United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable Roslyn O. Silver Senior United States District
Judge.
Lydia
Merck (“Plaintiff”) alleges she was inside the
cab of her parked semi-truck when Defendant Robert Gary
Parker (“Parker”), a truck driver employed by
Defendant Swift Transportation (“Swift”), crashed
into Plaintiff's truck, causing her to collide with her
closet and dragging her truck into nearby vehicles, thereby
causing injury to Plaintiff's back. (Doc. 1). The case is
set for a jury trial, and Plaintiff now moves in
limine to exclude Swift's biomechanical and accident
reconstruction expert, Joseph Manning
(“Manning”), from testifying at trial, and to
preclude Swift's other experts from referencing
Manning's opinions. (Doc. 179). In support, Plaintiff
argues Manning's “opinions are unreliable and
formed without proper foundation, and thus are contrary to
the requirements of F.R.E. 702, Daubert, and its
progeny, ” and also that Manning's opinions are
irrelevant and likely to confuse the jury. (Id.).
These arguments are addressed in turn.
First,
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 states that “[a] witness who is
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b)
the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.” Fed.R.Evid. 702.
Since Rule 702 only requires an expert's opinion to be
based on “sufficient” facts-not all facts-an
expert should not be struck simply because the opinion fails
to take account of every fact. In such circumstances, the
opposing party can impugn the expert's credibility on
cross-examination or through the presentation of contrary
evidence. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1993) (“Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.”); see also Kechi Twp. v.
Freightliner, LLC, 592 Fed.Appx. 657, 669 (10th Cir.
2014) (concluding that fire expert's failure to gather
certain relevant facts “did not render his opinion
unreliable under Rule 702” in light of other indicia of
reliability and expert's knowledge in the field, and that
any concerns regarding the expert's conclusions
“could easily have [been] expressed [ . . . ] through
cross-examination and closing argument”).
Here,
Plaintiff argues Manning is not qualified to testify as an
expert and draw certain conclusions regarding the accident
and its impact on the Plaintiff because Manning lacks
sufficient knowledge about the accident and how it injured
Plaintiff. For example, Plaintiff argues Manning “does
not know whether both [of Plaintiff's] feet were firmly
on the ground” at the time of the accident, “does
not know whether [Plaintiff] was bent at her torso or
standing erect” at the time of the accident,
“does not know how far [Plaintiff's] body was from
the closet prior to making contact with it, ” and
“did not calculate distances for the interior of the
cabin.” In addition, Plaintiff argues Manning cannot
conclude Plaintiff's pre-existing conditions did not
increase Plaintiff's likelihood of being injured from the
accident because, among other things, Manning does not know
Plaintiff's pre-collision medical status and has not
taken account of Plaintiff's preexisting asymptomatic
herniation or scoliosis.
Even if
true, Plaintiff's attempts to discredit Manning are not
sufficient to exclude him. Rather, they go to the weight not
the admissibility of the opinions. And this Court has
independently reviewed Manning's qualifications and his
detailed expert report, clearly establishing he is qualified
to testify on this topic. In addition, Plaintiff's
criticism of Manning's conclusions, and Plaintiff's
assertions that Manning's conclusions lack sufficient
factual support go to the credibility of Manning's
testimony, not its admissibility. That is because-even taking
these alleged omissions into account- Manning's opinion
was based upon sufficient facts. For example, although
Manning did not know whether, at the time of impact,
Plaintiff was standing erect or bent, or whether she had both
feet planted on the ground, Manning made an arguably credible
assumption that Plaintiff was standing erect with both feet
on the ground because Plaintiff stated she was standing when
the impact occurred. Indeed, if Manning's analysis with
regard to Plaintiff's body position is deficient, it is
not because Manning failed to account for information
provided by Plaintiff, but because Plaintiff failed to
provide accurate information in the first instance. Moreover,
regarding Plaintiff's distance from the closet and the
interior dimensions of Plaintiff's truck, Manning made a
reasonable assumption regarding these facts based upon his
knowledge of the layout and dimensions of this specific truck
model's interior cabin. In sum, Manning's opinions
are based on sufficient facts and reasoning to be admissible
pursuant to Rule 702. Plaintiff may question the validity of
his conclusions on cross-examination or in closing argument.
Finally,
Plaintiff argues Manning's opinions are irrelevant and
will confuse the jury. Evidence is relevant if it has any
tendency to make a fact of consequence in determining the
action more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. However, the court may still
exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of [ . . . ] confusing
the issues [or] misleading the jury.” Fed.R.Evid. 403.
Here,
Manning's opinion makes Plaintiffs injuries more or less
probable because it explains the nature of the forces
involved in the collision which allegedly injured Plaintiff
Thus, Manning's opinions are relevant. Further, that
Manning's opinions provide an alternate theory of the
injury, contradicting Plaintiffs narrative, will not confuse
the jury, but will aid them when considering the evidence.
Thus, Manning's opinions will not be excluded pursuant to
Rule 403.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED Plaintiffs Motion in
Limine to Exclude Defendant's Expert Joseph ...