United States District Court, D. Arizona
Darryl D. Johnson, Petitioner,
Charles L Ryan, et al., Respondents.
HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
S. WILLETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
before the Court is Darryl D. Johnson's
(“Petitioner”) “Petition Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus” (Doc. 1) (the
“Petition”). After reviewing the parties'
briefing (Docs. 1, 11, 15), the undersigned finds that
Petitioner's habeas claims are without merit. It is
therefore recommended that the Court dismiss the Petition
April 2012, a Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner
on (i) one count of illegally conducting an enterprise, a
class three felony; (ii) one count of attempted illegally
obtaining or procuring administration of narcotic drugs, a
class four felony; and (iii) one count of possession of a
dangerous drug for sale in an amount over the statutory
threshold, a class two felony. (Doc. 11-1 at 27). Following a
jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of
possession of a dangerous drug for sale in an amount over the
statutory threshold, a class two felony. (Id.). The
trial court sentenced Petitioner to an eight-year prison
term. (Id.). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed
Petitioner's conviction and sentence. (Id. at
his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a Notice of
Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Id. at
38-40). The trial court dismissed the PCR proceeding on March
7, 2016. (Id. at 17-22). Petitioner sought further
review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
trial court's ruling on October 19, 2017. (Id.
at 14). Petitioner did not seek further review by the Arizona
December 4, 2017, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas
proceeding (Doc. 1). Petitioner raises two claims for habeas
relief. Respondents do not assert that Petitioner's
habeas claims are unexhausted or procedurally defaulted.
However, as explained below, both claims are meritless.
reviewing the merits of a habeas claim, the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)
requires federal courts to defer to the last reasoned state
court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109,
1120 (9th Cir. 2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073,
1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state
prisoner must show that the state court's adjudication of
his or her claims either:
1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g.,
Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews,
132 S.Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011).
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly
established federal law” refers to the holdings of the
U.S. Supreme Court's decisions applicable at the time of
the relevant state court decision. Carey v.
Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v.
Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision
is “contrary to” such clearly established federal
law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in [U.S. Supreme
Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts
that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the
[U.S. Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result
different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.”
Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)).
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual
determinations by state courts are presumed correct unless
the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also
Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011). A
state court decision “based on a factual determination
will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively
unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the