United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable Steven P. Logan United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Linda Johnson (the “Plaintiff”) filed suit
against defendant Ahtna Technical Services Incorporated (the
“Defendant”) alleging violations of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”), the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “Rehabilitation
Act”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(the “Title VII”). (Doc. 1) The Defendant moved
to dismiss counts 2, 4 and 5 (the “Motion”) of
the Plaintiff's complaint for the claims related to the
Rehabilitation Act and Title VII. (Doc. 12) The Court's
ruling is as follows.
I.
Background
The
Plaintiff is a former employee of the Defendant, and she is
diabetic. (Doc. 1 at 2) The Plaintiff suffered certain
symptoms from diabetes that required her to have frequent
access to a restroom. (Doc. 1 at 3) The Plaintiff states that
she provided the Defendant with multiple doctor's notes
to make the Defendant aware of her need to be assigned to
tasks that gave her necessary access to the restroom. (Doc. 1
at 3) The Defendant did not oblige the Plaintiff's
requests and continued to assign her to tasks without regard
to her disability. (Doc. 1 at 5)
On
January 8, 2018, the Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit (the
“Complaint”) alleging violations of the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act and Title VII. (Doc. 1) On February 12,
2018, the Defendant filed the Motion seeking dismissal of
certain of the Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 12) The
Defendant initially sought to dismiss Counts 2, 4 and 5 of
the Complaint, with Counts 2 and 4 arising under the
Rehabilitation Act and Count 5 arising under Title VII. The
Defendant has withdrawn its Motion as to Count 5. (Doc. 20 at
1) Accordingly, the Court only addresses the Defendant's
Motion on Counts 2 and 4.
II.
Legal Standard
To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief” such that the
defendant is given “fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)). The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for two reasons:
(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, and (2) insufficient
facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri
v. Pacificia Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1990).
In
deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept as
true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact, and
construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ.
Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). In
comparison, “allegations that are merely conclusory,
unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences” are not entitled to the assumption of
truth, and “are insufficient to defeat a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id.;
In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th
Cir. 2010). A plaintiff need not prove the case on the
pleadings to survive a motion to dismiss. OSU Student
All. v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012).
III.
Analysis
The
Defendant moves to dismiss Counts 2 and 4 of the Complaint
arguing that the Plaintiff cannot bring any claims against
the Defendant under the Rehabilitation Act because the
Defendant does not receive “federal financial
assistance” as required by the Rehabilitation Act. The
Rehabilitation Act prevents discrimination on the basis of
disability by “any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service.” 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Defendant
argues that it does not receive any financial assistance from
the federal government, and, therefore, the Plaintiff cannot
establish the elements necessary to bring any claim against
the Defendant pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 12 at
4)
In
response, the Plaintiff concedes that the Defendant is not
receiving any direct financial assistance from the federal
government. (Doc. 14 at 6) Instead, the Plaintiff argues that
the Defendant's website states that the Defendant
participates in the U.S. Small Business Administration's
8(a) Business Development Program (the “SBA”),
and that the Defendant's participation in the SBA
constitutes an indirect federal benefit to the Defendant that
should qualify as federal financial assistance for the
purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 14 at 7-8) The
Defendant acknowledges past participation in the SBA, but
states that it discontinued its involvement in the program in
2010. (Doc. 20 at 2)
The
Court finds that the Defendant's involvement in the SBA
is not sufficient to subject the Defendant to the
Rehabilitation Act. While there is precedent to support the
argument that indirect financial assistance may subject a
party to the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court of the
United States has held that the financial federal assistance
portion of the Rehabilitation Act is intended to cover
“those who receive the aid, but does not extend as far
as those who benefit from it, ” drawing a line between
the recipients of federal financial assistance and those who
benefit economically from federal funds. Castle v.
Eurofresh, Inc., 2010 WL 797138, at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 8,
2010); Sharer v. Oregon, 581 F.3d 1176, 1181 (9th
Cir. 2009); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 467 (1999). The Court finds that
the Defendant's participation in the SBA, while entirely
speculative at this point and not addressed in the Complaint,
is insufficient to bring the Defendant under the umbrella of
the Rehabilitation Act. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs request
for discovery on the issue of whether the Defendant received
non-monetary assistance through the SBA is improper. The
purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to enable defendants to challenge
the legal sufficiency of complaints without subjecting
themselves to discovery. Castle, 2010 WL 797138 at 6
(citing Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery,
829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir.1987)).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 12) is granted as to Counts 2 ...