Spendlove v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

          ORDER

          DAVID G. CAMPBELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Plaintiff Pamela Spendlove seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, which denied her disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under §§ 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. The Court finds that the administrative law judge's (“ALJ”) decision is based on legal error, and will remand for further proceedings.

         I. Background.

         Plaintiff is a 59 year old female who previously worked as an internal security manager, security officer, taxi driver, and emergency medical technician. A.R. 23. Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income in July and August 2013, alleging disability beginning on June 22, 2012. A.R. 13. On January 5, 2016, Plaintiff testified at a hearing before an ALJ. Id. A vocational expert also testified. Id. On March 24, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. A.R. 13-25. This became the Commissioner's final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on June 4, 2017. A.R. 1-5.

         II. Legal Standard.

         The Court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ's decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. In determining whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).

         Harmless error principles apply in the Social Security context. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless if there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision and the error does not affect the ultimate nondisability determination. Id. “The burden is on the party claiming error to demonstrate not only the error, but also that it affected [her] substantial rights.” Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2012).

         III. The ALJ's Five-Step Evaluation Process.

         To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). To establish disability, the claimant must show that (1) she is not currently working, (2) she has a severe impairment, and (3) this impairment meets or equals a listed impairment or (4) her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) prevents her performance of any past relevant work. If the claimant meets her burden through step three, the Commissioner must find her disabled. If the inquiry proceeds to step four and the claimant shows that she is incapable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must show at step five that the claimant is capable of other work suitable for her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

         At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2016, and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 22, 2012. A.R. 15. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease, chronic pain syndrome, obesity, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and borderline personality disorder. A.R. 15. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals a listed impairment. A.R. 16. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform medium work with some additional limitations, but that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as an internal security manager, security officer, taxi driver, or emergency medical technician. A.R. 17-23. At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, she was able to perform the requirements of occupations like hand packager, kitchen helper, and laboratory equipment cleaner. A.R. 24.

         IV. Analysis.

         Plaintiff makes three arguments: (1) the ALJ erred by rejecting her treating physician's opinion, (2) the ALJ improperly credited the opinions of Dr. Hirdes and the state agency reviewing physicians, and (3) the ALJ erroneously discredited Plaintiff's symptom testimony. Doc. 11 at 9-25. Defendant summarizes the ALJ's decision, but offers few specific counterarguments. See Doc. 14.

         A. Medical Opinion Evidence.

         The Commissioner is responsible for determining whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability, and need not credit a physician's conclusion that the claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). But the Commissioner generally must defer to a physician's medical opinion, such as statements concerning the nature or severity of the claimant's impairments, what the claimant can do, and the claimant's physical or mental restrictions. § 404.1527(a)(1), (c).

         In determining how much deference to give a physician's medical opinion, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give the greatest weight to a treating physician's opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective evidence).

         If a treating or examining physician's medical opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, the opinion can be rejected only for clear and convincing reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Under this standard, the ALJ may reject a treating or examining physician's opinion if it is “conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole or by objective medical findings, ” Batson v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), or if there are significant discrepancies between the physician's opinion and her clinical records, Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).

         When a treating or examining physician's opinion is contradicted by another doctor, it can be rejected for “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. To satisfy this requirement, the ALJ must set out “a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under either standard, “[t]he ALJ must do more than state conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors', are correct.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

         1. Dr. Ramadan.

         Dr. Mohamed Ramadan is a treating physician who opined in January 2016 that Plaintiff “may have difficulty with memory and understanding complicated instructions, ” is “unable to concentrate and maintain attention, ” and “may not be able to respond to work demands.” A.R. 942. Because these opinions are inconsistent with those of the state agency non-examining physicians, they can be rejected for ...