United States District Court, D. Arizona
TO THE
HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
HONORABLE DEBORAH M. FINE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
On May
4, 2018, Petitioner Robert Dean Endreson
(“Petitioner” or “Endreson”), who is
confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence in
Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1)
(“Petition”). Respondents answered the Petition
(Doc. 8), and Petitioner replied (Doc. 9). This matter is
ripe for decision. This matter is on referral to the
undersigned pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local
Rules of Civil Procedure for further proceedings and a report
and recommendation. As set forth below, the undersigned
recommends that the Petition be denied and dismissed with
prejudice.
I.
Procedural History
A.
Conviction, sentence, appeal, PCR proceedings, and previous
habeas
Petitioner
was convicted in Maricopa County Superior Court, case numbers
CR- 54712 and CR-54669, of first-degree murders which both
took place on March 12, 1968.[1] Although Petitioner was initially
sentenced to death in each case, the Arizona Supreme Court
later reduced his sentences to life imprisonment pursuant to
Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972),
citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
See State v. Endreson, 506 P.2d at 254; Doc. 8-1,
Ex. A at 5, fn. 1; Doc. 8-1, Ex. B at 8-9. Petitioner asserts
that he was 20 years old at the time of the murders (Doc. 1
at 6), and this appears to be uncontested (Doc. 8-3 at 58;
Doc. 8 at 14).
Petitioner
filed a prior § 2254 Petition, CIV 96-00389-PHX-RCB,
involving both cases and arguing that the Arizona Supreme
Court had no authority to sentence him to life sentences
under A.R.S. §13-453 given that the death penalty
provision of that statute had been found unconstitutional
(Doc. 8-1, Ex. B at 4-11). Although the District Court denied
Petitioner relief on procedural grounds and went on to state
that the habeas claim “is wholly without merit, ”
the judgment states that the Petition was dismissed without
prejudice (Doc. 8-1, Ex. B at 10; Doc. 8-1, Ex. B at
7).[2]
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court
(Doc. 8-1, Ex. B at 14-15).
On
August 28, 2013, the state superior court sua sponte
appointed counsel and initiated a post-conviction proceeding
to address the effect of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460 (2012), on Endreson (Doc. 8-1, Ex. D at
17-19).[3] After briefing, the superior court
determined that Miller applied retroactively, but
denied relief for Endreson (Doc. 8-3, Ex. H at 24-30):
This Court appreciates that there was a time in the past that
the legal definition of a minor was a person under the age of
21 years and it was this definition that existed when
[Petitioner] was sentenced. That does not however, suggest
that a person [like Petitioner] who was above 18 and below 21
years of age at the time of the offense is entitled to the
same consideration of age as would apply to an offender under
the age of 18 years. The relied upon research was not based
upon legal definitions of adult versus juvenile status but
rather, was based upon under versus over the age of 18 years
of age at the time of the offense.
(Doc. 8-3, Ex. H at 29).
The
Arizona Court of Appeals granted review and denied relief,
agreeing with the superior court's holding and reasoning:
We grant review, but deny relief. Miller is a
significant change in the law and is retroactive.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___U.S.___, 136 S.Ct. 718,
736 (2016); State v. Valencia, 239 Ariz. 255, 259,
¶ 17 (App. 2016). Miller, however, has no
application to Endreson's case. Although Miller
does make frequent reference to “children” and
“juveniles, ” the Court ultimately held,
“We therefore hold that mandatory life without parole
for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crime
violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
‘cruel and unusual punishments.'”
Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (emphasis added). In other
words, Miller placed a constitutional limitation on
the states' authority to sentence offenders who committed
their offenses when they were under the age of 18, not
offenders who committed their offenses before they reached
the age of majority as that may be defined by each individual
state.
That the Supreme Court intended to draw the line at 18 years
of age in Miller is made clear by earlier decisions
that likewise established constitutional limitations on the
sentencing of juvenile offenders. In Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74-75 (2010), the Court held a
juvenile offender who did not commit homicide may not receive
a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. As in Miller, the Court in Graham
made frequent reference to “juvenile offenders”
in general, but drew a “clear line” to
differentiate between who is and who is not a “juvenile
offender.” Id. at 74. The Court expressly
held, “Because ‘[t]he age of 18 is the point
where society draws the line for many purposes between
childhood and adulthood,' those who were below that age
when the offense was committed may not be sentenced to life
without parole for a nonhomicide crime.” Id.
at 74-75 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
574 (2005)). In Roper, the Court held states could
not impose the death penalty for offenders it repeatedly
identified as “juvenile offenders under 18.” 543
U.S. at 568-74. Because Endreson was over 18 when he
committed his offense, the superior court correctly concluded
that Miller provides no basis for granting him
relief from his life sentence.
(Doc. 8-3, Ex. H at 57). The court of appeals also found that
the superior court's failure to hold an evidentiary
hearing was not a due process violation because the only
issues were legal issues, under Miller, and the
application of the law to undisputed facts; the court of
appeals also noted that the legal issue was adequately
briefed in the court of appeals briefing (Doc. 8-3, Ex. H. at
57-58).
The
Arizona Supreme Court denied review (Doc. 8-3, Ex. H at 74),
and the court of appeals issued the mandate on May 23, 2017
(Doc. 8-3, Ex. H at 76). Respondents acknowledge that the
Petition was timely filed (Doc. 8 at 4).
B.
This Petition
The
Petition names Charles Ryan as Respondent and the Arizona
Attorney General as an Additional Respondent. Petitioner
raises four grounds for relief.[4] Grounds One through Three are the
same; Petitioner asserts in each that he received an illegal
sentence, in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment, because he was a “juvenile by law”
and, therefore, his life-without-parole sentences violate
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016).
Petitioner argues that he ...