United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before
the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docs. 196, 197, [1]198, [2] 199[3]), Defendant Maricopa County's
Opposition (Docs. 200, 202[4]), Defendants Arpaio and Henderson's
Opposition (Docs. 201, 203[5]), and Plaintiffs' Reply (Docs. 204,
205[6]). For the reasons stated below,
Plaintiffs' motion is denied in its entirety.
I.
Background[7]
A.
Factual Background
Plaintiff
Bret Frimmel owns and operates Uncle Sam's restaurants
through Plaintiff Pishka, Inc. (Doc. 197 ¶¶ 1, 2;
Doc. 202 ¶¶ 1, 2; Doc. 203 ¶¶ 1, 2.) At
all times relevant to this action, Defendant Arpaio was the
Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona. (Doc. 197 ¶ 4; Doc.
202 ¶ 4; Doc. 203 ¶ 4.) At all times relevant to
this action, Defendant Henderson was a Maricopa County
Sheriffs Office (“MCSO”) deputy employed by
Maricopa County. (Doc. 197 ¶ 7; Doc. 202 ¶ 7; Doc.
203 ¶ 7.) At all times relevant to this action,
Henderson was assigned to the MCSO Criminal Employment Unit
(“CEU”). (Doc. 197 ¶ 8; Doc. 202 ¶ 8;
Doc. 203 ¶ 8.) Henderson was assigned as the lead
investigator of the alleged identity theft at the Uncle
Sam's restaurants. (Doc. 197 ¶ 13; Doc. 202 ¶
13; Doc. 203 ¶ 13.) Prior to working on the Uncle
Sam's case, Henderson had never drafted a search warrant
probable cause statement. (Doc. 197 ¶ 14; Doc. 202
¶ 14; Doc. 203 ¶ 14.) On July 16, 2013, Henderson
applied for and obtained three search warrants for two Uncle
Sam's restaurants and Frimmel's personal residence.
(Doc. 197 ¶ 18; Doc. 202 ¶ 18; Doc. 203 ¶ 18.)
Henderson provided probable cause affidavits to support those
applications. (Doc. 197 ¶ 19; Doc. 202 ¶ 19; Doc.
203 ¶ 19.)
On July
17, 2013, Henderson and other MCSO deputies executed the
search warrants at two Uncle Sam's restaurants and
Frimmel's personal residence. (Doc. 197 ¶ 31; Doc.
202 ¶ 31; Doc. 203 ¶ 31.) Following the raids, they
took nine subjects into custody on suspected identity theft
and forgery charges. (Doc. 197 ¶ 31; Doc. 202 ¶ 31;
Doc. 203 ¶ 31.) Henderson subsequently conducted
interviews with four cooperating witnesses. (Doc. 197 ¶
33; Doc. 202 ¶ 33; Doc. 203 ¶ 33.)
On
January 22, 2014, [8] Henderson and other MCSO deputies
arrested Frimmel on charges related to trafficking in
identify theft, identify theft, conspiracy, and forgery.
(Doc. 197 ¶ 47; Doc. 202 ¶ 47; Doc. 203 ¶ 47.)
When Frimmel was arrested, Henderson placed Frimmel in
handcuffs with his arms behind his back in an unnecessarily
rough manner that caused discomfort and injury in
Frimmel's right arm and shoulder. (Doc. 197 ¶¶
48, 52; Doc. 203 ¶¶ 48, 52.) Frimmel did not
display any hesitancy to follow Henderson's instructions
nor did he resist the arrest. (Doc. 197 ¶ 49; Doc. 203
¶ 49.) Frimmel told Henderson that the handcuffs were
causing him discomfort, were too tight, and asked him to
loosen the cuffs. (Doc. 197 ¶ 49; Doc. 203 ¶ 49.)
Henderson ignored his complaints. (Doc. 197 ¶ 50; Doc.
203 ¶ 50.) Frimmel was in handcuffs for more than an
hour and leaned forward in the police car to try to ease his
discomfort. (Doc. 197 ¶¶ 51, 53; Doc. 203
¶¶ 51, 53.) While he was restrained in the
handcuffs, Frimmel's right hand swelled and went numb.
(Doc. 197 ¶ 54; Doc. 203 ¶ 54.) Henderson remembers
arresting Frimmel but does not remember whether he handcuffed
Frimmel or if Frimmel complained of his discomfort. (Doc. 197
¶¶ 55, 57; Doc. 203 ¶¶ 55, 57.)
