In re Marriage of Barron

          Review Granted in part February 05, 2019

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          Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County; No. S1400DO201501132; The Honorable Stephen J. Rouff, Judge Pro Tempore . AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

          Mary Katherine Boyte, PC, Yuma, By Mary K. Boyte Henderson, Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

         S. Alan Cook, PC, Phoenix, By S. Alan Cook, Sharon Ottenberg, Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

         Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

          OPINION

         JOHNSEN, Judge:

         [¶ 1] Paul Roger Barron appeals from the dissolution decree ending his marriage to Shelly Rae Barron. We reverse and remand the decree’s parenting-time provisions because they are the product of impermissible presumptions about equal parenting time and gender. We also reverse portions of the decree that violate federal law governing military retirement pay and vacate and remand the attorney’s fees award. In all other respects, we affirm the decree.

          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         [¶ 2] The parties ("Husband" and "Wife," respectively) were married in 2004 and have three children, all girls, born in 2006, 2008 and 2010, respectively. The family moved to Arizona in 2013, when Husband, a helicopter pilot on active duty with the United States Marine Corps, was transferred to Yuma. Wife filed a petition for dissolution in August 2015, but the couple remained together in the marital home until shortly after the superior court issued temporary orders in March 2016.

         [¶ 3] Following a three-day trial, the superior court entered a decree of dissolution in May 2017. Relevant to this appeal, the decree continued joint legal decision-making but reduced Husband’s parenting time to 130 days a year, plus specified holidays and a summer vacation, and divided the community’s interest in Husband’s military retirement. The court declined both parties’ requests for equalization payments and awarded attorney’s fees to Wife.

         [¶ 4] We have jurisdiction of Husband’s timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018) and -2101(A)(1) (2018).^[1]

          DISCUSSION

          A. Parenting Time.

         [¶ 5] By agreement, the temporary orders had allowed Husband more parenting time than Wife because Wife was in training to become a firefighter/emergency medical technician. The parties shared joint legal decision-making, but temporary orders granted Husband parenting time every Thursday through Sunday until Wife finished her training and "bec[ame] employed." Wife completed her training within a few months but did not take a full-time job and did not petition the court for weekend parenting time. The dissolution decree, entered 14 months after issuance of temporary orders, reduced Husband’s parenting time to one overnight a week plus every other weekend from Friday afternoon through Monday morning.

         [¶ 6] On appeal, Husband argues the superior court abused its discretion in failing to order equal parenting time. We review a parenting-time order for an abuse of discretion.

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Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 11, 304 P.3d 1093, 1096 (App. 2013). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court commits legal error, Arpaio v. Figueroa, 229 Ariz. 444, 447, ¶ 7, 276 P.3d 513, 516 (App. 2012), or "when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s decision, is ‘devoid of competent evidence to support’ the decision," Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, ¶ 5, 975 P.2d 108, 110 (1999) (quoting Fought v. Fought, 94 Ariz. 187, 188, 382 P.2d 667 (1963) ).

         [¶ 7] As relevant here, A.R.S. § 25-403.02(B) (2018) requires the superior court to adopt a parenting plan that is "[c]onsistent with the child’s best interests in § 25-403" and that "maximizes [each parent’s] respective parenting time." Section 25-403 (A) (2018) requires the court to determine parenting time "in accordance with the best interests of the child." Further, § 25-403(A) states:

The court shall consider all factors that are relevant to the child’s physical and emotional well-being, including:

1. The past, present and potential future relationship between the parent and the child.

2. The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parent or parents ....

3. The child’s adjustment to home, school and community.

4. If the child is of a suitable age and maturity, the wishes of the child as to legal decision-making and parenting time.

5. The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

         [¶ 8] In findings and conclusions issued in support of the decree’s parenting-time provisions, the superior court stated:

The primary focus concerning parenting time is the best interest of the children and not the parents. If the interests of parents are more important than children, then children, like ...