United States District Court, D. Arizona
A. TEILBORG, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
before the Court is Ryan Evans'
(“Plaintiff's”) Motion to Object pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). (Doc. 220).
filed a non-habeas civil action on January 26, 2017 alleging
that Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, and were negligent under state law, by failing to
provide Plaintiff adequate medical care related to a
“fracture of his left [clavicle] suffered in a motor
vehicle accident” while he was in the custody of the
Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADC”) and
while he was under the care of Corizon Correctional Health,
Inc. (“Corizon”). (Doc. 1).
January 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed an application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2).
23, 2018, Plaintiff filed his third motion  for appointment
of counsel. (Doc. 209). Plaintiff asserted that his case was
complex by the virtue that it involved a denial of medical
treatment, and that he needed assistance to prepare for trial
due to his lack of legal training. (Id.) On June 5,
the Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff's third motion for
appointment of counsel because: (1) there is no
constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in a civil
case; and (2) Plaintiff had not shown “exceptional
circumstances” as required by the Ninth Circuit to
warrant appointment of counsel by the Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). (Doc. 210). The Magistrate Judge
found Plaintiff's claim that his case was complex
conclusory and noted that appointment of counsel to prepare
for trial would be premature because the case had not been
set for trial and the dispositive motions deadline had not
15, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the Magistrate
Judge's order denying his motion to appoint counsel.
(Doc. 217). On June 19, the Magistrate Judge denied this
motion. (Doc. 218).
19, Plaintiff filed a motion to object to the Magistrate
Judge's decision to deny Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration of appointment of counsel, (Doc. 220), which
this Court treats as an appeal from the Magistrate Judge.
nondispositive matters, a district judge “must consider
timely  objections and modify or set aside any
part of the [magistrate judge's] order that is clearly
erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a).
To determine that a matter is nondispositive, the Court must
“examine whether the denial of the motion effectively
disposes of a claim or defense or precludes the ultimate
relief sought.” Bastidas v. Chappell, 791 F.3d
1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015).
the District of Arizona's Local Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Local Rules”), a district judge “will
ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order
absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts
or legal authority that could not have been brought to its
attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv
7.2(g). The Local Rules operate with the “force of
law” and bind the Court and the parties. Prof'l
Programs Grp. v. Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 1349,
1353 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Martel v. Cty. of Los
Angeles, 21 F.3d 940, 946-47 (9th Cir. 1994)).
Furthermore, although courts must construe pro se
filings liberally, Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886,
889-90 (9th Cir. 2008), these rules apply equally to pro
se litigants such as Plaintiff. LRCiv 83.3(c)(1);
Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam) (upholding dismissal of pro se action
where the prisoner failed to comply with a Nevada local
is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil
case such as this one. Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d
1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Hedges v. Resolution
Tr. Corp., 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil
proceedings.”). A “court may request an
attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (emphasis added).
Federal courts, however, have no authority to coercively
appoint counsel under Section 1915. Mallard v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). A court may only
appoint counsel under Section 1915 under “exceptional
circumstances.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d
1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984). When determining whether
exceptional circumstances exist, a court's decision
should be “based on such factors as the likelihood of
success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to
articulate his claims in light of their complexity.”
Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328,
1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). Neither factor is dispositive;
“both must be viewed together before reaching a
decision on request of counsel . . . .”
Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331.
Magistrate Judge's order denying Plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration of the previous order denying his motion
requesting appointment of counsel is nondispositive. See
Marquez v. Corizon Health Servs., 710 Fed.Appx. 301, 301
(9th Cir. 2018). That order did not dispose of any claims or
defenses. Thus, this Court will ...