Johnson v. Ryan

          HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

          EILEEN S. WILLETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         Pending before the Court is Darryl D. Johnson's (“Petitioner”) “Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus” (Doc. 1) (the “Petition”). After reviewing the parties' briefing (Docs. 1, 11, 15), the undersigned finds that Petitioner's habeas claims are without merit. It is therefore recommended that the Court dismiss the Petition with prejudice.

         I. BACKGROUND

         In April 2012, a Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on (i) one count of illegally conducting an enterprise, a class three felony; (ii) one count of attempted illegally obtaining or procuring administration of narcotic drugs, a class four felony; and (iii) one count of possession of a dangerous drug for sale in an amount over the statutory threshold, a class two felony. (Doc. 11-1 at 27). Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count of possession of a dangerous drug for sale in an amount over the statutory threshold, a class two felony. (Id.). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an eight-year prison term. (Id.). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. (Id. at 25-29).

         After his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”). (Id. at 38-40). The trial court dismissed the PCR proceeding on March 7, 2016. (Id. at 17-22). Petitioner sought further review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's ruling on October 19, 2017. (Id. at 14). Petitioner did not seek further review by the Arizona Supreme Court.

         On December 4, 2017, Petitioner initiated this federal habeas proceeding (Doc. 1). Petitioner raises two claims for habeas relief. Respondents do not assert that Petitioner's habeas claims are unexhausted or procedurally defaulted. However, as explained below, both claims are meritless.

         II. LEGAL STANDARDS

         In reviewing the merits of a habeas claim, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires federal courts to defer to the last reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's adjudication of his or her claims either:

1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011).

         As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” refers to the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions applicable at the time of the relevant state court decision. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Thaler v. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010). A state court decision is “contrary to” such clearly established federal law if the state court (i) “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [U.S. Supreme Court] cases” or (ii) “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [U.S. Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent.” Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)).

         As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct unless the petitioner can show by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011). A state court decision “based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court ...