On
January 22, 2014, MCSO released a press release stating that
Frimmel was arrested on charges related to identity theft and
forgery. (Doc. 197 ¶ 68; Doc. 203 ¶ 68.) The press
release also stated that “detectives have questioned
several witnesses who claimed to have first-hand knowledge
that Norton and Frimmel colluded together to acquire false
identification documents in order to provide those IDs to
undocumented workers.” (Doc. 197 ¶ 69; Doc. 203
¶ 69.) Also on January 22, 2014, Arpaio stated in an
interview with Channel 10 news that Frimmel “was
knowingly hiring employees with fake social security
numbers.” (Doc. 197 ¶ 71; Doc. 203 ¶ 71.) In
another interview that day with Channel 3 news, Arpaio stated
that Frimmel “was arrested for providing stolen
ID's, mainly social security cards, to his
workers.” (Doc. 197 ¶ 73; Doc. 203 ¶ 73.)
On
February 7, 2014, a grand jury indicted Frimmel based on
Henderson's testimony. (Doc. 197 ¶ 78; Doc. 202
¶ 78; Doc. 203 ¶ 78.) On May 16, 2014, Frimmel
filed a motion for a Franks hearing in Maricopa
County Superior Court. (Doc. 197 ¶ 80; Doc. 202 ¶
80; Doc. 203 ¶ 80.) On April 15, 2015, the Superior
Court found that, based on numerous errors in the affidavits,
there was no probable cause to issue the search warrants and
voided them. (Doc. 197 ¶¶ 81-83; Doc. 202
¶¶ 81-83; Doc. 203 ¶¶ 81-83.) On April
23, 2015, all remaining charges against Frimmel were
dismissed. (Doc. 197 ¶ 85; Doc. 202 ¶ 85; Doc. 203
¶ 85.)
B.
Procedural History
On
January 20, 2015, Plaintiffs filed complaints in federal
court. (Doc. 1 of 2:15-cv-00087-SPL; Doc. 1 of
2:15-cv-00088-SRB.) On June 5, 2015, those cases were
consolidated under this Case No. 2:15-cv-00087-SPL. On June
19, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (the
“Complaint.”) (Doc. 25-1.) On January 19 and 20,
2017, the parties filed motions for full and partial summary
judgment. (Docs. 170, 173, 175.) On September 29, 2017, the
Court denied those motions with leave to re-file. (Doc. 195.)
On October 30, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their renewed motion
for summary judgment against Maricopa County, Arpaio, and
Henderson. (Doc. 196.) On November 29, 2017, Maricopa County
filed its response. (Doc. 200.) Also on November 29, 2017,
Arpaio and Henderson filed their response. (Doc. 201.) On
December 12, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their reply. (Doc. 204.)
II.
Standard of Review
A
court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Material facts are
those facts “that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute
of material fact arises if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id.
The
party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the court of the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record, together with
affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323. If the movant is able to do so, the burden then shifts
to the non-movant who “must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts, ” and, instead, must “come forward with
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
III.
Discussion
Plaintiffs
moved for summary judgment on the following claims: (1)
judicial deception violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Defendants Maricopa County, Arpaio, and
Henderson (Claims I, IV, V); (2) defamation against Maricopa
County and Arpaio (Claim IX); (3) grossly negligent restraint
against Henderson (Claim X); and (4) intentional infliction
of emotional distress (“IIED”) against Arpaio and
Henderson (Claim XI). (Doc. 196.)
A.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claims I, IV, and V)
1.
Judicial Deception/Illegal Search and Seizure/Malicious
Prosecution
The
Court cannot determine which bases Plaintiffs are relying
upon in regard to Claims I, IV, and V.[9] It appears that
Plaintiffs attempt to argue judicial deception under Claims
IV and V for their labeled “illegal search and seizure
claims” and malicious prosecution as to Claim I.
However, the separate causes of action under Section 1983,
the basis for those separate actions, and their elements are
lacking. (See Doc. 196 at 8.) These claims are
intertwined in Plaintiffs' motion, and the Court cannot
determine the appropriate standards and the requisite
elements in order to match the appropriate analysis and
argument. As such, the Court denies Plaintiffs' request
for summary judgment as to Claims I, IV, and V as to
Henderson, Arpaio, and Maricopa County. However, the Court
will address the narrow issue of whether Arpaio is the final
policymaker in the area of criminal law enforcement, which
includes the constitutional violations here.
2.
Municipal Liability
Plaintiffs
argue that Maricopa County is jointly liable for Arpaio's
share in liability under Monell on its Section 1983
claims. (Doc. 196 at 15.) Plaintiffs argue that Arpaio is the
final policymaker of Maricopa County in the context of
criminal law enforcement, which would encompass the alleged
violations in this action. (Doc. 196 at 15.) Maricopa County
argues that Arpaio is the final policymaker for the State and
not for Maricopa County. (Doc. 200 at 10.) Because the Court
is not determining liability as to Arpaio or Maricopa County
in this motion, see supra, this analysis is limited
to the determination of whether Arpaio is the final
policymaker for Maricopa County in the area of criminal law
enforcement, to include the areas of obtaining and executing
search and ...