United States District Court, D. Arizona
DOUGLAS L. RAYES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
September 26, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in
part Defendants' motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. 128.) Specifically, the Court
granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Counts I,
II, III, and IV of Plaintiff's first amended complaint.
The Court also granted summary judgment on Count VII as to
Plaintiff's claim that Defendants failed to provide
relief from excess on-call coverage by hiring an additional
specialist, but denied summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
allegations that Defendants failed to: (1) hire an additional
physician specializing in pediatric nephrology, thereby
causing him to be unable to use his accrued paid time off
(“PTO”); (2) compensate for his unused PTO; (3)
pay his base salary during the ninety-day termination notice
period; and (4) pay him under Defendants' Physician
Incentive Plan for 2014. (Id. at 12-14.)
October 9, 2018, Defendants moved the Court to reconsider the
portion of its order denying summary judgment. On October 25,
2018, Plaintiff filed a response to the motion for
reconsideration. (Doc. 142.) For the reasons stated below,
Defendants' motion is granted.
for reconsideration are disfavored and should be granted only
in rare circumstances. Defenders of Wildlife v.
Browner, 909 F.Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Mere
disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis
for reconsideration. See Leong v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 689 F.Supp. 1572, 1573 (D. Haw. 1988).
“Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court
(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2)
committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly
unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in
controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty.
v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A
motion for reconsideration ordinarily will be denied
“absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new
facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to
its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv
7.2(g). Further, the motion must “point out with
specificity the matters that the movant believes were
overlooked or misapprehended by the Court, any new matters
being brought to the Court's attention for the first time
and the reasons they were not presented earlier, and any
specific modifications being sought in the Court's
argue that the Court committed clear error in finding that
Plaintiff's “breach of implied covenant claim is
untimely only if it was not brought within two-years after he
knew or reasonably should have known the underlying
facts.” (Doc. 128 at 12.) The Court agrees.
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing based solely on breach of an employment contract are
subject to a one-year limitations. See
Zenaty-Paulsen v. McLane/Sunwest, Inc., No.
99-CV-PHX-RCB, 2000 WL 33300666, at *19 (D. Ariz. March 20,
2000) (“Plaintiff's claim for breach of covenant
duplicates her claim for breach of employment contract, and
it is time-barred pursuant to the one-year statute of
limitations provided in A.R.S. § 12-541.”);
Day v. LSI Corp., 174 F.Supp.3d 1130, 1156 (D. Ariz.
2016) (“However, although a two year statute of
limitations applies to claims for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . because [the
employee's] claim is based on a contract theory, a one
year statute of limitations applies” under A.R.S.
§ 12-541), aff'd, 705 Fed.Appx. 539 (9th
Cir. 2017). Here, Plaintiff's implied covenant claim is
based on the same facts as his claim for breach of employment
contract. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 101-118.) Therefore, it is
subject a one-year statute of limitations.
Arizona applies the discovery rule, Plaintiff's breach of
implied covenant claim is timely only if it was brought
within one-year after he knew or reasonably should have known
the underlying facts. The Court, in a prior order (Doc. 36),
determined when Plaintiff knew or reasonably should have
known the underlying facts to each of his breach of implied
First, [Plaintiff's] claim that [Defendants] failed to
compensate him for excess on-call coverage accrued on July
30, 2014, the last date upon which [Defendants] would have
owed him compensation from excess on-call coverage. Second,
[Plaintiff's] claim that [Defendants] failed to
compensate him for unused PTO accrued, at the latest, by the
end of 2014, the last year in which [Plaintiff] could have
accrued PTO. Third, [Plaintiff's] claim that [Defendants]
failed to pay him his base salary during the ninety-day
termination notice period accrued no later than April 12,
2015, two weeks after his effective termination on March 29,
2015. Fourth, [Plaintiff] claims that [Defendants] failed to
pay his 2014 PIP incentive, but that breach occurred sometime
in April 2015, when [Defendants] paid PIP incentives to other
physicians but not to [Plaintiff].
four of these claims are untimely because Plaintiff filed his
complaint on June 14, 2016, more than one year after he knew
or reasonably should have known the underlying facts.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that
Defendants' motion for reconsideration (Doc. 131) is
IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon reconsideration,
Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 111) is
GRANTED in full. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of
Defendants and against Plaintiff on all claims and terminate