United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
JAMES
A. TEILBORG, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Pending
before the Court is Michael Quiel's
(“Petitioner”) Amended Motion to Reconsider
Order, (Doc. 24), which fully incorporates Petitioner's
Motion to Reconsider Order, (Doc. 23). Much of the background
of this case is set out in this Court's order denying
Petitioner's request for 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief.
(Doc. 21). Subsequent to the Court's denial of §
2255 relief: (1) Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration and an amended motion for reconsideration,
(Docs. 23 & 24); (2) the Government filed a response to
Petitioner's amended motion for reconsideration, (Doc.
31), pursuant to this Court's order, (Doc. 28), and
Petitioner permissibly filed a reply, (Doc. 32); and (3) the
Government filed evidence allegedly establishing that at
least one attorney in the underlying criminal case was
appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause and gave the
statutorily-required oath of office, (Doc. 35), as required
by the Court, (Doc. 34), and Petitioner objected to that
evidence, (Doc. 36), which he later supplemented, (Doc.
37).[1]
I.
Governing Law
Motions
for reconsideration are disfavored, and “[t]he Court
will ordinarily deny” such motions “absent a
showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal
authority that could not have been brought to its attention
earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g). The
party seeking reconsideration must “point out with
specificity the matters the movant believes were overlooked
or misapprehended by the Court, any new matters brought to
the Court's attention for the first time and the reasons
they were not presented earlier, and any specific
modifications being sought in the Court's order.”
Id. The movant is not permitted to repeat arguments
that were rejected in the challenged order. Id. The
Court may deny a motion for reconsideration for failure to
abide by any of these rules.
II.
Analysis
Petitioner
contends that the Court erred in deciding three of his
arguments in favor of § 2255 relief. (Docs. 23 &
24).
A.
Appointments Clause [2]
Petitioner
first contends that the Court erred in finding that the
attorneys who prosecuted his criminal case were appropriately
appointed and had taken the statutorily required oaths of
office, and additionally by concluding that it had
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. (Doc. 23 at 2-6);
(Doc. 32 at 3-7). Given that this Court must have
subject-matter jurisdiction to render authoritative
judgments, the Court ordered the Government to produce
evidence that at least one of the attorneys who prosecuted
the underlying criminal matter was properly appointed and
took an oath of office. (Doc. 34). In response, the
Government submitted evidence establishing that Timothy
Stockwell (“Stockwell”) and Monica Edelstein
(“Edelstein”) were both properly appointed and
took the required oaths of office. See (Docs.
35-1-35-4). Petitioner filed an objection, followed by a
supplemental objection, to the Government's
evidence.[3]
Petitioner
seems to make three challenges to this evidence. First,
Petitioner challenges the authenticity of the appointment
affidavits. Second, he argues that the affidavits do not
identify appropriate offices to which the attorneys were
appointed. Third, he argues that the attorneys' oaths had
expired. The Court will consider these arguments in turn.
1.
Authenticity
Petitioner
first challenges the Government's evidence on the ground
that it is not authenticated and that its form suggests
unreliability. (Doc. 36 at 3-4). Evidence introduced upon the
Court's request in a § 2255 proceeding need not be
authenticated. Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings (“If the motion is not dismissed, the judge
may direct the parties to expand the record by submitting
additional materials relating to the motion. The judge
may require that these materials be
authenticated.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the
Court finds that the Government's evidence was
appropriately introduced without authentication.
Furthermore,
the Court does not agree that the Government's evidence
is in an unreliable form. According to Petitioner, the fact
that the date stamps on the documents contain different fonts
for the month and the day on the one hand, and the year on
the other hand, suggests the possibility of fraud. (Doc. 36
at 3-4). Additionally, Petitioner contends that the
appointment letters are different than others reviewed by
Petitioner's counsel. (Id. at 4). Reasonable
explanations exist for both discrepancies. As for the stamps,
it is likely that the Government has a different stamp for
the year than it does for the day and month. The difference
in the wording and formatting of the appointment letters is
explained by the fact that they were written by different
appointing officers. Compare (Doc. 36-1 (providing
that the appointing officer was John A. Marrella)),
with (Doc. 35-2 (providing that the appointing
officer was Ronald A. Cimino)), and (Doc. 35-4
(same)).
2.
Identification of Office
Petitioner
next contends that there is no “Office of the Trial
Attorney” to which Stockwell and Edelstein could be
appointed. (Doc. 36 at 5-6). In Huff v. United
States, 10 F.3d 1440, 1443-44 (9th Cir. 1993), however,
the Ninth Circuit held that a “trial attorney in the
tax division of the Department of Justice”
appropriately represented the United States in a criminal tax
prosecution. A necessary implicit assumption of Huff
is that a trial ...