from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20152255001 The
Honorable Howard Fell, Judge Pro Tempore
Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief
Counsel By Amy Pignatella Cain, Assistant Attorney General,
Tucson Counsel for Appellee
Feinman, Pima County Public Defender By David J. Euchner and
Michael J. Miller, Assistant Public Defenders, Tucson Counsel
Presiding Judge Vásquez authored the opinion of the
Court, in which Judge Espinosa and Judge Eppich concurred.
VÁSQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE.
After a jury trial, Oscar Trujillo was convicted of sexual
abuse. The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence
and placed him on three years' probation. On appeal,
Trujillo argues the court erred by ordering him to register
as a sex offender pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3821(A)(3)
because there was no jury determination of the victim's
age. He also contends the court erred in precluding
impeachment evidence about a state witness. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
and Procedural Background
We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in
the light most favorable to affirming Trujillo's
conviction. See State v. Granados, 235 Ariz. 321,
¶ 2 (App. 2014). In April 2015, fifteen-year-old M.A.C.
left his home in Honduras to seek asylum in the United
States. When he walked across the United States-Mexico border
into McAllen, Texas, United States Border Patrol agents took
him to an immigration office in Texas, where he stayed for
three days before being transferred to a refugee facility in
Tucson called Southwest Key. A social worker told M.A.C. he
would stay there until his father "had all the necessary
paperwork in order" and then M.A.C. could go live with
One morning, M.A.C. was lying on his bed when Trujillo, a
youth-care worker at Southwest Key, entered the room.
According to Trujillo's supervisor, workers at Southwest
Key are not allowed to enter the children's bedrooms
"for any reason unless it's [an] emergency,"
and then "they are to request a witness as they're
going into the room so they're not alone." When
M.A.C. asked if it was time to get up, Trujillo said,
"No. . . . I'm going to tickle you," and
proceeded to touch M.A.C.'s chest and stomach over his
clothing. Trujillo left, and M.A.C. stayed in bed awaiting
instructions to get up. A few minutes later, Trujillo
returned and "tickl[ed]" M.A.C.'s penis over
his clothing. Trujillo left, and M.A.C. remained in bed.
Shortly thereafter, Trujillo returned a third time and again
touched M.A.C.'s penis over his clothing. Trujillo tried
to "lift" M.A.C.'s underwear, but M.A.C. told
him to stop.
Trujillo then responded that "he thought [M.A.C.] wanted
him to do that." Trujillo told M.A.C. not to tell anyone
because "[Trujillo] would get into trouble" and be
"suspended from his job." Although M.A.C. agreed,
he later that day asked to speak with a counselor and
reported the incident.
A grand jury indicted Trujillo for one count of sexual abuse.
While testifying at trial, Trujillo denied touching M.A.C. in
any way and instead explained that he went "in and
out" of M.A.C.'s room that morning to "give him
hair gel and toothpaste." Trujillo was convicted as
charged and placed on probation as described above. At
sentencing, the trial court ordered him to register as a sex
offender pursuant to § 13-3821(A)(3). Trujillo objected,
arguing the statute did not apply because there was no jury
finding of M.A.C.'s age. The court disagreed that a jury
finding was necessary but stated it would modify its order if
convinced the ruling was erroneous.
The next day, Trujillo filed a "Motion for Modification
of Sentence," requesting that the trial court
"remove the registration requirement imposed." He
maintained, "The Sixth Amendment reserves to juries the
determination of any fact, other than the fact of a prior
conviction, that increases a criminal defendant's maximum
potential sentence." Citing Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Southern Union Co.
v. United States, 567 U.S. 343 (2012), he argued that a
jury must make the necessary factual determinations for
"any penalties inflicted for the commission of an
offense," and he asserted that "[registration is a
penalty." "[B]ecause the age of the victim was not
implicit in the offense and there was no jury finding of the
victim's age being under eighteen," Trujillo
reasoned that § 13-3821(A)(3) did not apply.
At the end of the hearing on Trujillo's motion, the trial
court stated it had directed the probation officer not to
require Trujillo to register as a sex offender until the
matter was fully resolved. The court ultimately issued an
under-advisement ruling denying Trujillo's motion and
ordering him to register as a sex offender in accordance with
its original order at sentencing. This appeal
followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
Relying on Apprendi and Southern Union Co.,
as he did below, Trujillo argues "[t]he trial court
erred in ordering sex offender registration when there had
not been a jury determination of M.A.C.'s age."
Because this argument presents a question of law involving
§ 13-3821, our review is de novo. See State v.
Kuntz, 209 Ariz. 276, ¶ 5 (App. 2004); see also
State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, ¶ 7 (App. 2002).
Pursuant to § 13-3821(A):
A person who has been convicted of . . . a violation or
attempted violation of any of the following offenses . . .
within ten days after the conviction or adjudication or
within ten days after entering and remaining in any county of