moral turpitude statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), is not
unconstitutionally vague. The panel concluded that
Jordan and Tseung Chu remain good law in
light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v.
United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) (concluding that
the residual clause of the federal criminal code's
definition of "crime of violence" is
unconstitutionally vague), and Sessions v. Dimaya,
138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018) (extending Johnson's
holding to the immigration context). The panel explained that
it was obliged to follow on-point Supreme Court precedent-
here, Jordan-even if later Supreme Court cases cast
some doubt on its general reasoning. The panel also pointed
out that Johnson and Dimaya interpret
statutory "residual" clauses whose wording does not
include the phrase "moral turpitude" and which are
not tethered to recognized common law principles.
GRABER, CIRCUIT JUDGE
Rocio Aurora Martinez-de Ryan is a native and citizen of
Mexico who entered the United States without being inspected
and admitted or paroled. She timely seeks review of a
decision issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals, which
affirmed an immigration judge's decision pretermitting
her application for cancellation of removal and ordering her
removed from the United States. She argues that the statutory
phrase "crime involving moral turpitude," 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), is unconstitutionally
entered the United States some time before 1999. A few years
later, she provided cash payments to an employee at the
Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles to influence and reward
the employee for issuing identification documents to
non-citizens illegally present in the United States. As a
result, in 2010, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of
bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), for
which the maximum penalty is 10 years' imprisonment.
thereafter, Petitioner received a Notice to Appear, charging
her with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Through counsel, Petitioner conceded
inadmissibility but sought cancellation of removal. An
immigration judge ruled that Petitioner's bribery
conviction constituted a crime of moral turpitude, rendering
her ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of
Immigration Appeals agreed, and this petition for review