United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable John J. Tuchi United States District Judge
At
issue are Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Motion to
Interplead Funds and for Order of Discharge (Doc. 7, Mot. to
Interplead), to which Defendant Wyo Tech Investment Group LLC
filed a Response (Doc. 13, Resp. to Mot. to Interplead), and
Wells Fargo filed a Reply (Doc. 14, Reply to Mot. to
Interplead); and Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss
Counterclaims (Doc. 46, MTD), to which Wyo Tech filed a
Response (Doc. 56, Resp. to MTD), and Wells Fargo filed a
Reply (Doc. 59, Reply to MTD). The Court finds these Motions
appropriate for resolution without oral argument.
See LRCiv 7.2(f).
I.
BACKGROUND
In the
Complaint (Doc. 1, Compl.), Wells Fargo alleges the following
facts. On September 7, 2016, a New York state court entered
judgment in the amount of over seven million dollars in favor
of three Defendants in this matter, CWT Canada II LP,
Resources Recovery Corporation (“RRC”), and Jean
Noelting (collectively, “Judgment Creditors”),
and against Dennis M. Danzik and RDX Technologies
Corporation, f/k/a Ridgeline Energy Services, Inc.
(collectively, “Judgment Debtors”). (Compl. Ex.
A.) On October 18, 2017, the Judgment Creditors issued a
Restraining Notice and Information Subpoena to Wells Fargo
pursuant to New York law. (Compl. Ex. B.) The Restraining
Notice stated that Wells Fargo had custody of property in
which the Judgment Debtors had an interest, including an
account ending in -2809 containing $546, 282.55 in the name
of another Defendant in this matter, Wyo Tech Investment
Group LLC, a Wyoming LLC doing business in Arizona. After
receiving the Restraining Notice, Wells Fargo froze the Wyo
Tech account, which had been opened at a branch in Arizona.
Subsequently,
Wyo Tech contacted Wells Fargo and the Judgment Creditors to
dispute the Judgment Creditors' assertion that the
Judgment Debtors had an interest in Wyo Tech's account
and to demand that Wells Fargo unfreeze the account by
November 10, 2017. (Compl. Ex. C.) The Judgment Creditors
responded that the Restraining Notice was proper, that
Danzik's daughter Jovahna is listed as the owner of Wyo
Tech on the account's signature card, that Jovahna
directs payments to herself, her father, and her father's
company from the account, and that Wyo Tech is liable for
fraudulent transfer and conspiracy to commit fraudulent
transfer. (Compl. Ex. D.) The Judgment Creditors also stated
that Wells Fargo would be liable to them if it released the
funds in the Wyo Tech account.
On
November 9, 2017, Wells Fargo filed the present interpleader
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 22, requesting that the Court resolve which of the
adverse claimants, Wyo Tech or the Judgment Creditors, has
the legal right to the account. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-34.)
In its Answer to the Complaint (Doc. 37, Answer at 12-21,
Countercl.), Wyo Tech has raised counterclaims against Wells
Fargo for wrongful garnishment (Countercl. ¶¶
20-25) and “aiding and abetting wrongful garnishment
and tortious interference with contractual relations and
business expectancies” (Countercl. ¶¶ 26-38).
Wells Fargo now moves to dismiss Wyo Tech's counterclaims
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 46) as
well as to interplead the funds in the account and for
discharge (Doc. 7).
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Interpleader
The
interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, states that
district courts have original jurisdiction over actions filed
by a plaintiff that possesses money or property worth $500 or
more to which two or more adverse claimants of diverse
citizenship contend they are entitled, if the plaintiff has
provided the money or property, or given an equivalent bond,
to the court. Rule 22 provides, “Persons with claims
that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability
may be joined as defendants and required to
interplead.”
The
related process and procedure statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2361,
provides that “a district court may issue its process
for all claimants and enter its order restraining them from
instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or
United States court affecting the property, instrument or
obligation involved in the interpleader action until further
order of the court.” The statute also states that the
“district court shall hear and determine the case, and
may discharge the plaintiff from further liability, make the
injunction permanent, and make all appropriate orders to
enforce its judgment.”
B.
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
A
complaint must include “only ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim can be based on either (1) the lack of a cognizable
legal theory or (2) insufficient facts to support a
cognizable legal claim. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's
obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint must thus
contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable, and that ‘recovery is very remote and
unlikely.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556
(quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
(1974)).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
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