United States District Court, D. Arizona
G. CAMPBELL, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Douglas Wayne Derello, Jr., who is currently confined in the
Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Florence, brought this
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc.
1.) Defendant Jackson moves for summary judgment, and
Plaintiff opposes. (Docs. 80, 85-87.) Also before the Court
is Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc. 93.) The
Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration,
grant Defendant Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment,
and terminate the action.
screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court
determined that Plaintiff stated an Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Jackson and
Olsen and directed them to answer. (Doc. 6.) The Court
dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Id.)
Defendant Olson was subsequently dismissed from the action
without prejudice. (Doc. 76.)
claim stems from an August 2016 assault on him by another
inmate while he was assigned to the Special Management Unit
(SMU) of ASPC-Eyman in Florence, Arizona. (Doc. 1 at 3-4.) In
relevant part, Plaintiff makes the following allegations
against Corrections Officer (CO) Jackson:
housing pod Plaintiff was assigned to contained “alot
[sic] of mental health/SMI [serious mental illness]
inmates.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not have
“mental issues” and has not “taken any
mental medication.” (Id.) On or about June 20,
2016, Plaintiff was moved to a new pod that contained
“even more mental issued [sic] inmates” including
“Brian, ” the inmate who assaulted Plaintiff.
(Id. at 4.) On some unspecified date, Brian
“boiled hot water and thr[e]w [it] on another inmate,
” but was not reprimanded by the staff. (Id.)
2016, Brian accused Plaintiff of thinking he (Plaintiff) was
better than the other inmates because Plaintiff did not take
psychiatric medications. (Id.) Brian also stated
that one of the officers told him that Plaintiff had been
whining about being housed near mentally ill inmates.
point, Plaintiff complained to Sergeant Olson that Brian had
threatened Plaintiff's life, made “racial
remarks” towards him, and threated the staff that
“they better move [Plaintiff's] ass out of the
pod.” (Id. at 4-5.) Olson responded,
“All you nuts better go to sleep [or] I'm going to
spray all of you[, ] and walked out of the pod. (Id.
August 16, 2016, Plaintiff was assaulted by Brian while
Defendant Jackson was escorting five maximum security
inmates, including Plaintiff and Brian, to recreation.
(Id. at 5.) At some unspecified time prior to the
assault, Defendant Jackson “had been made aware by
[Plaintiff]” that Brian had threatened Plaintiff with
physical harm, but Defendant Jackson failed to protect
result of the assault, Plaintiff sustained injuries to his
left eye and his ankle. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages as well as costs and fees.
(Id. at 10.)
Jackson moves for summary judgment on the grounds that he was
not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to
Plaintiff's safety and that he is entitled to qualified
immunity. (Doc. 80.)
must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears
the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its
motion and identifying those portions of the record, together
with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the
nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co.,
Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if
the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden
shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a
factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material,
i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986);
see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d
1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish
a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, First
Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.
253, 288-89 (1968); however, it must ...